United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage
LESLIE L. CAMICK, Plaintiff,
HARRY R. HOLLADAY, ESQ.; EVELYN A. WATTLEY; and KAITRAXX LLC, Defendants.
OPINION [DKT. NO. 1, 5]
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court upon the filing of an
application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”), [Dkt. No. 5], by Plaintiff Leslie L.
Camick (the “Plaintiff”). Plaintiff's
application to proceed IFP will be granted based on the
information provided therein, and the Clerk of the Court will
be ordered to file the Complaint. Because Plaintiff is
proceeding IFP, the Court must now screen his Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
December 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against
Defendants Harry Holladay (“Holladay”), Evelyn
Wattley (“Wattley”), and Kaitraxx, Inc.
(“Kaitraxx” and collectively, the
“Defendants”), alleging that they violated 28
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“Section 1985”) by
conspiring to cause Plaintiff to be wrongfully arrested on
multiple occasions between 2011 and 2013. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wattley made a false police
report and a series of false statements to police indicating
that Plaintiff had stolen her car, which ultimately resulted
in Plaintiff's arrest. With regard to Defendant Holladay,
Plaintiff seems to allege that he conspired to violate
Plaintiff's rights by providing Wattley with legal advice
regarding “her actions.” (See Compl. at
¶ 81-89). Defendant Kaitraxx appears to be an LLC of
which Wattley is the sole member and CEO. [Dkt. No. 1-4].
There are no allegations in the Complaint regarding any
wrongdoing by Kaitraxx.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must preliminarily
screen IFP filings, and must dismiss any filing that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing a
plaintiff's allegations, a district court “must
accept as true all well-pled factual allegations as well as
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and
construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 n.1
(3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, pro se pleadings must be
construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Where, however,
“the complaint facially shows noncompliance with”
a statute of limitations, it may be dismissed for failure to
state a claim. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran &
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994).
Section 1985(3) claim accrues when the plaintiff “knew
or should have known of the alleged conspiracy.”
Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 189
(3d Cir. 2010)(citing Bougher v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir.1989)). “The
statute of limitations, accordingly, runs from the date of
each overt act causing damage to the plaintiff.”
Bougher, 882 F.2d at 80. Courts in the Third Circuit
apply state personal injury statutes of limitation to Section
1985(3) claims. See Id. at 79. In New Jersey, the
limitations period for personal injury is two years. N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. Plaintiff's Complaint arises
from actions allegedly taken by Defendants between 2011 and
2013, and at the very latest January 2014 when Plaintiff was
convicted. Plaintiff did not, however, file his Complaint
until December 2016. Because he filed his Complaint more than
two-years from the date any alleged injury arose,
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of
fact, Plaintiff acknowledges in the second paragraph of his
Complaint that his claims are untimely. (See Compl.
at 2). He argues, however, that the limitations period should
be equitably tolled. “Equitable tolling is an
extraordinary remedy which should be extended only
sparingly.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d
744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005)(citations omitted). There are three
principal situations in which equitable tolling may be
appropriate: “(1) where the defendant has actively
misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of
action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has
been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where
the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Oshiver, 38
F.3d at 1387. Moreover, “[t]o obtain the benefit of
equitable tolling, a party also must show that ‘she
exercised due diligence in pursuing and preserving her
claim.'” Omar v. Blackman, 590 Fed.Appx.
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel Beato v.
United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
has not made any of the above showings. He argues instead
that he was barred from filing this suit, or any suit against
these Defendants, by order of the District of Kansas. In the
order on which Plaintiff relies, however, the court
denied a request by the government to enjoin
Plaintiff from filing further pleadings in federal court.
See United States v. Camick, No. 13-10042-01-JTM,
2014 WL 644997, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 19, 2014); see also
Camick v. Smith, No. CV 16-8844 (RBK/JS), 2017 WL
2779752, at *2 (D.N.J. June 26, 2017), aff'd,
698 Fed.Appx. 41 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Plaintiff's
action is barred by the statute of limitations, and the Court
will dismiss it with prejudice.
foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs application to proceed without
prepayment of fees and costs is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's
Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. An Order ...