United States District Court, D. New Jersey
JIMMY K. WHITE, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
L. WOLFSON United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court by way of a motion filed by
petitioner Jimmy K. White (“White” or
“Petitioner”), under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to
vacate a sentence imposed by judgment of the Court. (ECF No.
1.) For the reasons stated herein, the § 2255 motion is
dismissed upon screening.
February 2006, White pleaded guilty before the late Hon.
Joseph E. Irenas to one count of carjacking, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2119(2). United States v. White,
Crim. No. 06-134 (JEI), ECF No. 10. The plea agreement noted
that White and the government had reached no agreement as to
whether Jones should be sentenced as a career offender, under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.”). Id., Sched. A,
¶¶ 4-5. The parties concurred, however, that,
without accounting for a career-offender enhancement, the
applicable U.S.S.G. offense level was 21. Id.
¶¶ 8-9. In its subsequent sentencing memorandum,
the government argued that White should be sentenced with a
career-offender enhancement due to his prior convictions for
sexual assault and robbery. See Crim. No. 06-134,
ECF No. 11. Judge Irenas, in a Judgment entered on June 16,
2006, applied a career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 and sentenced White to 188
months in prison. Crim. No. 06-134, ECF No. 13; (see
also ECF No. 1 at 1).
filed a direct appeal challenging his sentence as a career
offender, mainly asserting that his two prior felony
convictions should have been considered “related”
(and thus not separate) for U.S.S.G. purposes. See United
States v. White, 258 Fed.Appx. 462 (3d Cir. 2007). In
December 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found that Judge Irenas had properly applied the
career-offender enhancement, and it affirmed the sentence.
Id. at 466.
24, 2016, White, acting by counsel, filed a Motion to Vacate,
Set Aside, or Correct his sentence, under 28 U.S.C. §
2255. (ECF No. 1.) White argues that, as the Supreme Court,
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015),
struck down as unconstitutionally vague the “residual
clause” definition of “crime of violence”
in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), the
identical clause in the U.S.S.G. must also be deemed
unconstitutional. (See id.) He further contends
that, without the residual clause, he could not have been
considered a career offender under the U.S.S.G. (See
id.) White asserts that his § 2255 motion should be
considered timely because he filed it within one year of the
Johnson decision. (Id. at 2, 17.)
23, 2016, Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle issued Standing
Order 16-2, which noted the large number of cases filed under
Johnson and created specific processes for such
cases. In re Motions Seeking Collateral Relief on the
Basis of Johnson v. United States, Misc. No. 16-11
(JBS), ECF No. 2. Among other things, the Standing Order
stayed Johnson cases and permitted motions filed
before June 27, 2016 to be filed in the form of short
“placeholders.” Id. at 3. It permitted
petitioners under Johnson “up to 150 days from
June 27, 2016 to file a final memorandum of law supporting
relief, ” and it further permitted the government
“a period of up to 150 days after the filing of the
movant's final memorandum of law to file its response to
the motion and memorandum.” Id. at 3-4.
Despite this instruction, neither party ever submitted any
further filings to the Court.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings,
“[i]f it plainly appears from the [§ 2255] motion
. . . that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the
judge must dismiss the motion.” Rules Governing §
2255 Proceedings, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2255.
Since White filed his motion, the Supreme Court, in
Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017),
directly addressed the petitioner's argument that
Johnson's voiding of the ACCA residual clause
also invalidated the U.S.S.G. residual clause. The
Beckles decision explicitly rejected this argument,
finding that “[b]ecause the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines are not subject to a due process vagueness
challenge, § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause is not void
for vagueness.” (Id. at 897.) As the central
premise underlying White's § 2255 motion has been
rejected by the Supreme Court, it is clear that White is not
entitled to relief. Accordingly, I now dismiss this
proceeding. See Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings, Rule 4.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a litigant may not appeal a final
order in a § 2255 proceeding unless the judge or a
circuit justice issues a certificate of appealability
(“COA”). That section further directs courts to
issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2255(d). “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court's resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In this case, the Court denies a
certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would
not find it debatable that White has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
reasons stated above, White's §2255 motion is
dismissed upon screening. An appropriate Order follows.
 Additionally, under the Third
Circuit's decision in United States v. Green,
898 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018), White's petition could also
be dismissed as untimely because, as Beckles made
clear that Johnson does not actually apply to the
claim White seeks to assert, Johnson also does not
function to trigger a new ...