United States District Court, D. New Jersey
RAYMOND D. HARVEY, Plaintiff,
GLOUCESTER COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.
B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
Raymond D. Harvey, was a pretrial detainee at the time he
filed this pro se rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. At this time, this Court must screen the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as
frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the
following reasons, the complaint will be dismissed, albeit
without prejudice against two of the defendants.
allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for
purposes of this screening opinion. Plaintiff names the
following as defendants in his complaint: (1) Gloucester
County Jail; (2) Cumberland County Jail; (3) State of New
Jersey; (4) Officer Deerfield - Cumberland County
Correctional Officer; and (5) Officer Deehan - Gloucester
County Correctional Officer.
alleges that on May 17, 2017, he was being transported from
Gloucester County Superior Court back to Cumberland County
Jail. According to plaintiff, he was under the care of
Officers Deerfield and Deehan during this return trip. They
did not provide him with the proper safety procedures during
the transport. While returning to the Cumberland County Jail,
there was a car accident. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his
back and neck as a result. He requests monetary damages as
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26,
1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review
complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is
proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee
or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings
a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42
U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to
sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. see 28 U.S.C. §
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane
v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.
2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 Fed.Appx. 230, 232
(3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 Fed.Appx. 159, 162
(3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That
standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
allege ‘sufficient factual matter' to show that the
claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing,
Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A]
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or
‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.' ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of constitutional rights. Section
1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.
to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that
the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains
Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, ...