United States District Court, D. New Jersey
B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
Charles Lawson, is proceeding pro se with a civil
rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the
reasons stated in this Opinion, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim.
Court will construe the allegations of the Complaint as true
for the purpose of this Opinion. Plaintiff names the
following parties as Defendants in this matter: (1) then
Governor Chris Christie; (2) the Office of the Attorney
General; (3) the Cumberland County Courthouse; (4) the
Director of the Division of Criminal Justice; (5) the
Vineland Police Department; (6) the Honorable Judge Christen
D'arrigo; and (7) then Attorney General Christopher S.
great liberality, the Court gleans from the Complaint that
Defendants conspired, at some unspecified time, to deprive
Plaintiff “of life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness” by keeping him unlawfully incarcerated at
the Cumberland County Jail, where he has been
“subjected to post dramatic[sic] stress, anxiety,
frustration, [and] poor medical treatment.” (ECF No. 1,
specifically, the Office of the Attorney General established
policies, practices, and procedures to support bail reform,
and that the Vineland police officers arrested Plaintiff
“under this fraudulent system” and violated
“their own procedure.” (ECF No. 1-1, at 1). This
violation somehow affected Plaintiffs Public Safety
Assessment (“PSA”) score under New Jersey's
Bail Reform Act, which then “infringed on [his]
constitutional rights.” (Id.); see generally
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:162-15 to -26. Plaintiff then summarily
alleges that the remaining parties are also at fault for
“advocat[ing]” for, or perhaps applying, bail
reform policies, which violated his constitutional rights.
filed the instant Complaint, seeking an order from the Court
for monetary compensation, his immediately release, the
eradication of the Bail Reform Act, and to “bring
back monetary bail.” (ECF No. 1, at 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
courts must review complaints in civil actions in which a
plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). District courts may sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See Id. According to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
“a pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'” 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim,  the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the
claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
[alleged] misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Moreover, while courts liberally construe pro se
pleadings, “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
addition to these pleading rules, however, a complaint must
satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which states
that a complaint must contain:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain[:]
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for
the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
a pro se plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint must
recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the
plaintiffs claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a ‘short and plain'
statement of a cause of action.” Johnson v.
Koehler, No. 18-00807, 2019 WL 1231679, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 15, 2019). Stated differently, Rule 8 requires a showing
that the plaintiff is entitled to relief in order to
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id.
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93