United States District Court, D. New Jersey
FELDER, PETITIONER PRO SE
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE JUDGE
Felder moves for relief from this Court's August 30, 2017
order dismissing his amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Motion for Relief,
Docket Entry 10. For the reasons stated below, the motion is
denied without prejudice.
history was briefly recounted by the Court in its opinion
transferring the habeas petition to the Third Circuit for
consideration under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h):
Petitioner was sentenced in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (“Eastern District”) on June 9, 2008
after being convicted by a jury of drug and firearm offenses.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
convictions and 264-month sentence.
In 2011, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 in the Eastern District challenging his
convictions. However, the court treated his § 2255
motion as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 33 and denied relief. The Third Circuit
affirmed the recharacterization and result. Petitioner later
filed a § 2255 motion raising arguments pursuant to
Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013).
The Eastern District denied the motion.
Felder v. Kirby, No. 17-1534, 2017 WL 3736658, at *1
(D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017) (footnote and internal citations
omitted). See also United States v. Felder,
529 Fed.Appx. 111 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In his §
2241 petition, Petitioner asked the Court to resentence him
without the career offender enhancement because his prior
convictions no longer qualified him as a career offender
citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243
(2016), and Holt v. United States, 843 F.3d 720 (7th
Court concluded that existing Third Circuit precedent did not
confer jurisdiction to review Petitioner's challenges to
his sentencing enhancement under § 2241. August 30, 2017
Opinion at 4-5 (citing United States v. Brown, 456
Fed.Appx. 79, 81 (3d Cir. 2012 (per curiam); In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d, 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997)). The
Court exercised its discretion to transfer the matter under
28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the Third Circuit for review under
§ 2255(h) as a second or successive § 2255 motion.
Id. at n.2. See In re Felder, No. 17-2902
(3d Cir. dismissed Oct. 31, 2017).
March 27, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant motion under
Rule 60(b). He argues the Court erred by converting the
motion to a second or successive § 2255 motion without
providing him notice under United States v. Miller,
197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999). He also argues the Court erred
by concluding it lacked jurisdiction under § 2241. He
noted there are several cases pending before the Third
Circuit raising identical issues that were not
recharacterized as § 2255(h) motions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
60(b) motion is “addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court guided by accepted legal principles applied
in light of all the relevant circumstances.” Ross
v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 648 (3d Cir. 1981). Rule 60(b)
“does not confer upon the district courts a
‘standardless residual of discretionary power to set
aside judgments.'” Moolenaar v. Gov. of the
Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir. 1987).
“Rather, relief under Rule 60(b) is available only
under such circumstances that the ‘overriding interest
in the finality and repose of judgments may properly be
overcome.'” Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16
F.Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Martinez-McBean
v. Gov. of the Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 913 (3d
Cir. 1977); see also Moolenaar, 822 F.2d at 1346
(“The remedy provided by Rule 60(b) is
‘extraordinary and special circumstances must justify
granting relief under it.”) (internal citation
omitted). “Rule 60(b) must be applied ‘[s]ubject
to the propositions that the finality of judgments is a sound
principle that should not lightly be cast aside, [and] ... is
not a substitute for appeal.” Kock v. Gov. of the
Virgin Islands, 811 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1987)
(internal citation omitted).