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State v. J.L.G.

Supreme Court of New Jersey

July 31, 2018

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.L.G., a/k/a J.L.J., Defendant-Appellant.

          Argued April 24, 2018

          On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

          Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Lauren S. Michaels and Joseph J. Russo, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

          Najma Q. Rana, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Najma Q. Rana and Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).

          John J. Zefutie, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae The Last Resort Exoneration Project at Seton Hall University School of Law (Duane Morris and The Last Resort Exoneration Project at Seton Hall University School of Law, attorneys; John J. Zefutie, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs, and D. Michael Risinger, on the briefs).

          Brian J. Neary argued the cause for amicus curiae The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Law Offices of Brian J. Neary, attorneys; Brian J. Neary, on the brief).

          Alexi Machek Velez argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexi Machek Velez, Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief).

          Sarah E. Elsasser, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah E. Elsasser, of counsel and on the brief).

          Theo Mackey Pollack submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (The Law Office of Theo Mackey Pollack, and Munger, Tolles & Olson, attorneys).

          Laura Sunyak, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor, submitted a letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Richard T. Burke, President, attorney; Laura Sunyak and Joseph Paravecchia, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

          Herbert I. Waldman submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Association For Justice (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; Herbert I. Waldman and Rubin M. Sinins, on the brief).

          RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court.

         The Court considers whether the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" (CSAAS) has a sufficiently reliable basis in science to be the subject of expert testimony.

         Defendant J.L.G. went to trial on the following charges: first-degree aggravated sexual assault; third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact; second-degree endangering the welfare of a child; and third-degree witness tampering. Defendant's stepdaughter, "Bonnie," testified at trial about an escalating pattern of sexual abuse that defendant carried out against her for roughly eighteen months, from when she was fourteen and defendant was about thirty-two. Defendant pointed a gun at Bonnie and threatened to hurt her, her mother, or her brother if word got out. Bonnie told no one about the abuse, which she found embarrassing. A close friend of Bonnie's mother visited the family apartment and found defendant lying on top of Bonnie with an erection. When Bonnie's mother heard about the incident, she said, with a knife in hand, she would kill defendant. Bonnie was afraid her mother would follow through and denied any sexual activity. Although Bonnie claimed she wanted to tell her mother, she also did not "want her to do anything for her to get locked up." In May or June of 2012, Bonnie used her iPhone to record the last episode of sexual abuse. The State introduced the audio recording at trial and played it during Bonnie's testimony. The jury heard very descriptive, at times graphic, language about sexual acts. After an argument, Bonnie told her mother that defendant had "been raping [her] for the past year and a half." Bonnie made a statement to the prosecutor's office and placed two phone calls to defendant under the guidance of detectives. During the recorded conversations, defendant offered to give Bonnie money after he asked her to withdraw the allegations.

         The State presented the above evidence at trial through various witnesses. Defense counsel highlighted the absence of physical evidence and challenged Bonnie's credibility. The defense did not dispute the authenticity of the recording Bonnie made and told the jury that defendant "pleads guilty" to the child endangerment charge as a result.

         Central to this appeal is the CSAAS evidence. Defendant tried to bar the testimony in advance. In a written opinion, the trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion. Dr. Lynn Taska, a clinical psychologist, testified as an expert on CSAAS. Immediately before, the trial court gave the jury detailed instructions about how to consider her testimony; the court's charge closely followed the model jury charge. Dr. Taska testified before Bonnie did. The prosecution referenced her testimony in summation and argued that "just because" child victims of sexual assault "don't report the abuse, that doesn't mean they shouldn't be believed." In the final instructions to the jury, the trial court again recited the model charge on CSAAS.

         The jury convicted defendant of all four counts. On appeal, defendant challenged the admissibility of the CSAAS testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court granted defendant's petition for certification limited to "whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's expert regarding CSAAS," and remanded to the trial court for a hearing "to determine whether CSAAS evidence meets the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702, in light of recent scientific evidence." 229 N.J. 606');">229 N.J. 606, 607 (2017).

         The Honorable Peter F. Bariso, Jr., A.J.S.C., presided over the hearing on remand. Four experts submitted reports and testified, and dozens of exhibits were introduced, including multiple published scientific articles. Judge Bariso found that the State failed to show general acceptance of CSAAS in the relevant scientific community, and concluded that there was consensus only as to delayed disclosure. Judge Bariso concluded that CSAAS evidence did not meet the standard for admissibility under N.J.R.E. 702.

