United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MCNULTY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the court are two motions to dismiss the Amended
Complaint ("AC", DE 20) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The first (DE 25) is brought on behalf
of defendants the City of Newark, Newark Municipal Jail, and
Mayor Ras J. Baraka (collectively, the "City"). The
second (DE 28) is brought on behalf of the County of Essex,
Essex County Jail, and County Executive Joseph N. DiVincenzo,
(collectively, the "County").
Judge Linares, to whom the case was previously assigned,
granted die defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint
in its original form, without prejudice to amendment. (DE 18,
19) The plaintiff, Anthony Brown, through counsel, then filed
the Amended Complaint. (DE 20) Thereafter, on May 20, 2019,
the current motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint were
filed. Upon Judge Linares's retirement, the case was
reassigned to me. (DE 30) Because over three months had
passed without counsel having filed any opposition to the
motions to dismiss, on September 10, 2019, I filed an Order
to Show Cause requiring the plaintiff to file an opposition
within 21 days with a motion to file out of time, with a
warning that if he did not do so, the motions to dismiss
might be treated as unopposed and granted. (DE 31) The
deadline set in the Order to Show Cause has come and gone. I
will therefore decide the motions based on the submissions
that are before me.
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
allegations of the Amended Complaint, taken as true for
purposes of this motion only, are as follows.
Brown was arrested and confined in jail cells for a total of
approximately three days, until his release on June 2, 2016.
Initially hek was placed in the Newark Municipal Jail, but
was transferred at some point to the Essex County Jail. (AC
¶¶ 1, 4)
confined, Mr. Brown "made request for treatment to the
officers on duty to see the medical staff because of the pain
and suffering experienced from staying in the cell and the
bedding conditions." (AC ¶ 2) The officers,
however, "refused to grant him a visit to the
infirmary." (AC ¶ 3) The officers thus
"deprived the plaintiff of health treatment and
exhibited a deliberate indifference by the plaintiff not
being treated." (AC ¶ 5) "The deprivation
caused the plaintiff to suffer and experiencing marital and
social discord by not being treated in a timely manner
experienced pain and suffering and unsightly markings about
his body. Plaintiff was in extreme discomfort and was refused
treatment." (AC ¶ 6)
Amended Complaint asserts two counts under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Count 1 alleges that the City is liable for the alleged
conduct because of a policy or practice whereby it failed to
train the officers properly. Count 2 alleges that the County
is similarly liable.
12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides for the dismissal of a
complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The defendant, as die moving party, bears the
burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Animal
Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654
F.3d 462, 469 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a
motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are
accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
favor of the plaintiff. New Jersey Carpenters & the
Trustees Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of New Jersey,
760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).
Rule of Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint
contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his
'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, die
complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to
raise a plaintiffs right to relief above a speculative level,
so that a claim is "plausible on its face."
Id. at 570; see also West Run Student Housing
Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169
(3d Cir. 2013). That facial-plausibility standard is met
"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw die reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While *[t]he plausibility
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement'.
. . it asks for more than a sheer possibility."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
interpret these claims as Fourteenth Amendment claims of
deliberate indifference to a detainee's serious medical
needs. The standard, which is at least as high as the Eighth
Amendment standard that applies to convicted defendants, is
To demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation, [die inmate]
must show "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs." Estelle v. Gamble,429 U.S. 97, 106, 97
S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). We have interpreted this to
mean that there are two prongs to the inquiry: (1) deliberate
indifference on die part of prison officials; and (2) the
prisoner's medical needs are serious. Monmouth County
Corr. Inst. Inmates ...