United States District Court, D. New Jersey
OPINION
Robert
B. Kugler, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff,
Richard Briggs, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the
Central Reception and Assignment Facility, in Trenton, New
Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons
stated in this Opinion, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
Court will construe the allegations of the complaint as true
for the purpose of this Opinion. Plaintiff names Patrolman
Becker and John Doe officers of the Mount Ephraim Police
Department as Defendants in this matter. (ECF No. 1, at 4-5).
This case arises from Plaintiff's arrest and subsequent
detention at the Mount Ephraim Police Station and Camden
County Jail. (Id., at 10).
On
September 13, 2016, Defendant officers pulled over a vehicle
for tinted windows, in which Plaintiff was a passenger. The
driver of the vehicle provided the officers with the
requested documents, along with a police benevolent
association card bearing Plaintiff's name. Plaintiff had
worked at South Woods State Prison as a corrections officer,
but the prison had terminated his employment in August of
2016. (Id. at 9).
An
altercation then took place, after one of the officers
searched Plaintiffs name and found that Plaintiff was facing
child molestation charges. One officer acted “like a
deranged individual” taking issue with the notion that
Plaintiff was receiving a pension, yelled a racial slur at
Plaintiff, and demanded to see Plaintiffs retirement
paperwork. (Id.). Plaintiff feared for his life and
tried to explain that he did not yet have any official
paperwork and tried to record the incident with his phone.
The officers then arrested Plaintiff “for hindering an
investigation.” (Id.).
While
waiting at the Mount Ephraim Police Department's holding
cell, Plaintiff, a diabetic, complained that he was
experiencing severe headaches, dry mouth, blurred vision, and
belligerence, due to a lack of insulin, but the officers
ignored his pleas. Officials then transferred Plaintiff to
the Camden County Jail where a nurse eventually gave him
medication, but that his blood sugar was at “stroke
numbers.” (Id.).
Plaintiff
now raises false arrest, false imprisonment, and deliberate
indifference claims, as well as corresponding state law
claims against all Defendants.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
District
courts must review complaints in civil actions in which a
plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). District courts may sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See Id. According to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
“a pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'” 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, [1] the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the
claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the [alleged]
misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover,
while courts liberally construe pro se pleadings,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient
facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of his civil rights guaranteed under the United
States Constitution. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must allege two things: first, a violation of a
right under the Constitution, and second, that a
“person” acting under color of state law
committed the violation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d
1250, 1255-56 (3d. Cir. 1994)).
As an
initial matter, the Court will address the statute of
limitations on § 1983 claims since it appears from the
face of Plaintiff s Complaint that this action is
time-barred. “Although the running of the statute of
limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that
defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no
development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a
time-barred complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C.
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