United States District Court, D. New Jersey
ERICK J. A. H., Petitioner,
CHARLES L. GREEN, Respondent.
OPINION & ORDER
Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
matter, having come before this Court on Petitioner's
August 14, 2018 motion seeking reconsideration (at ECF No.
22) of this Court's July 17, 2018 Order (at ECF No. 17)
denying Petitioner's June 13, 2018 motion for emergent
injunctive relief (at ECF No. 10). By way of his June 13th
motion, Petitioner requested that the Court order
Petitioner's immediate release from immigration detention
or that it schedule a bond hearing before an immigration
judge. (ECF No. 10-1 at PageID: 239.) The Court held oral
argument on Petitioner's motion on July 17, 2018
(see ECF No. 17), and entered the Order denying that
request “for the reasons stated on the record” on
July 18, 2018. (ECF No. 17.)
District of New Jersey, motions for reconsideration can be
made pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). The rule provides
that such motions must be made within fourteen (14) days of
the entry of an order. Substantively, a motion for
reconsideration is viable due to (1) an intervening change in
the controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not
previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Carmichael v.
Everson, No. 03-4787, 2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May
21, 2004) (citations omitted). Relief under this rule is
inappropriate when a party merely disagrees with a
court's ruling or when a party simply wishes to re-argue
or re-hash its original motion. Sch. Specialty, Inc. v.
Ferrentino, No. 14-4507, 2015 WL 4602995, *2-3 (D.N.J.
July 30, 2015); see also Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v.
Chevron U.S.A., 680 F.Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988).
Moreover, a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity
to raise matters that could have been raised before the
original decision was reached. Bowers v. NCAA, 130
F.Supp.2d 610, 613 (D.N.J. 2001). Indeed, the Third Circuit
has indicated that “Rule 7.1(i) motions are appropriate
‘only where dispositive factual matters or
controlling decisions of law were presented to the court but
not considered.'” Tucker v. I'Jama,
404 Fed.Appx. 580, 581 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Khair
v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F.Supp. 316, 337 (D.N.J. 1995)
(emphasis added). Ultimately, reconsideration is an
“extraordinary remedy” that is granted
“very sparingly.” Brackett v. Ashcroft,
2003 WL 22303078, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2003) (citations
August 14, 2018 motion for reconsideration is denied. As an
initial matter, the motion is untimely because Petitioner did
not file the motion within fourteen days of the date on which
the Order now being challenged was filed, i.e., July
18, 2018. This fact alone provides a basis for the Court to
deny that motion. See, e.g.,
Tucker, 404 Fed.Appx. at 581; Testa v.
Hoban, No. 16-55, 2018 WL 1091290, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb.
addition, Petitioner's reconsideration motion fails to
provide any substantive basis for relief. Petitioner first
argues that reconsideration is appropriate because the Court
“misapplie[d] the ‘significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future' legal
standard [set forth] in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001).” (ECF No. 22-1 at PageID: 482.) Petitioner
further avers that the Court's denial of Petitioner's
motion for injunctive relief “is inconsistent with the
reasoning against unreasonably prolonged detention . . . in
Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221 (3rd
Cir. 2001), Leslie v. Atty Gen., 678 F.3d 265 (3rd
Cir. 2012), and Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty.
Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3rd Cir. 2015).” (ECF No.
22-1 at PageID: 482.) In so doing, Petitioner is simply
re-asserting claims and arguments that were already
considered and rejected by the Court. To be clear, the Court
gave - and continues to give - careful thought and attention
to the applicability of each of these decisions to
Petitioner's case. The fact that Petitioner disagrees
with the Court's findings regarding their import with
respect its denial of Petitioner's June 13, 2018 motion
for emergent injunctive relief is not a proper basis for the
Court to grant his reconsideration motion. Sch.
Specialty, Inc., 2015 WL 4602995 at *2-3.
also asserts that the Court improperly found that
Petitioner's several requests to the immigration court to
adjourn his still-pending merits hearing - which is presently
scheduled for October 11, 2018 (see ECF No. 22-1 at
PageID: 485) - were made in bad faith and have delayed
resolution of his ongoing immigration proceedings. (See
Id. at PageID: 487-91.) Petitioner inaccurately asserts
that during “oral argument[, ] the Court opined that
the decision to deny the preliminary injunction was because
[Petitioner] requested each continuance in his withholding
proceeding.” (Id. at PageID: 488.) To be
clear, during argument, the Court repeatedly stated only that
it was not making any conclusive determinations on the import
of Petitioner's adjournment requests to the resolution of
his habeas case. While the Court certainly - and quite
justifiably - questioned Petitioner's counsel about the
urgency of her client's emergent application in light of
the fact that she herself had recently sought and obtained an
adjournment of Petitioner's merits hearing to attend a
continuing legal education program, the Court disagrees with
- and in fact takes exception to - Petitioner's
assertions that the Court: (i) denied Petitioner's motion
for a preliminary injunction “because
[Petitioner] requested [continuances]”; and (ii)
expressly found that those requests were made in bad faith to
delay resolution of his underlying immigration proceedings.
The transcript of the Court's July 17, 2018 hearing - if
and when it is produced - will speak for itself. At this
juncture, it is sufficient to note that Petitioner's
inaccurate claims regarding the alleged “unjustifiable
inferences” made by the Court fail to provide a basis
for the Court to grant Petitioner's reconsideration
the Court, having read and considered Petitioner's August
21, 2018 motion for reconsideration, concludes that
Petitioner's motion fails to provide a basis for the
Court to grant him the “extraordinary remedy”
these reasons, and for good cause shown, IT IS on this
28th day of September 2018, ORDERED that
Petitioner's motion ...