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Spinner Consulting LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solutions, Inc.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 11, 2019



          Kevin McNulty United States District Judge.

         This matter comes before the Court on the motion of the defendant Bankruptcy Management Solutions, Inc. ("BMS") to dismiss the complaint. (DE 16). Plaintiff Spinner Consulting LLC ("Spinner") alleges that BMS participated in a horizontal conspiracy with its competitors to fix the manner of charging fees for its bankruptcy software services in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

         When a debtor files a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy, an estate containing the debtor's property is created and a trustee is appointed to administer the estate. BMS provides software and other services to assist in administration of the estate. Prior to the financial crisis in 2008, BMS would direct a trustee who wished to use its product to deposit the funds of the estate in a specific partner bank. The partner bank earned money on the deposit, paying interest to the estate as well as a fee to BMS. At that time, the U.S. Trustees' rules governing Chapter 7 bankruptcy accounts prohibited banks from charging a fee for their services.

         After the financial crash and the resulting decline in interest rates, this payment structure became unfeasible. BMS and its competitors lobbied the Executive Office of the United States Trustee (“EOUST") to suspend the rule that prohibited banks from charging a fee, which EOUST did in April of 2011.

         Thereafter, BMS implemented a new payment structure: Its bankruptcy support and software services would only be sold in combination with banking services, and it would charge a set percentage of the funds in the estate's bank account for these combined services. BMS's competitors have set up their payment structures in the same manner.

         On March 31, 2015, Robert Fusari filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy. On April 27, 2015, Alan E. Gamza Trustee ("Gamza") was appointed as the Fusari estate's trustee. On June 8, 2015, Gamza entered into a contract with BMS, under which Gazma agreed to deposit with Rabobank N.A. ("Rabobank") the funds of the Fusari estate. Gamza agreed to allow Rabobank to automatically withdraw a monthly fee from the estate.

         Rabobank deducted $15, 627.98 in fees from the Fusari estate for combined banking and software services. On May 6, 2016, the Fusari case settled. On that date, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order incorporating the terms of the settlement. The Order required that the residual property of the Fusari estate revert to and be vested in Fusari.

         All payments under the Order were made on or before June 1, 2018. On July 27, 2018, Fusari executed an agreement with Spinner, under which Spinner acquired the residual property that had vested in Fusari under the Order.

         On July 31, 2018, Spinner filed a one-count antitrust complaint against BMS. BMS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) Spinner is not a "direct purchaser" of its product or a proper party to bring this suit, and therefore lacks antitrust standing; (2) its lobbying efforts to EOUST are absolutely privileged under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; (3) a release provision in the Bankruptcy Court's May 6, 2016 Order bars this action; and (4) Spinner has failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

         For the reasons state below, Spinner's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of antitrust standing is granted.

         I. Facts[1]

         A. Bankruptcy Support Services

         Upon the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Office of the United States Trustee, a division of the United States Department of Justice, appoints a trustee from the private sector to administer the estate. (Compl ¶11). The trustee is compensated by the estate and is responsible for collecting and liquidating the debtor's property. (Compl ¶¶ 11-12). The trustee is also required to submit reports regularly to the Bankruptcy Court. (Compl. ¶12). Trustees use software to help them meet those reporting obligations. (Compl. ¶13).

         Since approximately 1987, BMS has provided bankruptcy support services. (Compl ¶13). BMS is the largest provider of bankruptcy support services, including software, in the United States. (Compl ¶4). BMS has more than a fifty percent share of "the number of Trustees in the United States." (Compl ¶20). Epiq eDiscovery Solutions, Inc. ("Epiq") is BMS's largest competitor, with a thirty percent share, and TrusteSolutions ("TES") is the second largest competitor of BMS, having a fifteen percent share. (Compl ¶¶5- 6, 20). BMS developed the software that is used by bankruptcy trustees, and secured copyright protection over their software. (Compl ¶¶ 15-16). BMS's competitors have developed and maintained comparable software. (Compl ¶17).

