United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Barbara A. Williams
I.B.E.W. Local 604 System Council No. 7, et al.
before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pro
se Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. (D.E. No. 23). For the
following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED. As set
forth in the Court's accompanying Order, Plaintiff may
file an amended pleading within sixty days to cure the
deficiencies identified below.
Defendants' previous motion for a more definite
statement, Defendants informed Plaintiff and the Court that
“[t]here is no such entity as I.B.E.W. Local 604 System
Council 7.” (D.E. No. 9-1 at 2). Defendants explained:
• The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(“IBEW”) is “a national labor organization
and the duly authorized bargaining representative under the
Railway Labor Act . . . for persons employed by New Jersey
Transit Rail Operations (‘NJTRO') as
• IBEW System Council No. 7 (the “System
Council”) “is a subordinate body of the IBEW with
responsibility for negotiating and administering collective
bargaining agreements with various railroads throughout the
country that employ IBEW members, including NJTRO, through
dealings with railroad labor relations officers.”
• IBEW Local No. 604 (the “Local”) “is
a subordinate body of the IBEW and an affiliate of the System
Council responsible for administering collective bargaining
agreements at the local level with local management
officials. The Local is comprised of members of the IBEW who
work at NJTRO.” (Id.).
Hon. Joseph A. Dickson, U.S.M.J., granted in part
Defendants' motion for a more definite statement and
directed Plaintiff to identify the specific defendants she is
suing. (D.E. No. 11). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, like her original Complaint, names I.B.E.W. Local
604 System Council 7 as the only organizational defendant.
The Court will therefore permit Plaintiff a final opportunity
to amend her pleading to identify which defendant she is
argue that Plaintiff's claims against the Individual
Defendants must be dismissed because Title VII does
not provide for individual liability. (D.E. No. 23 at 2). The
Court agrees. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
that individual employees cannot be held liable under Title
VII). The Court will dismiss these claims with
their moving brief, Defendants contend that Plaintiff filed
the relevant charge of discrimination with the EEOC on June
30, 2016. (D.E. No. 23 at 3). That charge indicates that the
earliest and latest dates of the discrimination were February
22, 2016. (Id.) (citing June 30, 2016 Charge of
Discrimination, attached as Ex. A). Defendants argue that,
under Title VII's administrative-exhaustion provisions,
Plaintiff cannot sue Defendants for conduct that occurred
before January 2, 2016. (Id.) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000-e-5(e)(1)). Defendants contend that all of
Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because they concern
conduct that occurred before January 2, 2016. (Id.).
Plaintiff did not submit an opposition brief, she did submit
several documents suggesting that she filed other potentially
relevant charges of discrimination with the EEOC. (D.E. Nos.
24 & 26). Accordingly, the Court will permit Plaintiff
the opportunity to amend her pleading to include all relevant
charges of discrimination filed ...