         HELD: The Court finds continued scientific support for only one aspect of CSAAS --delayed disclosure -- because scientists generally accept that a significant percentage of children delay reporting sexual abuse. Expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule. See N.J.R.E. 702. In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation. However, if a child cannot offer a rational explanation, expert testimony may help the jury understand the witness's behavior. The Court asks the Committee on Model Jury Charges to develop an appropriate instruction on delayed disclosure. In this appeal, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. As a result, the expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and defendant's convictions are affirmed.

         1. N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. The proponent of expert evidence must establish three things: (1) the subject matter of the testimony must be "beyond the ken of the average juror"; (2) the field of inquiry "must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable"; and (3) "the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the" testimony. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984). Consistent with the remand order, the hearing before Judge Bariso focused primarily on the reliability prong. In criminal cases, the Court has continued to rely on the Frye standard to assess reliability. The test requires trial judges to determine whether the science underlying the proposed expert testimony has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). (pp. 15-17)

         2. CSAAS originated from the work of Dr. Roland Summit. In 1983, he published an article in which he described the syndrome he outlined as "a common denominator of the most frequently observed" behaviors of child sexual abuse victims: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. He described the first two categories as "preconditions" to sexual abuse, and the remaining three as "sequential contingencies" of sexual assault. Nine years later, Dr. Summit published a follow-up paper. He revisited the original piece and its origin to address "subsequent distortions that court misuse has imposed," and acknowledged the "misunderstanding" that stemmed from his use "of the word syndrome." (pp. 17-22)

         3. The following year, the Court found that CSAAS had a "sufficiently reliable scientific basis" to be presented to a jury. State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 556 (1993). The Court relied extensively on Dr. Summit's initial 1983 article. The Court concluded that CSAAS is not "evidence of guilt or innocence" and cannot be used as direct proof that abuse occurred. Id. at 571, 574, 578. Rather, the Court allowed its use to help juries understand "traits often found in children who have been abused," which might otherwise be counterintuitive. Id. at 582. In response to J.Q., the Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee developed an instruction on CSAAS. The trial court in this case recited the model charge nearly verbatim -- both before Dr. Taska testified and before the jury began deliberating. Since J.Q., the Court has restated and refined certain principles about the use of CSAAS testimony but has not reassessed the scientific underpinning of CSAAS evidence. Forty other states and the District of Columbia allow CSAAS testimony for some purpose. A few states bar CSAAS evidence. (pp. 22-30)

         4. The remand hearing provided an opportunity to test the principles underlying CSAAS in an adversarial setting. The evidence at the hearing identified a number of shortcomings about the concept of a child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. First, the label "syndrome" itself raises serious questions. Second, CSAAS and its five component behaviors are not easy to define with precision. Third, there is disagreement as to how the behaviors relate to one another. Fourth, experts debated the import of the five behaviors at the hearing. Finally, CSAAS stems from observations made in clinical practice -- not systematic scientific study. Based on the record, it does not appear that CSAAS's five-category theory has been tested and empirically validated as a whole. (pp. 30-35)

         5. The Court thus considers relevant evidence for each of the five behaviors. (1) Dr. Summit explained secrecy by noting that "[t]he average child never asks and never tells." In short, victims keep abuse a secret by not talking about it. (2) Dr. Summit identified helplessness as a "precondition[]" to abuse, not a behavior. The concept appears to state the obvious. (3) Accommodation refers to the coping mechanism by which a child adjusts to sexual abuse. It encompasses all possible behaviors from the most resilient to the most self-destructive, and all victims fall under the broad construct in one way or another. (4) Judge Bariso found that delayed disclosure is generally accepted among the scientific community. The record supports that finding. (5) Retraction occurs when a victim truthfully discloses abuse and then recants. Evidence presented at the hearing revealed that only a minority of victims recant truthful allegations of abuse and that experts do not agree on the rate of recantation. The Court also observed that there does not appear to be a consensus among the experts, or in the scientific literature, on the subject of false denials. (pp. 35-45)