         Prior to the financial crisis in 2008, trustees had received software services directly from the bank that held the estate's assets. (Compl ¶¶14, 25). BMS therefore did not directly charge the estate for its services. (Compl ¶25). Instead of a direct charge, BMS "would direct the Estate to deposit its fund in a selected bank." (Compl ¶25). BMS required die trustees who used its services to deposit the funds of the estates at "a partner bank of BMS." (Compl ¶20). Before November of 2012, BMS required trustees to deposits funds at the Bank of New York Mellon. (Compl ¶21).

         After the funds of die estate were deposited into BMS's selected bank, die bank would "earn money from these deposits" and would pay a fee to die bankruptcy software provider. (Compl ¶25).[2] The bank paid this fee through a reduction in the estate's interest income, in essence, by providing a lower rate of interest on Chapter 7 estate deposits as compared to commercial clients. (Compl, ¶36, Ex. A at 2). This allowed die bank to earn money from die deposit, and the bank would then pay a fee to BMS as well as interest to the estate. (Id.). It appears that die process was set up in this manner, instead of a direct charge because, at the time, the U.S. Trustees' rules governing Chapter 7 bankruptcy accounts prohibited banks from charging a fee for their services. (Compl ¶34).[3]

         After the financial crisis in 2008, interest rates declined, and consequently, "die amount of money that the bank could earn from the deposits of Estates also declined, as did die bank's ability to pay BMS a fee." (Compl ¶26). Chapter 7 accounts were no longer profitable for banks, who responded by reducing interest rates and initial "collateral and administrative charges," and discouraging trustee deposits. (Compl, Ex. A, at 1). One major bank responded by ceasing its participation in the Chapter 7 program entirely. (Id. at 2).

         In response, BMS, Epiq, and TES requested that die U.S. Trustee suspend die rule that prohibited banks from charging a fee in order to allow trustees to pay bank fees from estate accounts. (Compl ¶35). BMS recognized that the goal of any proposed solution should take into account certain "conditions," including that the crisis was temporary, that banks should receive adequate compensation so that they remained active participants in Chapter 7 programs, and that any solution should continue "the historical process of allocating the cost of the services to the estates that are the beneficiaries of those services." (Compl, Ex. A).

         On or about November 26, 2010, BMS submitted a letter to the Executive Offices of the U.S. Trustee, noting the following:

In several conversations with various participant banks, a number of options have been discussed. Satisfying all of the conditions presented above, however, left a single structural option. Although die numbers vary slightly for each bank, die structure is constant with two key components:
First, since estates do not currently pay for services (banking and software) through a reduction in their interest income, have them continue to pay for these services via a service fee, as a of average deposit balance assessed monthly on each account.
Second, while there would be a base service fee percentage the actual percentage applied would vary reflecting changes, hopefully improvements, in the interest rate market by being tied to die Effective Federal Funds rate. As die Effective Federal Funds Rate increases, the service fee would be reduced, eventually disappearing as bank interest rates increase.

(Compl ¶36). BMS proposed that a monthly fee be "applied evenly" to all Chapter 7 accounts. (Compl., Ex. A, at 3). Based on its "conversations with die banks and independent research regarding bank costs and profitability targets," BMS "believed that a rate as low as 3% with die fee adjustment reflecting the actual [Effective Federal Funds rate (EFF)] may be adequate to attract the banks to continue their full participation to include the funding of die software providers." (Compl, Ex. A at 4).[4]

         Sometime after BMS drafted this letter, Epiq received and reviewed it, and provided its own comments to the U.S. Trustee on January 18, 2011. (Compl ¶¶37-38, 76 Ex. B). In preparing its comments, Epiq reviewed the remarks that had been "submitted previously by other market participants and solicited input from all financial institutions with which Epiq Systems has relationships in the Chapter 7 environment." (Compl, Ex. B). With respect to BMS's proposal, Epiq indicated that the proposed "structure would promote future stability for trustees' activities," and "would be accessed uniformly to all estate accounts." (Compl ¶37, Ex. B). On or about January 21, 2011, TES requested that the U.S. Trustee allow this fee. (Compl ¶¶ 39, 77).

