United States District Court, D. New Jersey
LETTER ORDER
MADELINE COX ARLEO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dear
Litigants:
Before
me is Plaintiff Sarah Deriphonse's
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Default Judgment against
Defendants Maplewood Diner and George Filippatos
(“Filippatos, ” or, together with Maplewood
Diner, “Defendants”). ECF No. 9. On February 27,
2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) against Maplewood Diner and
violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”) against both Defendants. ECF No. 1. The
docket indicates that both Defendants were served on April
13, 2018. See ECF No. 5. As of the date of this
Order, neither defendant has filed an answer or otherwise
responded to the Complaint. Plaintiff moved for entry of
default judgment on November 9, 2018. ECF No. 9.
Before
entering a default judgment, a court must determine whether
it has jurisdiction over the parties and the action, whether
the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of
action, and whether the plaintiff has proved damages. See
Chanel v. Gordashevsky, 558 F.Supp.2d 532, 536, 538
(D.N.J. 2008); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Nat'l Metals & Minerals Import & Export
Corp., 596 F.Supp.2d 842, 848 (D.N.J. 2008).
Plaintiff
alleges claims for constructive discharge based on her
October 2016 separation, wrongful termination based on her
December 2016 separation, and hostile work environment
against Maplewood Diner under Title VII.[1] Plaintiff also
alleges the same three claims against both Defendants under
the NJLAD. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because
the action presents a federal question under Title VII, which
arises from the same nucleus of operative facts as the NJLAD
claims. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over both
defendants, as they are both domiciled in the State of New
Jersey.
To
establish a claim for employment discrimination in connection
with a termination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish: (1) that she belongs to a protected class; (2)
that she was qualified for the position she sought to retain;
(3) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action;
and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
See Titus-Morris v. Banc of Am. Card Servicing
Corp., 512 Fed.Appx. 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
elements of discriminatory termination claim under Title
VII); Arenas v. L'Oreal USA Products, Inc., 790
F.Supp.2d 230, 237 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting elements of
discriminatory termination claim under NJLAD). Plaintiff is a
female, Compl. ¶ 12, [2] and during her employment with the
Maplewood Diner, she was subjected to gender-based derogatory
gestures, comments, and advances “on a constant basis,
” including but not limited to Defendant Filippatos
requesting sexual favors from Plaintiff and prohibiting
Plaintiff's boyfriend from picking her up from work,
Compl. ¶ 15. Filippatos “would consistently
touch/grab Plaintiff's butt and breasts.”
Id. ¶ 15. Filippatos also made
“derogatory comments about Plaintiff's gender,
including but not limited to calling Plaintiff a
‘b**ch' on multiple occasions and telling others
not to speak to her because she was a ‘single mom who
[was] not even in school.'” Id. ¶ 17.
Plaintiff complained about and rejected Filippatos's
crude behavior, but the advances and comments persisted
despite her objections. See id. ¶¶ 18-20.
Plaintiff left her position with the Maplewood Diner in
October 2016 because of Filippatos's behavior toward her.
Id. ¶ 21. In December 2016, Plaintiff returned
to Maplewood Diner after Filippatos apologized for his
behavior and “promised Plaintiff that things would be
better if she returned.” Id. ¶ 21.
Plaintiff was terminated by Filippatos in March 2017.
Id. ¶ 23. On the date of her termination,
Filippatos “yelled and screamed” at Plaintiff: he
called her a “f***ing b***h” and used a series of
other expletives when he terminated her employment.
Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff was given no other reason
for her termination. Id. ¶ 26. Based on these
facts, Plaintiff has sufficiently established a claim for
wrongful termination under Title VII and the NJLAD.
In
order to establish a claim for constructive discharge, a
plaintiff must plead facts to demonstrate that “the
employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in
employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to
them would resign.” See Brown v. Kessler Inst. For
Rehab., Inc., 504 Fed.Appx. 83, 85 (3d Cir. 2012)
(noting standard for Title VII constructive discharge claim);
Nuness v. Simon and Schuster, Inc., 221 F.Supp.3d
596, 604 (D.N.J. 2016) (noting standard for NJLAD
constructive discharge claim). Based on the allegations
discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled constructive
discharge in connection with her October 2016 separation.
A Title
VII claim for a hostile work environment requires a plaintiff
to show: (1) that she suffered intentional discrimination
because of her sex; (2) that the discrimination was pervasive
and regular; (3) that the discrimination detrimentally
affected her; (4) that the discrimination would detrimentally
affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position;
and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Hargrave v. County of Atlantic, 262 F.Supp.2d 393,
411 (D.N.J. 2003). A hostile work environment claim under the
NJLAD requires a plaintiff to establish the first four
factors of the Title VII test. See id., 262
F.Supp.2d at 410-11 n.7 (“[T]he elements of an
actionable hostile work environment claim under the NJLAD
closely resemble the first four elements of [a] Title VII
hostile work environment claim.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Based on the allegations discussed above,
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled hostile work environment
claims under Title VII and the NJLAD.
A
plaintiff with a successful claim for employment
discrimination under Title VII or the NJLAD may be entitled
to remedies including equitable relief such as back pay,
compensatory and punitive damages, and reasonable
attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.; N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. Plaintiff's Complaint
requests the following relief: (1) that Defendants
“promulgate and adhere to a policy prohibiting sexual
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation”; (2)
compensation and reimbursement for “any and all pay and
benefits Plaintiff would have received had it not been for
Defendants' illegal actions, including but not limited to
back pay, front pay, salary, pay increases, bonuses,
insurance, and benefits”; (3) compensatory damages
including a monetary award for pain and suffering; (4)
punitive damages; (5) costs of suit and reasonable
attorney's fees. Compl. at pp. 10-11, ECF No. 1.
Although
facts in a complaint are treated as conceded for the purpose
of a default judgment motion, a plaintiff must still prove
that she is entitled to the damages she seeks. See
Polidoro v. Saluti, 675 Fed.Appx. 189, 190 (3d Cir.
2017). Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment fails to
quantify or support her damages demand. Instead, Plaintiff
concludes that her damages “cannot be made certain by
computation of the clerk” and requests an appropriate
damages hearing. The Court agrees that a hearing is
warranted. For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's
Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 9, is
GRANTED. The matter is referred to
Magistrate Judge Hammer for an evidentiary hearing to
establish the amount of damages to be awarded in connection
with the entry of default judgment.
SO
ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] Plaintiff alleges that she has
properly exhausted her administrative remedies. Compl. ...