United States District Court, D. New Jersey
ORDER [219, 273, 274, 283]
L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
consideration of the parties' motions to strike the
reports of the four experts, their oppositions thereto, and
oral argument held on the record, and WHEREAS, Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 provides:
witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
the Third Circuit has described the requirements of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 as a “trilogy of restrictions on
expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit.”
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider
v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404-05 (3d Cir.
2003)(“[T]he district court acts as a gatekeeper,
preventing opinion testimony that does not meet the
requirements of qualification, reliability and fit from
reaching the jury.”)); and
a witness “must be qualified to testify as an
expert.” Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321. This
“requires ‘that the witness possess specialized
expertise.'” Id. (quoting
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 405); and
the Third Circuit “interpret[s] this requirement
liberally, ” and an expert can be qualified through
“a broad range of knowledge, skills, and
training.” Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994)); and
WHEREAS this “liberal policy of admissibility extends
to the substantive as well as the formal qualification of
experts.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741 (noting
the Third Circuit has “eschewed imposing overly
rigorous requirements of expertise and ha[s] been satisfied
with more generalized qualifications.”); and
“it is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony
simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed
expert to be the best qualified or because the expert does
not have the specialization that the court considers most
appropriate.” Lauria v. AMTRAK, 145 F.3d 593,
598-99 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Holbrook v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996)). Indeed,
experts can be qualified “on the basis of practical
experience alone, and a formal degree, title, or educational
specialty is not required.” Id.
“[I]nsistence on a certain kind of degree or background
is inconsistent” with Third Circuit jurisprudence.
In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855; and
an expert witness's “testimony must be
reliable.” Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321. “To
establish reliability, the testimony ‘must be based on
the methods and procedures of science rather than on
subjective belief or unsupported speculation; the expert must
have good grounds for his . . . belief.'”
Furlan v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 516 Fed.Appx.
201, 205 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Schneider, 320 F.3d
at 404); and
“in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469
(1993), the Supreme Court charged trial judges with the
responsibility of acting as ‘gatekeepers' to
exclude unreliable expert ...