         Spinner alleges that the November 26, 2010 BMS document is evidence of a conspiracy because it demonstrates that "BMS had conversations with various banks participating in the Chapter 7 program, which necessarily included the partner banks of BMS's horizontal competitors" and "BMS reached an agreement with at least one of those banks, and therefore one of BMS's horizontal competitors, to fix the manner of selling and charging for combined bankruptcy support services and bankruptcy banking services." (Compl ¶74).

         Spinner further alleges that "upon information and belief," BMS, Epiq, and TES "communicated directly about selling bankruptcy support services only in combination with bankruptcy banking services" sometime before the November 26, 2010 BMS document, and have since been in regular communication. (Compl ¶¶ 72, 82).[5]

         On or about January 21, 2011, Texas Capital Bank, on its and TES's behalf, proposed to the U.S. Trustee "that Estates be charged for combined bankruptcy support services" and "banking services based upon a percentage of the amount of money in the Estate." (Compl ¶78). Texas Capital bank stated the following:

Due to the current interest rate environment financial institutions are able to secure deposits at virtually no operational cost. The current UST program requires a high level of operational support, including banking support, software support and hardware support to bankruptcy trustees to remain in compliance with the UST requirements to administer bankruptcy estates that cannot be offset solely by the value of deposits maintained. Therefore TCB will need to assess to the bankruptcy estates a monthly Custodial Fee as a percentage of balances maintained to offset the operational support provided. Depending on the level of operational support required and the interest rate environment TCB will annually adjust the Custodial Fee accordingly.

(Compl ¶78 (emphasis omitted)). Spinner alleges, "upon information and belief," that Texas Capital Bank communicated this information "to BMS and Epiq, either directly or indirectly." (Compl ¶79).

         On or about April 29, 2011, the U.S. Trustee agreed to suspend the rule that prohibited trustees from paying bank service fees from estate accounts. (Compl ¶40). It appears that even though the rule was suspended, the U.S. Trustee did not specify how the fee should be calculated, assessed, or paid.

         Spinner alleges that after this rule was suspended, BMS, Epiq, and TES, "upon information and belief, reaffirmed their conspiracy to sell Estates bankruptcy services only in combination with bankruptcy banking services, and to charge no fee to an Estate for those combined services other than a percentage of the amount in the bank account of the Estate." (Compl ¶¶ 41-42).

         Sometime after April 29, 2011, BMS and "its partner bank entered into agreements with Trustees that required their Estates to pay a combined fee for bankruptcy support services and bankruptcy banking services" based on "a percentage of the money in the account of the Estate." (Compl ¶43). BMS and its partner bank "then began deducting as a fee for those combined services a percentage of the money" in the estates' accounts. (Compl ¶44). BMS "continues to sell bankruptcy support services only in combination with bankruptcy banking services, and to charge Estates no fee for those combined services other than a percentage of the amount in the bank account of the Estate." (Compl ¶46). Since 2012, BMS has used Rabobank as is "partner bank," and has required trustees to deposit the funds of the estate there. (Compl ¶7).[6]

         Neither BMS, Epiq, nor TES has charged a fee for bankruptcy support services "(a) on a per trustee basis, (b) on a per case basis, or (c) on a per transaction basis." (Compl ¶45). At the time the complaint in this action was filed, BMS and Rabobank charged fees at the annual rate of 1.75 percent "of the amount on deposit at Rabobank." (Compl ¶47). Epiq "and its partner banks charge" a 1.75 percent fee on the amount on deposit, and TES and "its partner banks charge fees at the annual rate of 1.9 percent of the amount on deposit at those banks." (Compl ¶47).[7]

         In June of 2011, BMS stated in a "publicly distributed" document that the service fee was not negotiable, "[i]n order to provide equal treatment in all bankruptcy cases." (Compl ¶91). The "document" further stated that "the Service Fee is based on a uniform rate as set forth above and is a condition of participation in the BMS program." (Compl ¶91).

