United States District Court, D. New Jersey
RENÉE MARIE BUMB United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on Thomas Reyes'
(“Petitioner”) petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). Respondent Federal
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) opposes the petition.
(ECF No. 4).
was released from BOP custody on July 19, 2019. (ECF No. 16).
For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses the
petition as moot.
26, 2017, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in this
Court challenging a disciplinary proceeding at FCI Fairton,
New Jersey that found him guilty of possessing narcotics.
(ECF No. 1). The BOP submitted an answer to the petition in
opposition. (ECF No. 4).
reviewing the administrative record, the Court ordered the
BOP to supplement its answer with further documentation
regarding the reason video footage of the Special Housing
Unit (“SHU”) corridors was unavailable during
Petitioner's disciplinary hearing. (ECF Nos. 10 &
14). The BOP provided two supplements, (ECF Nos. 12 &
16), and Petitioner submitted a response, (ECF No. 15).
BOP's second supplement indicated that Petitioner's
release date was July 19, 2019. (ECF No. 16). The BOP's
Inmate Locator confirms that Petitioner was released from
custody on that date. Inmate Locator, available at
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/# (last visited September 9,
Article III of the Constitution, a federal court may
adjudicate ‘only actual, ongoing cases or
controversies.'” Burkey v. Marberry, 556
F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). The
“case or controversy” requirement continues
through all stages of federal judicial proceedings and
requires that parties have a personal stake in the outcome.
Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (citing Lewis, 494
U.S. at 477-78). For there to remain a case or controversy,
there must be a likelihood that the petitioner's injury
would be redressed by a District Court's grant of his
habeas corpus petition. Id. at 150.
has been released from BOP custody, presumably onto the
supervised release portion of his sentence. (See ECF
No. 4-1 at 5). The remedy in a § 2241 petition
challenging a disciplinary proceeding would be to remand to
the BOP to conduct a new disciplinary hearing. See Bridge
v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97, 105 (3d Cir.
1992) (“[T]he appropriate judicial remedy when an
agency exceeds its discretion is a remand to the agency for
further proceedings consistent with the court's
opinion.”) (citing Federal Power Comm. v. Idaho
Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952)); Mitts v.
Zickefoose, 869 F.Supp.2d 568, 575 (D.N.J. 2012)
(“If a federal court sitting in habeas review finds
that the constitutional safeguards . . . of due process, have
been violated, the sole remedy that court could offer is a
curative hearing.”); Cannon v. Schultz, No.
08-4514, 2010 WL 2539387, at *6 (D.N.J. June 16, 2010)
(“[E]ven if a federal court determines that an
inmate's due process rights were violated during an
administrative hearing, the federal court does not conduct
its own ‘trial' superceding a defective
administrative proceeding: in such case, the proper remedy is
a curative administrative hearing conducted in accordance
with due process requirements.”). However, the Court
cannot order the BOP to conduct a new hearing in this matter
because Petitioner has completed his period of incarceration
and is no longer in BOP custody.
Burkey, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that a § 2241 petition
challenging a prison disciplinary hearing was moot after the
petitioner was released from BOP custody onto supervised
release. 556 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2009). The court reasoned that
petitioner's sentence had expired and that delayed
commencement of a “validly imposed term of supervised
release” is insufficient to be a “continuing
injury” to avoid mootness after release from BOP
custody. Id. at 148. As Petitioner challenges only
the actions of the BOP in his prison disciplinary hearing,
there is no live case or controversy following
Petitioner's release from prison.
Court will therefore dismiss the petition as moot. III.
CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the petition is