United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage
B. KUGLER United States District Judge
Court now considers Defendants ARP Renovations and
Maintenance, LLC (“ARP”) and Andrew Pollock's
“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc.
No. 22). For the reasons expressed below, Defendants'
motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
case arises out of a dispute between a roofing company and
its salesman over allegedly unpaid minimum and overtime wages
and commissions. Pollock owns ARP,  a roofing business. (Compl.
¶ 5). In March 2014, Defendants hired Collins as a sales
person to sell roofing jobs. (Compl. ¶ 7; Pl.'s Ex.
A at 16; Pl.'s Ex. C ¶ 3). Pollock was Collins's
only supervisor. (Pl.'s Opp. at 2; Pl.'s Ex. C ¶
5). Collins's job consisted of canvassing neighborhoods;
that is, making cold calls to the homes of potential
customers. (Pl.'s Opp. at 2; Pl.'s Ex. B at 13-14).
Collins “reported to” Defendants' offices and
used a vehicle provided by Defendants to make these sales
calls at the homes of customers. (Pl.'s Opp. at 2;
Pl.'s Ex. A at 56; Pl.'s Ex. C ¶ 6). Collins
also sometimes performed emergency roofing services and roof
patches. (Pl.'s Ex. C ¶ 7). The parties had a verbal
agreement regarding compensation, though they dispute the
terms of that agreement. (Pl.'s Ex. C ¶ 11;
Defs.' Br. at 3). Both parties agree that Collins was
paid commissions based on the number of sales he made. The
commission structure itself is in dispute,  as are the number
of hours Collins worked per week.
party disputes that Defendants paid Collins in a timely
manner and in full from the time he was hired until March
2015. (Defs.' Br. at 2-3; Defs.' Ex. H at 22; Compl.
¶ 10; Pl.'s Opp. at 2). Nor do the parties dispute
that Defendants fired Collins in August 2015. (Defs.' Br.
at 2; Compl. ¶ 17). The parties' versions of the
facts diverge, however, insofar as what occurred between
March and August 2015. Defendants assert that Collins was
paid in full between March and August 2015. (Defs.' Br.
at 3; Defs.' Ex. I at 33). Collins claims that he is owed
minimum and overtime wages for every week he worked in 2015,
seven weeks that he was not paid between March and August.
(Pl.'s Opp. at 3-4). Collins also claims that he is owed
at least $23, 277.18 in commissions and a signing bonus
combined. (Pl.'s Ex. C ¶¶ 26-31). Collins
brought suit for unpaid minimum wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) (Count I), unpaid overtime
wages under the FLSA (Count II) and unpaid wages under the
New Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”) (Count
filed his complaint against Defendants for alleged violations
of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and the
NJWPL, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56, et seq.
Defendants answered the complaint and asserted counter-claims
against Collins. (Doc. No. 7). On July 17, 2017, Defendants
moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of all
of Collins's claims. (Doc. No. 22). Defendants'
argument is largely based on Collins's failure to timely
respond to Defendants' request for admissions, rendering
the requests admitted. (Doc. No. 22 ¶ 15). Thus,
Defendants assert, because Collins essentially admitted that
he has no claim, he cannot establish a prima facie case under
the FLSA or the NJWPL. Collins then filed a motion to
withdraw and amend his admissions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
36(b). (Doc. No. 23). This Court granted that motion on
August 22, 2017. (Doc. No. 26). We now turn to consider the
issues remaining in Defendants' motion for partial
brings claims under the FLSA and the NJWPL. Accordingly, this
Court exercises federal question subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental
jurisdiction over the accompanying state law claim pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is appropriate pursuant to 28
U.S. § 1391.
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
330 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When a court weighs the evidence
presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine
issue” is on the party moving for summary judgment.
Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074,
1080 (3d Cir. 1996). The moving party may satisfy its burden
either by “produc[ing] evidence showing the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact” or by
“‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the
district court-that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 If the party seeking
summary judgment makes this showing, it is left to the
nonmoving party to “do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must “make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Furthermore, “[w]hen
opposing summary judgment, the nonmovant may not rest upon
mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts
of record which would contradict the facts identified by the
movant.'” Corliss v. Varner, 247 F.
App'x 353, 354 (3d Cir. 2002)).
deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary
judgment, the Court's role is not to evaluate the
evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility
determinations are the province of the fact ...