         Spinner claims that since late 2011, BMS, Epiq, and TES have "refused to negotiate fees with Trustees." (Compl ¶92). In a declaration submitted by Coffey of BMS in In re Nanodynamics, Inc., No. 09-13438 (MJK) (W.D.N.Y.), dated September 12, 2011, Coffey addressed the issue of the fee in response to the Court's concerns regarding the pricing for BMS's services. (Compl ¶94).[8]

         The Court expressed concern "that the business model, pricing, . . . [was] not based on monthly activity [or] on the burdens upon the service providers, [but was] based simply upon how many dollars are in an account." (Compl ¶94 (alterations added)). In response, Coffey certified that:

21. The Court's observation is essentially correct, but that should not affect the allowance of the BMS Service Fee as an administrative expense, for at least three reasons. . . . Where, as here, the trustee in the exercise of his discretion has determined that the foregoing requirements are satisfied, I am not aware of anything that requires that a claim be measured by any particular method, such as the (a) cost to the provider of providing the service; (b) the amount of the service actually used by the estate each day; or (c) the price at which a competitor might be willing to offer a similar product, albeit with a lower quality of service. If it were otherwise, then administrative expenses for things like a trustee's compensation under section 326(a), the UST's quarterly fees, or even the rent paid by a trustee for a facility to store estate property, would all be subject to retrospective revaluation on an individual case basis. I would submit that under such a regime, few, if any, parties would be willing to do business with a chapter 7 trustee; BMS and BNY Mellon certainly would not.
22. Second, the BMS 'flat' percentage fee structure exists for a reason, much like the rate structures for trustee compensation, UST quarterly fees, and, say monthly premises rent, are 'flat fee' based, rather than being based [on] use or activity levels. The reason is that no other structure is administratively feasible. BMS and BNY Mellon do business with hundreds of trustees across the nation, who collectively handle more than 50, 000 'asset' cases currently (in addition to hundreds of thousands of 'no asset' cases annually), it would be utterly impractical for BMS and BNY Mellon to negotiate hundreds, or thousands, of 'one-off deals' with individual trustees, based on the facts and circumstances of each case; the costs of evaluating, negotiating and monitoring so many unique contracts would by themselves be prohibitive, to both the trustees and to BMS and BNY Mellon. While the trustee services business may, if this interest rate environment continues, ultimately evolve to a different model, where pricing is based on a set schedule of fees and charges for numbers and types of transactions, at this point, that is simply not a business model that BMS and BNY Mellon are prepared to offer. When and if any other providers are willing to offer services under such a model, trustees of course have the ability to terminate their arrangements with BMS and BNY Mellon on 30 days notice, and to contract with such providers, to the extent that die trustees believe that they should do so in accordance with the exercise of their fiduciary duties.

(Compl ¶94).

         Spinner's complaint includes allegations of "circumstantial evidence" of the alleged conspiracy. (Compl ¶¶ 80-102). On Epiq's Form 10K, filed on February 25, 2011 with Securities and Exchange Commission (before the U.S. Trustee agreed to suspend die rule), Epiq represented that it does not compete "in the market for bankruptcy support services based upon price." (Compl ¶¶87-90). Jill Bauer, the Managing Director of Trustee and Fiduciary Services for Epiq, executed a declaration on January 12, 2016, confirming that bankruptcy support service providers competed only in terms of market share, and not in terms of price. (Compl ¶95).

         Spinner also alleges that Bankruptcy Courts have questioned whether trustees "should pay combined fees for bankruptcy support services and bankruptcy banking services from Estate accounts." (Compl ¶90; see Compl ¶98 (citing In re Canopy, no. 09-44943 (ERW) (Bankr. N.D. 111.))). Spinner points to the following ...

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