United States District Court, D. New Jersey
L. WOLFSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Sherone Long (“Long” or “Plaintiff”),
is proceeding pro se with this Complaint asserting
violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(See Compl., ECF No. 1.) On November 7, 2018, the
Court granted Long leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 7.) The Court now screens the
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). For the reasons
stated herein, Long's Complaint as a whole is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and his claims are dismissed with
prejudice insofar as they are asserted against the Somerset
filed his Complaint, Long was being held as a pretrial
detainee at the Somerset County Jail, and his claims concern
the circumstances of his detention there. (See ECF
No. 1.) Long, a practicing Muslim, claims that defendant, the
Somerset County Jail, violated his right to free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment. (Id.)
Specifically, Long alleges that the Jail did not permit
obligatory Jumu'ah prayer services on Fridays, provided
insufficient accommodations for Ramadan, served Muslim
detainees meals that were kosher instead of halal, and did
not provide prayer rugs, kufis, or prayer oils. (See
ECF No. 1 at 5-6.) Long does not specify what relief he seeks
with his Complaint.
Complaint was initially terminated due to defects in his
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
(See ECF Nos. 3-5.) Long subsequently submitted a
proper in forma pauperis application, and the action
was reopened. (ECF Nos. 6-8.) Long also recently notified the
Court that he is no longer detained at the Somerset County
Jail. (ECF No. 9.) The Court now undertakes a screening of
Long's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
THE SCREENING STANDARD
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26,
1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review
prisoner complaints when the prisoner is proceeding in
forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs district courts to sua
sponte dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious,
that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane
v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). That
standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007). To survive the Court's screening for
failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is
facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678; see also Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.
Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or
‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
involvement by a defendant in an alleged constitutional
violation is central to a § 1983 claim, and liability
cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior.
See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d
210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). Pleading supervisory liability
generally requires some affirmative conduct by the
supervisor, such as a supervisor's implementation or
maintenance of a policy, practice, or custom that caused the
plaintiff constitutional harm. Parkell v. Danberg,
833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Santiago v. Warminster
Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010).
se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);
Glunk v. Noone, 689 Fed.Appx. 137, 139 (3d Cir.
2017). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
That section provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such ...