United States District Court, D. New Jersey
RENÉE MARIE BUMB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendants First Service Residential and
Anthony Iancono [Docket No. 134] (collectively, the
“Defendants”). The procedural history of this
case is protracted and has been set forth in this Court's
prior Opinions. [See, e.g., Docket No.
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have set forth
documentary evidence that demonstrates that Plaintiff's
apartment, 27H located at Riviera Towers, was ordered to be
sold by virtue of a default judgment entered against her in
the amount of $10, 056.15. Defendants' Statement of
Material Facts (“DSMF”), [Docket No. 134-1, at
¶ 7]. Plaintiff was subsequently evicted and the
apartment was sold. [Id. at ¶ 9]. The sale
netted a surplus and the funds were deposited into the New
Jersey Superior Court Trust Fund. [Id. at ¶
Order dated December 7, 2011, Plaintiff was ordered
“ejected and directed to immediately quit and surrender
possession” of the apartment to Riviera Towers.
[Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. D]. Riviera Towers proceeded
to change the locks and arranged for Plaintiff's
belongings to be inventoried and stored by co-defendant
American Movers, Inc. [Id. at ¶ 12].
judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it
will “affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is
“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable
jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. at 248.
deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact,
a court's role is not to weigh the evidence: all
reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of
credibility should be resolved against the moving
party.” Meyer v. Riegel Products
Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983).
However, a mere “scintilla of evidence, ” without
more, will not give rise to a genuine dispute for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In the face of such
evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “where
the record . . . could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party . . . .” Matsushita
Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986). “Summary judgment motions thus require
judges to ‘assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a
‘fair-minded' jury could ‘reasonably'
decide.'” Williams v. Borough of West Chester,
Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265).
movant “always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, ' which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Then,
“when a properly supported motion for summary judgment
[has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.'” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The non-movant's burden is
rigorous: it “must point to concrete evidence in the
record”; mere allegations, conclusions, conjecture, and
speculation will not defeat summary judgment. Orsatti v.
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir.
makes three factual allegations against Defendants: (1)
Iancono, as an employee of FirstService, “arranged for
a locksmith to break, enter and change” the lock on
Plaintiff's condo; (2) Iancono, “knowing he was
dealing in stolen property, ” arranged for American
Movers, Inc. to store items from Plaintiff's condo; and
(3) Iancono lied to the West New York Police. Plaintiff avers
that Defendants' alleged actions violate the Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
claims against Defendants fail. As Defendants correctly
state, they are not state actors, and thus, Plaintiff's
litany of claims of constitutional violations fail as a
matter of law. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1002 (1982)(noting that Section 1983 excludes from its reach
“merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory
or wrongful”)(quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13 (1948)); see also McCabe v. Mut. Aid Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at *15, 2015
WL 4715260 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2015)(“It is well
recognized, that the Constitution protects citizens from
infringement of their rights by the government, not by
private parties.”) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)).
to the extent Plaintiff alleges violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242, these are criminal statutes, and
they do not authorize private rights of action. See,
e.g., Jung v. Bank of Am., N.A., No.
3:16-CV-00704, 2016 WL 5929273, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2,
2016)(collecting cases discussing lack of private right of
action under criminal statutes). Finally, Plaintiff's
claims of conspiracy fail as there are no material facts in
dispute to support such a claim.
request for an extension of time to respond to
Defendants' Motion will likewise be denied because
Plaintiff fails to set forth how the discovery she seeks will
materially affect the Summary Judgment Motion. “[I]t is
well established that a court ‘is obliged to give a
party opposing summary judgment an adequate opportunity to
obtain discovery.'” Doe v. Abington Friends
Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 139 (3d
Cir. 1988)). Rule 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant
shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion
or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other
appropriate order.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).
discovery is incomplete, a district court is rarely justified
in granting summary judgment, unless the discovery
request pertains to facts that are not material to the moving
party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law,
” or the Rule 56(d) declaration is inadequate.
Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir.
2015)(citing Doe, 480 F.3d at 257)(emphasis added);
see also Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18
(3d Cir. 1986). Defendant seeks an extension so that she
may receive responses to her “First Set of
Interrogatories, Productions, and Admissions.”
[See Docket No. 143]. There are multiple issues with
Plaintiff's request. First, Plaintiff indicates that she
is waiting for a response from Riviera Towers Corporation and
Kenneth Blane, who are no longer parties to this case.
Second, Plaintiff does not identify what information she
seeks from Defendants or how it would preclude summary
judgment. As discussed above, Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because (1) they are not state