United States District Court, D. New Jersey
DANIELLE L. ANTONELLI, Plaintiff,
GLOUCESTER COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, MORGAN COX, JANICE FREER, JESSICA LANE, and WALTER NORRIS, Defendants.
DANIELLE L. ANTONELLI 410 BROAD ACRES DRIVE CLEMENTON, N.J.
08021 Appearing pro se
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Danielle Antonelli, appearing pro se, filed a
complaint on October 27, 2017 against the Gloucester County
Housing Authority, Morgan Cox, Janice Freer, Jessica Lane,
and Walter Norris; and
Plaintiff claims she was subject to discrimination on the
basis of her disability and asks for relief under the Fair
Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Rehabilitation Act; and
Plaintiff has filed an application to proceed without
prepayment of fees (“in forma pauperis” or
“IFP” application), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1), a court may allow a litigant to proceed
without prepayment of fees if he submits a proper IFP
although § 1915 refers to “prisoners, ”
federal courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP
applications, Hickson v. Mauro, No. 11-6304, 2011 WL
6001088, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (citing Lister v.
Dep't of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir.
2005)); Lister, 408 F.3d at 1312 (“Section
1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and
not just to prisoners.”); and
the screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal
court to dismiss an action sua sponte if, among other things,
the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to
comply with the proper pleading standards, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin
v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, No. 17-3129,
2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017) (“Federal
law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint
for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss any
claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss
any defendant who is immune from suit.”); and
pro se complaints must be construed liberally, and all
reasonable latitude must be afforded the pro se litigant,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), but pro
se litigants “must still plead the essential elements
of [their] claim and [are] not excused from conforming to the
standard rules of civil procedure, ” McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e
have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil
litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those who proceed without counsel.”); Sykes v.
Blockbuster Video, 205 F. App'x 961, 963 (3d Cir.
2006) (finding that pro se plaintiffs are expected to comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); and
Plaintiff does not provide any facts linking her claimed
injuries to her unidentified disability, nor does Plaintiff
provide sufficient factual allegations to support her claim
that the cited statutes were violated by Defendants; see
generally Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (“Although the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an
intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for
relief, they do require that the pleadings ‘give
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.'” (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))); and
the Court therefore finds Plaintiff's complaint is
IT IS on this 6th day of February, 2018
that Plaintiff's IFP application (Docket No. 1-2) is
hereby GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed to
file Plaintiff's complaint; and it is further
that Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE in its entirety; and it is further
that Plaintiff may move to reopen her case within twenty days
from the date of this Order, attaching to any such motion a
proposed amended complaint which addresses the deficiencies of ...