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Bey v. Pennsauken Municipal Court
United States District Court, D. New Jersey
March 12, 2018
ATIYA KIRKLAND BEY, Plaintiff,
PENNSAUKEN MUNICIPAL COURT, STEVEN M. PETRILLO, DONNA M. KENNEY, MERCHANTVILLE MUNICIPAL COURT, OREN R. THOMAS, III, MAUREEN F. FINNEGAN, ROSMARY S. KELLY, ALICIA D. HOFFMEYER, CAMDEN MUNICIPAL COURT, PALMIRA WHITE, TONYA STEWART, CHRISTINE T.J. TUCKER, SHARON EGGLESTON, ELISSA REDMER, DONNA LEE VITALE, DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, MELISSA IDLER, JENNY ESPINAL, JENNIFER DISANTIS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER LAW GUARDIAN, URIJAH SUAREZ, EDEN FAYTHE FELD, LAUREN PETTY, KELLY DONEGAN, PAUL FITZPATRICK, EVESHAM MUNICIPAL COURT, CHERYL BEAUMONT, STACI HEAVNER, CAMDEN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, LINDA W. ENYON, NALO BROWN, MARY WIESEMAN, MARY EVA COLALILLO, KAREN J. CAPLAN, DAVID ANDERSON, DAVID GARNES, RODERICK T. BALTIMORE, TEOFILO MONTANEZ-SANTIAGO, KELLY DONEGAN, IRIS MOORE, CHRIS CHRISTIE, CAMDEN MUNICIPAL CODE ENFORCERS, CAMDEN PARKING AUTHORITY, STARR M. WATSON KIRKLAND, EVESHAM TOWNSHIP CODE ENFORCERS, WESTVILLE CODE ENFORCERS, WOODLYNNE MUNICIPAL CODE ENFORCERS, KENNEDY HOSPITAL, ST. CECILIA SCHOOL, PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, DELAWARE VALLEY PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, LLC, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION, FAMILY PART, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY FOR THE DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, CARISSA FERGUSONTHOMAS, MERYL E. UDELL, TENICHA TOWNSEND-MOBLEY, DCFLO- CAMDEN NORTH, J. CLINE, JOEL SCHNEIDER, ANN MARIE DONIO, DEAN GIRARD NASSON, BRADFORD GILL, ERICA G. SMITH, G. QUINTANA, BRUCE BULLOCK, DAWN BRANCH, LISA VON PIER, JESSICA TROMBETTA, CHARMAINE THOMAS, BRIAN C. ROSS, CHRISTOPHER S. PORRINO, JAMES LOUIS, JOSEPH E. KARKARA, LORRAINE M. AUGUSTINI, CENTRALIZED INFRACTIONS BUREAU, NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PENNSAUKEN MUNICIPAL CODE ENFORCERS, and NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSIONER, Defendants. v.
KIRKLAND BEY Appearing pro se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Atiya Kirkland Bey, appearing pro se, filed a
complaint on October 17, 2017, followed by a November 30,
2017 amended complaint, asserted against seventy-nine named
Plaintiff claims she was forced to have supervised visitation
with her son against her will and that she was pulled over by
"code enforcers" unlawfully and given parking
tickets in "violati[on of her] constitutional
Plaintiff asks for "all records . . . corrected,
expunged and sealed, " "a copy of all [of her]
records, " "a formal written apology from"
various individuals, "$1 billion dollars"
"[f]or all of [her] stress, defamation of character and
forced separation from [her] son, " and not to "be
on the . . . detain list"; and
Plaintiff has filed an application to proceed without
prepayment of fees ("in forma pauperis" or
"IFP" application), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1), a court may allow a litigant to proceed
without prepayment of fees if he submits a proper IFP
although § 1915 refers to "prisoners, "
federal courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP
applications, Hickson v. Mauro, No. 11-6304, 2011 WL
6001088, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (citing Lister v.
Dep't of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir.
2005)); Lister, 408 F.3d at 1312 ("Section
1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and
not just to prisoners."); and
the screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal
court to dismiss an action sua sponte if, among other things,
the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to
comply with the proper pleading standards, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin
v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, No. 17-3129,
2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017) ("Federal
law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint
for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss any
claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss
any defendant who is immune from suit."); and
pro se complaints must be construed liberally, and all
reasonable latitude must be afforded the pro se litigant,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), but pro
se litigants "must still plead the essential elements of
[their] claim and [are] not excused from conforming to the
standard rules of civil procedure, " McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("[W]e have
never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil
litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those who proceed without counsel."); Sykes v.
Blockbuster Video, 205 Fed.Appx. 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006)
(finding that pro se plaintiffs are expected to comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); and
Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual allegations to
support her claim that the Federal Constitution and various
statutes were violated, see generally Baldwin
Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3
(1984) ("Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately
detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they
do require that the pleadings 'give defendant fair notice
of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))); and
Plaintiff further does not plead the basis for any liability
for the majority of the named defendants; and
for those named defendants Plaintiff does attempt to plead
liability, namely Melissa Idler, Jenny Espinal, Starr Watson
Kirkland, Linda Enyon, and the Pennsauken Municipal Code
Enforcers, Plaintiff's vague, conclusory allegations fail
to satisfy the pleading standards required in civil actions
by Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), see
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
2009) ("[A] complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
'show' such an entitlement with its facts.");
the Court therefore finds Plaintiff's ...