United States District Court, D. New Jersey
SALVADOR GONZALEZ-PEREZ. Fort Dix Federal Correctional
Institution, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
NOEL L. HILLMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is the complaint and motion for a
preliminary injunction of Plaintiff Salvador Gonzalez-Perez
(ECF No. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), this Court is
required to screen Plaintiff's complaint and dismiss it
if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for
relief, seeks damages from a party immune to suit, or was
filed prior to the exhaustion of Plaintiff's
administrative remedies. For the following reasons, this
matter will be dismissed without prejudice as Plaintiff
informs the Court that he has not yet exhausted his
administrative remedies. Plaintiff's motion seeking a
preliminary injunction will be denied without prejudice.
Salvador Gonzalez-Perez, is a citizen of Mexico who at the
time he filed his complaint was housed at the Fort Dix
correctional facility. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiff
apparently suffers from numerous medical issues and asserts
that he is unable to care for or take care of himself.
(Id. at 11-12). Plaintiff apparently relies on his
fellow inmates to take care of him, as he alleges that prison
staff do not help him. (Id. at 10-13). Following
numerous medical issues, Plaintiff filed a grievance seeking
to challenge administratively the care he was receiving and
the denial of his request for compassionate release based on
his lack of a release plan and the fact that Plaintiff is
subject to an immigration detainer. (Id. at 13).
Following the filing of this grievance and an appeal of the
denial of compassionate release, both of which apparently
remained pending at the time Plaintiff filed this matter,
Plaintiff asserts he was retaliated against - his medical
records were apparently changed, his accommodations taken
away, and his scheduled transfer to a medical facility was
changed to a transfer to a non-medical facility.
(Id. at 13-14). Plaintiff therefore states that he
intends, at some point in the future, to file a civil rights
complaint raising claims against various BOP officials for
denial of medical care, retaliation and other issues.
has attached to his current filings a copy of the complaint
he intends to file in the future (see Document 2
attached to ECF No. 1), but states that he is still in the
process of exhausting his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 1
at 6, 9). Plaintiff thus admits he did not exhaust his
available administrative remedies prior to filing this
matter, but in any event seeks a preliminary injunction
barring his transfer to a non-medical facility and related
relief. (Id. at 9-24) .
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26,
1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review
complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief, or is on its face unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [or § 1915A] is the same as that for
dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506
Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as
true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable
to the [Plaintiff]." Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A]
complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations." Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the
Plaintiff's "obligation to provide
the'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is "not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead,
assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true,
those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to'state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged." Id.
"Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are
plausible is a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." Id. at 679. "[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id.
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Moreover, while pro
se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro
se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added) .
current filings, Plaintiff states that he wishes, in the
future, to file a federal civil rights action, pursuant to,
inter alia, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
challenging the conditions under which he is confined
including his medical care and prison official's
retaliation against him for filing of a grievance. Plaintiff,
however, readily admits that he had not yet exhausted all of
his administrative remedies at the time he filed this matter.
to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, a plaintiff who is incarcerated in
prison at the time he seeks to file a complaint is required
to exhaust all available administrative remedies before he
may file a federal civil rights suit challenging "prison
conditions." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
84-85 (2006). A prisoner is required to meet this exhaustion
requirement before filing his complaint "even where the
relief sought - [such as] monetary damages - cannot be
granted by the administrative process." Id.;
see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001).
Where an administrative procedure is available, a plaintiff
seeking to challenge prison conditions via a federal civil
rights action must fully and properly exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and ...