         6. To assess the reliability prong of N.J.R.E. 702, the Court considers whether CSAAS has achieved general acceptance in the scientific community. The evidence presented at the remand hearing answers that question. Judge Bariso found that there is consensus for only one type of behavior -- delayed disclosure. The Court agrees. Because evidence about CSAAS as a whole and the other four categories does not satisfy the Frye standard, experts may not present evidence on those topics at trial. When the other prongs of Rule 702 are met, the State may present expert evidence on delayed disclosure among victims of child sexual abuse -- and only that evidence -- to a jury. When expert evidence on delay is introduced, trial courts should provide limiting instructions to the jury -- both before an expert witness testifies and as part of the court's final charge. The Court asks the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges to draft appropriate instructions limited to delayed disclosure as soon as practicable. The Court also invites the parties and amici to submit proposed charges to the Committee and provides guidance about the charge. (pp. 47-52)

         7. Proponents of expert evidence on delayed disclosure must satisfy all three parts of Rule 702, including that the testimony concerns a subject beyond the ken of the average juror. Expert testimony is not appropriate to explain what a jury can understand by itself. By contrast, issues that are beyond the understanding of the average juror may call for expert evidence. Trial judges, as gatekeepers, decide that threshold question. Whether a victim's delayed disclosure is beyond the ken of the average juror will depend on the facts of the case. In this case, no juror needed help from an expert to understand and evaluate Bonnie's testimony. (pp. 52-54)

         8. Applying the above findings to this case, it was error to admit testimony about CSAAS --both as to the theory in general and the behaviors that are not generally accepted by the scientific community. There are also serious concerns about the admissibility of expert testimony on delayed disclosure in this case because Bonnie, a teenager, gave reasons for the delay that were not beyond the ken of the average juror. Nonetheless, those errors are harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. In light of the evidence presented -- in particular, the testimony of the victim combined with a graphic audio recording of an act of sexual abuse -- there is not a sufficient possibility that the admission of CSAAS evidence led the jury to an unjust verdict or one it might otherwise not have reached as to Counts One and Two. During closing argument, defense counsel conceded that there was sufficient evidence to support Count Three. Finally, the CSAAS evidence had little if any bearing on the witness tampering charge. The admission of the CSAAS evidence in this case was harmless. (pp. 54-56)

         MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

          JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER's opinion.

          OPINION

          RABNER CHIEF JUSTICE.

         I. Introduction

         Thirty-five years ago, Dr. Roland Summit, M.D., a clinical psychiatrist, identified five categories of behavior that were reportedly common in victims of child sexual abuse: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted, unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. Dr. Summit drew on various sources, including his own clinical practice, and asserted that the five behaviors comprised a syndrome -- the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" (CSAAS).

         Courts across the nation embraced Dr. Summit's findings, which paved the way for experts to testify about the syndrome in criminal sex abuse trials. In 1993, this Court found that CSAAS evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted. State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554 (1993).

         In the decades since Dr. Summit's article first appeared, neither the American Psychiatric Association nor the American Psychological Association has recognized CSAAS. The syndrome does not appear in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), the mental health field's authoritative list of mental disorders. And the notion of a child abuse accommodation "syndrome" has been examined, critiqued, and undermined by a number of scientific studies.

         Defendant challenged the CSAAS evidence introduced at trial. To better assess defendant's claim, we remanded the matter for a hearing before the trial court. Four experts testified at the hearing, and the parties introduced and discussed numerous scientific studies.

         We rely heavily on the record developed at the hearing. Based on what is known today, it is no longer possible to conclude that CSAAS has a sufficiently reliable basis in science to be the subject of expert testimony. We find continued scientific support for only one aspect of the theory -- delayed disclosure -- because scientists generally accept that a significant percentage of children delay reporting sexual abuse.

         We therefore hold that expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule. See N.J.R.E. 702. In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror.

         That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation. However, if a child cannot offer a rational explanation, expert testimony may help the jury understand the witness's behavior. We therefore ask the Committee on Model Jury Charges to develop an appropriate instruction on delayed disclosure.

         In this appeal, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Among other things, the victim made an audio recording of an act of sexual abuse that took place several weeks before she spoke with the police. As a result, we find that the expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and we affirm defendant's convictions.

