United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Raymond Edward Dill, Plaintiff Pro Se
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Raymond Edward Dill seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Camden County Jail (“CCJ”). Complaint, Docket
Based on Plaintiff's affidavit of indigency, the Court
will grant his in forma pauperis application. Docket
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This
action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis.
the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim,
the complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
Plaintiff alleges he was mistreated by CCJ officers between
2007 and 2009. Complaint § III. He alleges he was
stripped searched “in an unlikely matter” when he
was brought in the facility and told to do other
“unconstitutionable [sic]” things. Id.
Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's two-year
limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J.
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). The accrual date of a § 1983 action
is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v.
Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which
the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at
480 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff knew of the
allegedly unconstitutional actions of the officers at the CCJ
at the time his detention ended in 2009; therefore, the
statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims expired in
2011 at the latest. As there are no grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations,  the complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice, meaning Plaintiff may not
refile his complaint. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart,
532 Fed.Appx. 110');">532 Fed.Appx. 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming
dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute of
the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
appropriate order follows.