United States District Court, D. New Jersey
OPINION
William J. Martini U.S. District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Presently
before the Court is pro se Petitioner James Edward
Fraction, Jr.'s motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed
on him by this Court on July 24, 1996 (Petitioner's
"§ 2255 Motion"). (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons
stated herein, the Court will deny Petitioner's §
2255 Motion and will not issue a certificate of
appealability.
II.
BACKGROUND
i.
Petitioner's Underlying Criminal Proceedings
On July
16, 1996, at the conclusion of roughly five days of trial
proceedings before the Honorable Alfred M. Wolin, U.S.D.J., a
jury convicted Petitioner of carjacking, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2119, and kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a). (See Gov't's Oct. 15, 2018
Opp. Br., ECF No. 12 at PageID: 63.) The Government
thereafter requested that the Court sentence Petitioner to
life imprisonment because: (1) he qualified as a career
criminal offender under United States Sentencing Guideline
("USSG") § 4B1.1; and, alternatively, (2)
Petitioner's carjacking and kidnapping convictions were
each "a third strike under the Federal three-strikes
law, [18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).]" (See July 24,
1996 Hr'g Tr. 44-46; accord July 24, 1996 Crim.
J., available at 1996 WL 33451708.) At the time of
Petitioner's conviction and sentence, the federal
three-strikes law provided, in relevant part, that "a
person who is convicted in a court of the United States of a
serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment if... the person has been convicted ... on
separate prior occasions [in state or federal court of] 2 or
more serious violent felonies[.]" 18 U.S.C. §
3559(c)(1)(A)(i).
On July
24, 1996, Judge Wolin sentenced Petitioner to "life
imprisonment for the full extent of his natural life" on
his conviction for kidnapping only; Judge Wolin imposed a
concurrent 180-month sentence for Petitioner's separate
carjacking conviction. (See Hr'g Tr. 55;
accord July 24, 1996 Crim. J.) During sentencing,
Judge Wolin expressly stated that Petitioner's life
sentence for kidnapping was being imposed pursuant to the
three-strikes law, and not because Petitioner qualified as a
career criminal offender under USSG § 4B1.1.
(See Hr'g Tr. 55 ("for the record, I am
sentencing under 3559(c)").) The two prior "serious
violent felonies" the Court relied on to invoke §
3559(c) were Petitioner's 1979 conviction for armed
robbery and his 1982 conviction for aggravated sexual
assault. (Id. at 12-13, 45-46, 51.)
On
direct appeal, Petitioner challenged, inter alia,
the Court's imposition of a life sentence under the
three-strikes law. (See Pet'r's Appeal Br.,
available at 2016 WL 33451708.) On February 26, 1997, the
Third Circuit summarily affirmed Petitioner's conviction
and sentence. United States v. Fraction, 107 F.3d
863 (3d Cir. 1997) (table). The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on October 6, 1997. Fraction v. United
States, 522 U.S. 832 (1997).
ii.
The United States Supreme Court's 2015 Johnson
Decision
On June
26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).
Johnson concerns the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA"), which imposes an increased prison term
upon a defendant with three prior "violent felony"
convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). At the
time Johnson was issued, a qualifying "violent
felony" under ACCA's so-called residual clause
included any felony that "involve[d] conduct that
present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another." Johnson at 2555-56 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)). The Johnson Court held that
this language was unconstitutionally vague and, thus, that
"[i]ncreasing a defendant's sentence under [that]
clause denies due process of law." Id. at 2557.
On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that
Johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral
review. See Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257
(2016).
iii.
Petitioner's Present Habeas Claims
Shortly
after the Court announced that Johnson had
retroactive effect, on or about June 16, 2016, Petitioner
filed his present § 2255 Motion collaterally attacking
his 1996 federal conviction and sentence.[1] (ECF No. 1.)
Petitioner's § 2255 Motion advances the following
arguments:
Ground One: Counsel rendered ineffective assistance ... to
[Petitioner] ... by failing to object to vague
"attempts" clause of charged offense [for]
carjacking under 18U.S.C. §2119 and [this] caused
[Petitioner] to be denied notice and fair[] ability to defend
himself contrary to Johnson v. United States, 135
S.Ct. 2251 (2015)
Ground Two: Counsel rendered ineffective assistance ... to
[Petitioner]... by failing to object to vague so-called
residual clause [of charged offense for carjacking under 18
U.S.C. § 2119, and this] caused [Petitioner] to be
denied notice and fair ability to defend himself contrary to
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2251 (2015)
Ground Three: Counsel rendered ineffective assistance... by
failing to object to [Petitioner's] non-qualifying and
vague U.S. Sentencing Guidelines enhancements . . . contrary
to Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2251
(2015)....
Ground Four: Counsel rendered ineffective assistance ... by
failing to object to [Petitioner's] designation as a
career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 . . . . contrary to
Johnson v. United States,135 S.Ct. 2251 (2015). . .
. [and by not seeking an expert] to testify to
Petitioner's age of 23 at the time of his prior New
Jersey ...