         II. Facts and Procedural History

         A. Facts

         A Hudson County Grand Jury charged defendant J.L.G. in a nine-count indictment in 2012. After the trial court severed four of the counts and the State dismissed a fifth, defendant went to trial on the following charges: first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); and third-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a). Defendant's stepdaughter, whom we refer to by the fictitious name "Bonnie" to protect her identity, testified at trial about an escalating pattern of sexual abuse that defendant carried out against her for roughly eighteen months. We rely on the trial record to recount the facts.

         Defendant began dating Bonnie's mother around 1996, when Bonnie was an infant. He moved in with them months later and assumed the role of Bonnie's father.

         According to Bonnie, the sexual abuse began in 2011, when she was fourteen and defendant was about thirty-two. One day, defendant called Bonnie into the living room and showed her his exposed penis. Over the course of the next year and a half, defendant had Bonnie record him masturbating, ejaculated on her chest area, touched her, had her masturbate him, performed oral sex on her, digitally penetrated her, and had vaginal intercourse with her four or five times.

         Bonnie said the sexual abuse occurred on a daily basis, always against her wishes. After each incident, defendant put money on her dresser. At one point, he gave her an iPhone. He also instructed her not to say anything and threatened her; defendant pointed a gun at Bonnie and threatened to hurt her, her mother, or her brother if word got out. Bonnie told no one about the abuse, which she found embarrassing.

         A close friend of Bonnie's mother visited the family apartment one day in or around 2011 and found defendant lying on top of Bonnie. Although defendant wore jeans, the friend noticed that he had an erection. When Bonnie's mother heard about the incident, she questioned her daughter. With a knife in hand, the mother said she would kill defendant "if he's doing something." Bonnie was afraid her mother would follow through with the threat and denied any sexual activity. Although Bonnie claimed she wanted to tell her mother, she also did not "want her to do anything for her to get locked up."

         In May or June of 2012, Bonnie used her iPhone to record the last episode of sexual abuse. She felt that she could no longer "stick it out" at home until age 18 and wanted to have proof when the abuse eventually came to light.

         Bonnie testified that defendant performed oral sex on her and also tried to penetrate her on this occasion. The State introduced the audio recording at trial and played it during Bonnie's testimony. The jury heard very descriptive, at times graphic, language about sexual acts. At one point, Bonnie refused to follow defendant's directive about how to position herself. At another, defendant said, "I'm not [e]aculating] in you" and cursed at Bonnie. Throughout the recording, Bonnie repeatedly stated that "[t]his is going to be the last thing."

         After an argument with defendant on June 13, 2012, Bonnie told her mother that defendant had "been raping [her] for the past year and a half." Bonnie added that she had proof and tried to play the iPhone recording. According to Bonnie's mother, defendant tried to take away the phone, turned "white as a ghost," and left the apartment after she decided to call the police.

         Bonnie made a statement to the prosecutor's office and placed two phone calls to defendant under the guidance of detectives. During the recorded conversations, defendant repeatedly said he was "sorry," at Bonnie's urging, but he did not specify the reason or admit to any sexual misconduct. He also offered to give Bonnie money, pay for her phone, and "[e]ven buy [her] a car" -- after he asked her to withdraw the allegations.

         Soon after, the police located defendant at a friend's house and arrested him. They also retrieved a pair of shorts that Bonnie claimed she wore during the last sexual encounter with defendant. The shorts contained a small amount of male DNA. Although defendant was not identified as the source, he could not be excluded as a possible contributor.

         B. Trial

         The State presented the above evidence at trial through various witnesses including Bonnie, her mother, the mother's friend, an expert on DNA, and a number of police officers.

         Defendant did not testify. In his defense, counsel highlighted the absence of physical evidence in support of Bonnie's accusations. Counsel also challenged Bonnie's credibility in a number of ways: inconsistencies in her account of events; a pending criminal charge against Bonnie that arguably influenced her cooperation with the prosecutor's office; Bonnie's delay in reporting acts of abuse for more than a year after they allegedly began; poor performance and behavior problems at school; and other issues.

         The defense did not dispute the authenticity of the recording Bonnie made on her own. Counsel told the jury in summation that the conversation should not have happened, and that defendant "pleads guilty" to the child endangerment charge as a result of the recording. Counsel argued, however, that the State presented no physical proof of penetration in the case.

