United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MICHAEL A. SHIPP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Tesla,
Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss pro se
Plaintiffs Rajinder Madan and Niru Madan's (collectively,
"Plaintiffs") Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiffs opposed (ECF
No. 9), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 10). The Court has
carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides
the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule
78.1. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is granted.
brevity and clarity, the Court provides Plaintiffs'
allegations in the Complaint verbatim, as best as the Court
can interpret Plaintiffs' handwriting. Plaintiffs allege:
Rajinder Madan was driving Tesla (Model S 2016) on October
30th 2016 in Warren[, ] ¶ 07059. [Rajinder Madan] was
driving into the driveway of his friend's house [at] 8
Conifer Dr., Warren [, ] ¶ 07059 and applied the brake.
Tesla speeded and flew 30 feet in the air and landed on the
car's roof injuring [Rajinder Madan] & spouse [Niru
Madan]. [Plaintiffs] [e]nded up [at] Morris General Hospital
with injuries. [Niru Madan] had broken [five] ribs &
Rajinder [Madan] had injury to the left leg.
(Notice of Removal, Ex. A ("Complaint"), ECF No.
1-1.) Moreover, the Complaint states:
The harm that occurred as a result of [Defendant's acts
include[s]: [(1)] Niru Madan had five fractures in the ribs
due to the accident on 10/30/2016 & taken to Morristown
General Hospital[.] Monetary issues still not resolved
fully[;] [(2)] Rajinder Madan had injury to the left leg
[which] still hurts occasionally!.] Monetary issues still not
resolved fully[;] [(3)] Tesla car Model S 2016 to be replaced
by the [D]efendant  or monetary compensation.
¶ 3.) On or about October 3, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a
Complaint against Defendant in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Somerset County, Law Division seeking monetary
compensation or replacement of their vehicle. (Compl.
¶¶ 1-3.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant removed this
action to this Court and filed the instant motion, arguing
the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. (Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 3.)
8(a)(2) "requires only 'a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief
in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). "[A]
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citation omitted). "In determining the
sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful
to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff."
Itiowe v. United States Gov't, No. 14-6342, 2015
WL 12911734, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2015),
ajf'd, 650 Fed.Appx. 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2016);
see also Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Nevertheless,
"a [pro se] litigant is not absolved from complying with
Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely
because [he or she] proceeds pro se." Camp v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-2463, 2017 WL 3429344, at *2
(D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2017) (quoting Thakar v. Tan, 372
Fed.Appx. 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010)).
pleadings must "set forth sufficient information to
outline the elements of [a] claim or to permit inferences to
be drawn that these elements exist." Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, I F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993); see
also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245
(3d Cir. 2013) ("[P]ro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim."). The Court, however, need not credit a pro se
plaintiffs "bald assertions" or "legal
conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merlon Sch. Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint because the Complaint fails to "identify a
single cause of action against Tesla or state facts and
allegations from which any colorable cause of action could be
reasonably ascertained." (Def.'s Moving Br. 1, ECF
No. 4.) Defendant, therefore, maintains that Plaintiffs'
Complaint fails to provide Defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. (Id.
at 4.) Plaintiffs oppose, stating that they wish to
"continue with the case." (PL's Correspondence
1, ECF No. 9.)
Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to
articulate any legal theory under which Defendant could be
held liable. For example, Plaintiffs do not allege any
specific defects in their car nor do they allege that
Defendant breached any contractual duties. The only
allegations the Court can discern are that an accident
involving a car Defendant manufactured occurred, and
Plaintiffs were injured. Plaintiffs fail to explain why they
believe Defendant is liable for their alleged injuries. The
Complaint, accordingly, fails to give Defendant fair notice
of what claim or claims Plaintiffs are bringing. See
Pushkin v. Nitssbawn, 2014 WL 4543069, at *6 (D.N.J.
2014) (explaining ...