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Gray v. Hagner

United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage

October 10, 2019

AARON ANTHONY GRAY, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. HAGNER, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER [DKT. NO. 1]

          RENÉE MARIE BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Aaron Anthony Gray's filing of a pro se Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] against Michael J. Hagner, Robert W. Bell, Lori Batten, Kaitlyn Compari, Cory Ferguson, Camden County Corrections, the Voorhees Township Police Department, the Municipality of Voorhees, the State of New Jersey, the Camden County Prosecutor's Office, and McDonald's (collectively, “Defendants”). In the pro se Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to assert causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights through false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed an application for permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)[Dkt. No. 1-1].

         For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's IFP Application will be GRANTED, and the Court will order the Clerk of the Court to open this matter and file the pro se Complaint on the docket. However, because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court is required to screen his Complaint for sua sponte dismissal and finds that it should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

         I. IFP APPLICATION

         When a non-prisoner files an IFP Application, seeking permission to file a civil complaint without the prepayment of fees, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the applicant is required to submit an affidavit that sets forth his or her assets and attests to the applicant's inability to pay the requisite fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Roy v. Penn. Nat'l Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4104979, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2014) (internal citations omitted). The decision whether to grant or to deny the application should be based upon the economic eligibility of the applicant, as demonstrated by the affidavit. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976). Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that he lacks the financial ability to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff's IFP Application.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

         Once an IFP Application has been granted, the Court is required to screen the Complaint and dismiss the action sua sponte “if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013). Indeed, the Court must dismiss any claim, prior to service, that fails to state a claim under which relief may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and/or dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain:

(1) [A] short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) [A] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) [A] demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

         To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In screening a complaint to verify whether it meets these standards, however, this Court is mindful of the requirement that pro se pleadings must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520- 21(1972).

         A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the former § 1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one. Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir.1995). A determination of “maliciousness” requires a subjective inquiry into the litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure, or harass the defendant. Id. at 1086. Examples of malicious claims can include those that “duplicate ... allegations of another ...federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff.” Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993).

         III. ...


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