         Central to this appeal is the CSAAS evidence that surfaced at various points during trial. Defendant tried to bar the testimony in advance. In a written opinion, the trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion. The court found that the evidence was relevant because it would help the jury evaluate "the significance of the victim's delayed disclosure." In addition, the trial judge concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice because the testimony would not be offered to prove defendant's guilt, would be subject to cross-examination, and would be accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions. The court also found that the testimony satisfied the admissibility requirements for scientific evidence under N.J.R.E. 702. In that regard, the trial judge relied on this Court's settled case law.

         Dr. Lynn Taska, a clinical psychologist, testified as an expert on CSAAS. Immediately before, the trial court gave the jury detailed instructions about how to consider her testimony; the court's charge closely followed the model jury charge.

         Dr. Taska has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and specializes in the area of child sexual abuse. She has testified as an expert witness on CSAAS more than thirty times.

         Dr. Taska testified before Bonnie did. Her testimony fills thirty pages in the trial transcript. At the outset, Dr. Taska stated that she knew nothing about the facts of the case. She also explained that CSAAS was not a diagnostic tool and did not offer proof that sexual abuse actually happened. Instead, it was "a description of a collection of behaviors" "meant to educate us about how children . . . who have been sexually abused typically behave."

         Dr. Taska described Dr. Summit's article on CSAAS and discussed in detail the five factors that comprise the syndrome. Throughout her testimony, she referred to various studies about CSAAS and summarized a number of them for the jury. She told the jury that, in her judgment, "there is an enormous body of literature supporting elements of" CSAAS. Dr. Taska critiqued two studies critical of CSAAS and countered that "there are hundreds of studies that support" it.

         The prosecution referenced Dr. Taska's testimony in summation and argued that "just because" child victims of sexual assault "don't report the abuse, that doesn't mean they shouldn't be believed." The prosecution also recounted Bonnie's reasons for not disclosing the abuse: defendant had threatened her with a gun, and she was scared of how her mother might react.

         In the final instructions to the jury, the trial court again recited the model charge on CSAAS. The court stressed that Dr. Taska's testimony could not be considered as proof that defendant sexually abused Bonnie. Instead, the testimony could be considered to "explain[] certain behavior of the alleged victim of child sexual abuse. . . . The accommodation syndrome, if proven, may help explain why a sexually abused child may delay reporting." The full text of the model charge appears later.

         C. Verdict and Appellate History

         The jury convicted defendant of all four counts. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-three years in prison, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility on the aggravated sexual assault count. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court dismissed the severed charges at sentencing.

         Among other arguments on appeal, defendant challenged the admissibility of the CSAAS testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but vacated a penalty for the Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund so that the trial court could assess the correct penalty amount on remand. As to the CSAAS issue, the panel appropriately observed that "[t]he admissibility of CSAAS expert testimony is well settled." The panel cited J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, for support. The Appellate Division also noted that the trial court provided proper limiting instructions and that Dr. Taska acknowledged CSAAS evidence was not meant to determine whether sexual abuse occurred in any individual case. The panel concluded that the testimony was relevant to explain Bonnie's delayed disclosure and determine her credibility.

         We granted defendant's petition for certification limited to a single issue:

whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's expert regarding CSAAS, on the grounds that CSAAS testimony was irrelevant to defendant's trial, that its admission was unduly prejudicial to defendant, and that CSAAS testimony is not sufficiently reliable to meet the standard of N.J.R.E. 702.
[229 N.J. 606');">229 N.J. 606, 607 (2017).]

         Because we lacked an adequate factual record to consider the issue, we remanded to the trial court for a hearing "to determine whether CSAAS evidence meets the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702, in light of recent scientific evidence." Ibid.

         D. Remand Hearing

         The Honorable Peter F. Bariso, Jr., A.J.S.C., presided over the hearing on remand. It was held in July 2017 and lasted four days. Four experts submitted reports and testified: Dr. Anthony D'Urso, Psy.D., and Dr. Thomas Lyon, J.D., Ph.D., for the State; and Dr. Charles Brainerd, Ph.D., and Dr. Maggie Bruck, Ph.D., for defendant. Dozens of exhibits were introduced, including multiple published scientific articles.

         Dr. D'Urso is the section chief and supervising psychologist at the Audrey Hepburn Children's House, a legislatively mandated regional child abuse diagnostic center in the State. He is also an associate professor of psychology at Montclair ...


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