EDWARD G. McDONOUGH, PETITIONER
v.
YOUEL SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SPECIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, NEW YORK, AKA TREY SMITH
Argued
April 17, 2019
ON
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Petitioner
Edward McDonough processed ballots as a commissioner of the
county board of elections in a primary election in Troy, New
York. Respondent Youel Smith was specially appointed to
investigate and to prosecute a case of forged absentee
ballots in that election. McDonough became his primary
target. McDonough alleges that Smith fabricated evidence
against him and used it to secure a grand jury indictment.
Smith then brought the case to trial and presented allegedly
fabricated testimony. That trial ended in a mistrial. Smith
again elicited allegedly fabricated evidence in a second
trial, which ended on December 21, 2012, with McDonough's
acquittal on all charges. On December 18, 2015, McDonough
sued Smith under 42 U.S.C. §1983, asserting, as relevant
here, a claim for fabrication of evidence. The District Court
dismissed the claim as untimely, and the Second Circuit
affirmed. The court held that the 3-year limitations period
began to run "when (1) McDonough learned that the
evidence was false and was used against him during the
criminal proceedings; and (2) he suffered a loss of liberty
as a result of that evidence," 898 F.3d 259, 265. Thus,
the court concluded, McDonough's claim was untimely,
because those events undisputedly had occurred by the time
McDonough was arrested and stood trial.
Held:
The statute of limitations for McDonough's §1983
fabricated-evidence claim began to run when the criminal
proceedings against him terminated in his favor-that is, when
he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. Pp. 3-15.
(a) The time at which a §1983 claim accrues "is a
question of federal law," "conforming in general to
common-law tort principles," and is presumptively-but
not always-"when the plaintiff has 'a complete and
present cause of action.'" Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388. An accrual analysis begins with
identifying "the specific constitutional right"
alleged to have been infringed. Manuel v. Joliet,
580 U.S. ___, ___. Here, the claimed right is an assumed due
process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a
government official's fabrication of evidence. Pp. 4-5.
(b) Accrual questions are often decided by referring to the
common-law principles governing analogous torts.
Wallace, 549 U.S., 388. The most analogous
common-law tort here is malicious prosecution, which accrues
only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved
in the plaintiffs favor. Following that analogy where it
leads: McDonough could not bring his fabricated-evidence
claim under §1983 prior to favorable termination of his
prosecution. Malicious prosecution's
favorable-termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic
concerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation
over the same subject matter and the related possibility of
conflicting civil and criminal judgments, and likewise avoids
allowing collateral attacks on criminal judgments through
civil litigation. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 484-485. Because a civil claim such as McDonough's,
asserting that fabricated evidence was used to pursue a
criminal judgment, implicates the same concerns, it makes
sense to adopt the same rule. The principles and reasoning of
Heck-which emphasized those concerns with parallel
litigation and conflicting judgments-confirm the strength of
this analogy. This case differs because the plaintiff in
Heck had been convicted and McDonough was acquitted,
but McDonough's claims nevertheless challenge the
validity of the criminal proceedings against him in
essentially the same manner as the plaintiff in Heck
challenged the validity of his conviction. Pp. 5-9.
(c) The soundness of this conclusion is reinforced by the
consequences that would follow from imposing a ticking
limitations clock on criminal defendants as soon as they
become aware that fabricated evidence has been used against
them. That rule would create practical problems in
jurisdictions where prosecutions regularly last nearly as
long as-or even longer than-the limitations period. Criminal
defendants could face the untenable choice of letting their
claims expire or filing a civil suit against the very person
who is in the midst of prosecuting them. The parallel civil
litigation that would result if plaintiffs chose the second
option would run counter to core principles of federalism,
comity, consistency, and judicial economy. Smith's
suggested workaround-stays and ad-hoc abstentions-is poorly
suited to the type of claim at issue here. Pp. 9-11.
(d) Smith's counterarguments do not sway the result.
First, relying on Wallace, Smith argues that
Heck is irrelevant to McDonough's claim. The
Court in Wallace rejected the plaintiffs reliance on
Heck, but Wallace involved a false-arrest
claim-analogous to common-law false imprisonment-and does not
displace the principles in Heck that resolve this
case. Second, Smith argues that McDonough theoretically could
have been prosecuted without the fabricated evidence, and was
not convicted even with it; and thus, because a violation
could exist no matter its effect on the outcome, the date of
that outcome is irrelevant. Although the argument for
adopting a favorable-termination requirement would be weaker
in the context of a fabricated-evidence claim that does not
allege that the violation's consequence was a liberty
deprivation occasioned by the criminal proceedings
themselves, that is not the nature of McDonough's claim.
