United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Norman, Plaintiff Pro Se
E. Walters, Esquire Office of Camden County Counsel Attorney
L. HILLMAN U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary
judgment (“the Motion”) of defendants, Warden
David Owens and Captain Carla Taylor (collectively,
“Defendants”) of the Camden County Correctional
Facility (“CCCF”) . (D.E. 23.) The Motion is
being considered on the papers pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for
summary judgment will be granted.
was a pretrial detainee at CCCF during the period January 3,
2014 through approximately January 2016. (D.E. 1 at 4; D.E.
22-1 at 5; D.E. 22-9 at ¶4.) He is proceeding pro se
with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint
(“the Complaint”) against the Defendants
regarding the conditions of confinement during
Plaintiff's incarceration at CCCF. (D.E. 1.)
alleges that he “was made to sleep on a thin mat on the
floor, ” and that CCCF had “poor air quality
[with] dust and dirt build-up in the cell which turned into
bacteria.” (D.E. 1 at 5.) He claims that he “was
subjected to drinking dirty brown water” at CCCF.
(Id. at 4.) He also contends that he brought the
water situation to Defendants' attention, but that they
“failed to correct the problem or find an alternative
states that the alleged conditions of confinement caused him
to suffer an infected scalp, a rash, headaches, dizziness,
and dehydration. (Id. at 5-6.)
seeks $50, 000 in damages for “pain[, ] suffering[, ]
mental anguish[, ] and physical discomfort.”
(Id. at 6.) He also asks that the Court: order water
testing at CCCF; and compel CCCF to hire a full-time
population control manager. (Ibid.)
March 17, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff's IFP
Application and directed the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint. (D.E. 2.) After screening Plaintiff's
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A, the Court ordered that the Complaint's Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendants
be allowed to proceed. (D.E. 4; D.E. 5.)
filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on December 19,
2017. (D.E. 15.) On January 30, 2018, Magistrate Judge Ann
Marie Donio issued a scheduling order requiring that all
pretrial factual discovery be concluded by June 29, 2018.
(D.E. 18.) Defendants served Plaintiff with their: (1)
January 30, 2018 Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 Disclosures (D.E. 22-5 at
2-29); (2) February 14, 2018 document requests (D.E. 22-6 at
2 and 11-14); and (3) February 14, 2018 interrogatories.
(D.E. 22-6 at 2-10.) Defendants' Motion states that
Plaintiff has not served them with any discovery responses or
disclosures. (D.E. 22-1 at 6-7.)
November 13, 2018, Defendants filed the motion for summary
judgment now pending before the Court. (D.E. 22.) On December
6, 2018, Plaintiff made an oral request for extension of time
to oppose the Motion. (D.E. 24.) The Court extended
Plaintiff's deadline until December 17, 2018.
(Ibid.) On December 18, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a
written request for further extension of time to file
opposition to the Motion. (D.E. 25.) The Court once again
extended Plaintiff's deadline, this time until April 17,
2019. (D.E. 29.) As of the date of this Opinion, Plaintiff
has not filed opposition to the Motion.
move for summary judgment on three grounds: (1)
Plaintiff's failure to adduce evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could find unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at CCCF (D.E. 22-1 at 8-12); (2) the
Complaint's mootness, in light of the Sixth and Amended
Final Consent Decree in the class action Dittimus-Bey, et
al. v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, et al., Docket No.
05-cv-0063 (D.N.J.) (“Dittimus-Bey”)
(D.E. 22-1 at 14-15); and (3) Defendants' entitlement to
qualified immunity, based on Plaintiff's failure to show
that Defendants were aware of purported risk of serious harm
or that they individually participated or acquiesced in the
alleged wrongs. (D.E. 22-1 at 13-14.)
Court finds that: for the reasons discussed in Part IV, the
mootness doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff's claims
for monetary relief; but for the reasons discussed in Part V,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment by virtue of the
lack of a genuine dispute of material fact. Given that
summary judgment is proper, there being no ...