United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Michael A. Shipp United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Irene
Fiorello's ("Plaintiff'') Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"). (Pl.'s Appl.,
ECF No. 49.) Plaintiffs Application has been entered on
CM/ECF, but no Defendants have responded. The Court has carefully
considered Plaintiffs submission, and, pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 78.1, decides the matter without oral argument.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Application is
standards for reviewing an application for a TRO are the same
as those for a preliminary injunction. See. e.g., Winter
v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). "Preliminary
injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should be
granted only in limited circumstances. Kos Pharm., Inc.
v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This remedy
should be granted only if: (1) the plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable
harm to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not
result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) granting
the injunction is in the public interest. Hartmann v.
Maybee-Freud, 279 Fed.Appx. 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2008). The
burden is on the party seeking the TRO to "establish
every element in [her] favor, or the grant of a [TRO] is
inappropriate." P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations
the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504,
508 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing NutraSweet Co v. Vit-Mar
Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir.
Plaintiff does not explicitly address any of the
aforementioned factors. The Court construes Plaintiffs motion
liberally, however, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even
construing Plaintiffs motion liberally, Plaintiff fails to
establish that the denial of her Application will result in
emergent, irreparable harm or that Plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits.
Plaintiff fails to establish emergent, irreparable harm
because Plaintiff fails to provide any support, other than
her assertion in her Application, that a sheriffs sale is
scheduled to occur. Plaintiff seeks a stay of a sheriffs
sale, yet she does not provide the Court with any
documentation of the sheriffs sale.
the documentation that Plaintiff provides fails to establish
that she is likely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiff
provides the Court with a July 14, 2017 Order of Discharge
and correspondence from the Hon. Michael B. Kaplan, U.S.B.J.,
purportedly as "evidence the Defendants don't
necessarily have the right to take possession of Plaintiffs
property.'' (Pl's Appl. 1.) As those
documents make clear, however, Plaintiff was informed that a
bankruptcy discharge does not prevent a creditor from
pursuing an in rem mortgage foreclosure action on
Plaintiffs mortgaged property. (Bankruptcy Ct. Correspondence
1-2 (citing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78,
79 (1991)), ECF No. 49 at *8-9.)
Court finds that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate she is
entitled to a temporary restraining order. Accordingly, IT IS
on this 2nd day of December 2019, ORDERED
that Plaintiffs Motion for an Order to Show Cause (ECF No.
49) is DENIED.
 Plaintiff styles her motion as
"Emergent Motion for an Order to Show Cause to Stay the
Sheriffs Sale." Plaintiff seeks "the entry of an
Order directing Defendants to stay the Sheriffs Sale of
property located at 58 Heron Court, Manalapan, New
Jersey." (Pl.'s Appl. 1, ECF No. 49.) The Court
considers this motion as an application for a TRO.
 Defendants are Santander Bank, Ocwen
Loan Servicing LLC, IndyMac Bank, One West Bank, CIT Group
Inc., Deutsche Bank, MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., Federal Deposit
Insurance Company, and Intercontinental Exchange
 Plaintiff subsequently filed
correspondence purportedly from Adirondack Enterprises.
(See Correspondence 1, ECF No. 50.) Plaintiff
alleges Adirondack Enterprises possesses the "only valid
Promissory Note on Plaintiffs property," and that
Adirondack Enterprises '"objects' to the
Defendants' alleged claim against Plaintiffs
property." (Pl.'s Appl. 2.) The correspondence
states that Adirondack Enterprises was never "served
with any other document or legal notice in relation to the
Sheriffs Sale" but that it "understand[s] that
Deutsche Bank and [its] attorneys have scheduled a Sheriffs
sale without providing Notice to Adirondack
Enterprises." (Correspondence 1.) The correspondence
requests that the Court "cancel the Sheriffs sale"
because "Adirondack Enterprises is entitled to the
proceeds of the Sheriffs sale." (Id.) The
correspondence is unpersuasive because: (1) the letter is not
supported by a valid certification, indeed it is unclear
whether the signor, David Frank, is an attorney or principal
for Adirondack Enterprises; and (2) the letter further fails
to provide any documentation of the sheriffs sale, serving
only to document the lack of documentation.
 Page numbers preceded by an asterisk
refer to the page numbers on the ECF header of Plaintiff s
 The Court notes that Plaintiff appears
to use her Application as an opportunity to litigate her
pending Motion to Produce the Note seeking to compel
Defendants to produce her original mortgage note.
(See Pl.'s Appl. 1 ("The sale must be
stayed until the Defendants produce the ORIGINAL ink-signed
IndyMac Bank Promissory Note to the Court...."); Mot. to
Produce the Note, ECF No. 27.) The Court also notes that
Defendants CIT Group Inc. and One West Bank raise issues of
the Court's jurisdiction, arguing that the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes the Court's
review of Plaintiffs Complaint because it seeks review of a
state-court judgment. (See Mot. ...