His claim remains most analogous to a claim of common-law
malicious prosecution. Nor does it change the result that
McDonough suffered harm prior to his acquittal, because the
Court has never suggested that the date on which a
constitutional injury first occurs is the only date from
which a limitations period may run. Third, Smith argues that
the advantages of his rule outweigh its disadvantages as a
matter of policy. But his arguments are unconvincing. It is
not clear that the Second Circuit's approach would
provide more predictable guidance, and while perverse
incentives for prosecutors and risk of foreclosing
meritorious claims could be valid considerations in other
contexts, they do not overcome other considerations here. Pp.
11-15.
898 F.3d 259, reversed and remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and GlNSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH,
JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
KAGAN and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
OPINION
SOTOMAYOR JUSTICE.
Petitioner
Edward McDonough alleges that respondent Youel Smith
fabricated evidence and used it to pursue criminal charges
against him. McDonough was acquitted, then sued Smith under
42 U.S.C. §1983. The courts below, concluding that the
limitations period for McDonough's fabricated-evidence
claim began to run when the evidence was used against him,
determined that the claim was untimely. We hold that the
limitations period did not begin to run until McDonough's
acquittal, and therefore reverse.
I
This
case arises out of an investigation into forged absentee
ballots that were submitted in a primary election in Troy,
New York, in 2009. McDonough, who processed the ballots in
his capacity as a commissioner of the county board of
elections, maintains that he was unaware that they had been
forged. Smith was specially appointed to investigate and to
prosecute the matter.
McDonough's
complaint alleges that Smith then set about scapegoating
McDonough (against whose family Smith harbored a political
grudge), despite evidence that McDonough was innocent. Smith
leaked to the press that McDonough was his primary target and
pressured him to confess. When McDonough would not, Smith
allegedly fabricated evidence in order to inculpate him.
Specifically, McDonough alleges that Smith falsified
affidavits, coached witnesses to lie, and orchestrated a
suspect DNA analysis to link McDonough to relevant ballot
envelopes.
Relying
in part on this allegedly fabricated evidence, Smith secured
a grand jury indictment against McDonough. McDonough was
arrested, arraigned, and released (with restrictions on his
travel) pending trial. Smith brought the case to trial a year
later, in January 2012. He again presented the allegedly
fabricated testimony during this trial, which lasted more
than a month and ended in a mistrial. Smith then reprosecuted
McDonough. The second trial also lasted over a month, and
again, Smith elicited allegedly fabricated testimony. The
second trial ended with McDonough's acquittal on all
charges on December 21, 2012.
On
December 18, 2015, just under three years after his
acquittal, McDonough sued Smith and other defendants under
§1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York. Against Smith, McDonough asserted two
different constitutional claims: one for fabrication of
evidence, and one for malicious prosecution without probable
cause. The District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution
claim as barred by prosecutorial immunity, though timely. It
dismissed the fabricated-evidence claim, however, as
untimely.
McDonough
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which affirmed. 898 F.3d 259 (2018). The Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court's disposition of the
malicious prosecution claim. As for the timeliness of the
fabricated-evidence claim, because all agreed that the
relevant limitations period is three years, id., at
265, the question was when that limitations period began to
run: upon McDonough's acquittal, or at some point
earlier. In essence, given the dates at issue,
McDonough's claim was timely only if the limitations
period began running at acquittal.
The
Court of Appeals held that McDonough's
fabricated-evidence claim accrued, and thus the limitations
period began to run, "when (1) McDonough learned that
the evidence was false and was used against him during the
criminal proceedings; and (2) he suffered a loss of liberty
as a result of that evidence." Ibid. This rule,
in the Second Circuit's view, followed from its
conclusion that a plaintiff has a complete
fabricated-evidence claim as soon as he can show that the
defendant's knowing use of the fabricated evidence caused
him some deprivation of liberty. Id., at 266. Those
events undisputedly had occurred by the time McDonough was
arrested and stood trial. Ibid.
As the
Second Circuit acknowledged, id., at 267, other
Courts of Appeals have held that the statute of limitations
for a fabricated-evidence claim does not begin to run until
favorable termination of the challenged criminal
proceedings.[1] We ...