United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
matter comes before the Court on a motion filed by Defendant
County of Monmouth to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. (ECF No.
28). Defendant Office of Child Support Services (OCSS) has
joined this motion. (ECF No. 30). Because this matter is the
subject of an ongoing state court proceeding, this Court
shall dismiss the complaint. Further, to grant Plaintiff
another chance to amend would be futile; as such, the
dismissal is with prejudice.
complaint is very difficult to construe; however, he appears
to challenge services provided by the Child Support
Enforcement Program, known as Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. §
651 et seq. It appears that individuals associated
with OCSS performed paternity establishment services, without
giving plaintiff due notice. Specifically, Plaintiff claims
these individuals used his social security number to violate
his constitutional rights "by using the number to track
and hunt him down through Proactive Matching." (Amended
Complaint, ECF No 25 at ¶ 36). Plaintiff asserts federal
civil rights claims for general deprivations of
initially filed a complaint on March 19, 2018. This Court,
after hearing oral argument, dismissed that complaint by
order dated November 26, 2018. (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff then
filed an amended complaint on December 7, 2018. (ECF No. 25).
Defendant filed this motion on December 19, 2018. (ECF No.
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),  the Court is required to accept as true
all allegations in the Complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d
1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994). "To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a court will
accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of
the motion, it will not accept bald assertions, unsupported
conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Morse v.
Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997). A complaint should be dismissed only if the
well-pleaded alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a
claim. See In re Warfarin Sodium, 214 F.3d 395,
397-98 (3d Cir. 2000).
as here, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court
reads Plaintiffs complaint generously and holds it "to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, "a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from
his burden of providing some affirmative evidence, i.e. not
just mere allegations, to establish a prima facie case; and
also to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial."
Niblack v. Murray, No. 12-6910, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99325, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016) (citing Barnett
v. N.J. Transit Corp., 573 Fed.Appx. 239, 243 (3d Cir.
courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that
is conferred upon them by Congress." Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). "This
duty is not, however, absolute." Id.
"[F]ederal courts may decline to exercise their
jurisdiction, in otherwise 'exceptional
circumstances,' where denying a federal forum would
clearly serve an important countervailing interest, for
example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of
'proper constitutional adjudication,' 'regard for
federal-state relations,' or 'wise judicial
administration.'" Id. (quoting Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 813 (1976)).
v. Harris ... and its progeny espouse a strong federal
policy against federal-court interference with pending state
judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances." Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass 'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982).
Abstention should be invoked rarely; "only 'in a few
carefully defined situations.'" Zahl v.
Warhafting, 655 Fed. App'x, 66, 70 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quoting Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp.,
970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992)). "[I]n order for a
district court to abstain under Younger, three
requirements must be met: (1) there must be ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3)
the state proceedings must provide an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims." Dixon v. Kuhn, 257
Fed.Appx. 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Anthony v.
Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003)). Each factor
is evaluated below.
the first factor, the amended complaint alleges the existence
of an ongoing state court proceeding that concerns the
payment of child support, as shown in several references:
• "N.J. OCSS agents induced the Monmouth county
Administrator, Board of Chosen freeholders, attorneys, family
court judges, clerk of court, sheriffs department etc., to
voluntarily enter into a 45 C.F.R. §302.34 Title IV-D
contract to provide Title IV-D enforcement services that are
initiated by OCSS and only target the individual group
defined as non-custodial parents in return for payment from
the Federal Government." (Amended Complaint at ¶
• "Monmouth County Chancery Division Family Part
Judges provides magistrate services that target only
individual non-custodial parents subject to Title IV-D
activities ... and certify that all hearings are conducted in
compliance with Title IV-D of the ...