United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PETER
G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
This
matter comes before the Court on two motions to dismiss
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. This case emanates from
the death of Jaquan Williams in the intensive care unit of a
hospital after a physical altercation with another inmate in
his jail cell. Plaintiff, Patricia Belin, is the
administratrix of Williams' estate. The motions to
dismiss are brought by the County of Somerset (ECF No. 38)
and the five supervising Defendants: Warden Charles
O'Neill, Deputy Warden Roger Delin, The Estate of Chief
Gary Hoats, Captain John Quinn and Sheriff Frank J.
Provenzano. (ECF No. 37).
The
Second Amended Complaint (SAC) sets forth seven separate
causes of action. They are: (1) failure to protect (Count I);
(2) failure to provide medical care (Count II); (3) failure
to train/supervisory liability (Counts III, VIII, IX); (4)
wrongful death (Counts IV, X); (5) conspiracy to interfere
with civil rights (Count V); (6) violations of civil rights
under the New Jersey Constitution (Counts VI, XI); and (7)
negligence (Counts VII, XII). (ECF No.. 32). The Court has
subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I.
On
January 11, 2017, the incident giving rise to this case
occurred. Williams was having difficulty breathing and a
"Code White" issued. (Id. at ¶ 43).
Approximately ten minutes later, the Somerville Rescue Squad
and the Mobile Intensive Care Unit arrived. (Id. at
¶ 45-46). Williams was transported to Robert Wood
Johnson University Hospital, where he went into cardiac
arrest. Williams was pronounced dead at 9:45 p.m.
(Id. at ¶ 47-51).
Plaintiff
alleges that Williams' death was caused by an altercation
between Williams and another inmate, James Kyser. The SAC
alleges that two unidentified inmates observed the incident.
One witness "observed Kyser throwing [Williams] around
in his cell, and could hear the thud . . . of Williams'
body hitting metal inside the cell." (Id. at
¶ 77). The SAC alleges the fight lasted about twenty
minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 74, 75). The official
incident report indicated that the two inmates who witnessed
the altercation stated that Williams initiated the fight.
(Id. at ¶ 55).
After
the altercation ended, two inmates pushed an intercom button
to alert corrections officers (CO) about Williams'
injuries. Upon arrival, the COs entered the pod, and one CO
allegedly looked into Williams' cell and then "kept
it moving" without tending to Williams' injuries.
(Id. at ¶¶ 68, 81). About one hour later,
another inmate walked by the cell, saw Williams, and called
the COs. (Id. at ¶ 82).
The SAC
alleges there were prior incidences or notices that the
supervisory defendants had knowledge that Williams'
health and safety were at risk within the corrections
institution. Most notably, the SAC alleges that on or about
ten separate times, Williams was noted to be a
"confirmed gang member" by institution officials,
and as such, his safety was at risk. (SAC ¶¶ 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 32, 33, and 35).
In
addition, the SAC alleges two other prior incidents giving
corrections officials notice that Williams was a safety risk.
In one prior confinement, Williams was not identified as a
gang member by County officials, and when Williams was moved
to a new cell, Williams was harassed by another inmate,
causing Williams to lodge a complaint against the other
inmate. (SAC ¶ 12-19).
During
another period of incarceration, a CO, responding to a call
by Williams, found him with lacerations on his face. Williams
claims that he had fallen out of bed, but he later admitted
that he had been in a fight. (Id. at ¶¶
22, 27). As a result, Williams was charged with several
violations of prison rules relating to the fight.
The SAC
alleged that the "Somerset County jail had policies and
practices" for video surveillance of the pods (SAC
¶ 129), and to provide the inmate with ... medical
attention. (SAC ¶ 130); however, supervisory employees
"were deliberately indifferent to the obvious
consequences... that directly caused constitutional harm to
decedent." (SAC ¶ 137). Despite these allegations,
there are no facts alleging that any of the supervisory
defendants knew that Williams was in jail or involved in a
fight.
II.
On a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court is required to accept as
true all allegations in the Complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d
1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994). "To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a court will
accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of
the motion, it will not accept bald assertions, unsupported
conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Morse v.
Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997). A complaint should be dismissed only if the
well-pleaded alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a
claim. See In re Warfarin Sodium, 214 F.3d 395,
397-98 (3d Cir. 2000).
In
reviewing a motion to dismiss, there is a three part test:
"(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2)
reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and
then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the
complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements
identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently
alleged." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563
(3d Cir. 2011).
Within
the SAC, there are a number of conclusory statements, which
focus on the supervisory employees bringing this motion, and
Somerset County. More specifically, they are:
118. Defendants, Charles O'Neill; Roger Delin; Gary
Hoats; John Quinn; Frank J. Provenzano, Sr.; and John Doe
Correctional Officers 1-10 knew or should have known that
Decedent was subjected to a malicious beating as made evident
by reports of Decedent being heard hitting metal inside of
his cell, asking for help, and gasping for air by fellow
inmates.
119. Defendants, Charles O'Neill; Roger Delin; Gary
Hoats; John Quinn; Frank J. Provenzano, Sr.; and John Doe
Correctional Officers 1-10 knew or should have known that
Decedent required medical treatment when a correctional
officer came to the pod directly after the fight to see what
was happening.
120. Defendants, Charles O'Neill; Roger Delin; Gary
Hoats; John Quinn; Frank J. Provenzano, Sr.; and John Doe
Correctional Officers 1-10 knew that Decedent required
immediate medical treatment, and intentionally refused to
provide it to him, as made evident by a correctional officer
doing rounds and not taking action to check on Decedent's
condition and seeking treatment for Decedent.
121. Defendants, Charles O'Neill; Roger Delin; Gary
Hoats; John Quinn; Frank J. Provenzano, Sr.; and John Doe
Correctional Officers 1-10 delayed Decedent from receiving
necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons, as made
evident by at least approximately one hour ...