United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for
reconsideration. (ECF No. 50). Defendant seeks for the Court
to address Defendant's remaining arguments in their
Motion to Dismiss: (1) that Plaintiff failed to provide
pre-suit notice of their dispute; and (2) that Plaintiff
failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for
reconsideration is denied.
Angel and Angela Rivera filed this Second Amended Complaint
(SAC), individually and on behalf of a putative class of
people, alleging Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(SPS) violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (FDCPA). (SAC at
¶¶ 18-19). SPS is a Utah-based a mortgage servicer
that "specializes in handling delinquent and defaulted
mortgage loans." (Id. at ¶¶ 6-8).
Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that SPS is a "special
servicer" and "debt collector, " as defined by
15 U.S.C. § l692a(6). (Id. at ¶¶
2004, Plaintiffs obtained a $328, 000 mortgage loan from
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. for their property at 56
Cumberland Avenue, Verona, New Jersey. (Id. at
¶ 29-30). By early 2007, Plaintiffs encountered
financial difficulties and were unable to make timely
payments. (Id. at ¶ 33). On March 23, 2007, a
foreclosure action was filed against Plaintiffs in New Jersey
Superior Court. (Id. at ¶ 34). Three days
later, March 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy. (Id. at ¶ 35). However, as their
financial situation continued to worsen, Plaintiffs were
forced to convert their bankruptcy protection to a petition
under Chapter 7 in July 2009. (Id. at ¶ 39).
Thereafter, Plaintiffs obtained a full discharge of all their
debts from Countrywide. (ECF No. 34 at 51).
9, 2015, Plaintiffs received a "Welcome Letter"
from SPS, notifying them that their mortgage obligation would
be transferred to SPS for servicing and collection.
(Id. at ¶ 42; ECF No. 34 at 54). The letter
contains a "Notice of Assignment, Sale or Transfer of
Servicing Rights, " which states in pertinent part:
IF YOU HAVE FILED BANKRUPTCY OR HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED IN
BANKRUPTCY, PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT
REPRESENT AND IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A DEMAND FOR PAYMENT.
THIS NOTICE IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. YOU SHOULD
CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL REGARDING YOUR OBLIGATION, IF ANY, TO
PAY ON THE MORTGAGE LOAN.
(ECF No. 34 at 55).
24, 2015, SPS sent Plaintiffs a "Validation of Debt
Notice, " which indicated that Plaintiffs owe $578,
922.50. (ECF No. 34 at 57). The letter also states,
"Federal law gives you thirty (30) days after you
receive this letter to dispute the validity of the debt, or
any part of it. If you don't dispute it within that
period, we will assume that it is valid." (Id.)
Less than a week later, July 29, 2015, SPS sent Plaintiffs a
monthly mortgage statement indicating that an outstanding
payment of $195, 862.63 was due by August 1, 2015. (ECF. No
34 at 60). The statement also included a "Notice of
Error, " which instructed Plaintiffs on how to
correspond with SPS in the event that they believed there was
an error with their account. (Id. at 61).
individually and behalf of the putative class, bring this
cause of action under the FDCPA. Specifically, under Count
One, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant violated Section
l692g of the FDCPA by failing to provide disclosures to
Plaintiffs within five days of sending the July 9, 2015
letter. (Id. at ¶ 78-80). Additionally,
Plaintiffs claim Defendant committed various misleading and
deceptive representations in its "Validation Letter,
" contrary to Sections l692e through l692g.
(Id. at ¶ 80 (a)-(j)). Under Count Two,
Plaintiffs assert, individually, that SPS violated 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692(e), l692e(2) and l692e(lO) by attempting to
collect a discharged debt and that Plaintiffs were
subsequently deprived of their "fresh start" under
the Bankruptcy Code and were furnished with inaccurate
for reconsideration are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and L.
Civ. R. 7.l(i). The "extraordinary remedy" of
reconsideration is "to be granted sparingly."
A.K. Stamping Co., Inc., v. Instrument Specialties Co.,
Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d 627, 662 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting
NL Indus., Inc., v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935
F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996)). The Rule "does not
contemplate a Court looking to matters which were not
originally presented." Damiano v. Sony Music Entm
't, Inc., 975 F.Supp. 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1996)
(quoting Florham Park Chevron, Inc., v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 680 F.Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988)).
Third Circuit has held that the "purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotincki,779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985).
"Reconsideration motions, however, may not be used to
relitigate old matters, nor to raise arguments or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment." NL Indus., Inc., 935 F.Supp. at 516.
Such motions will only be granted where (1) an intervening
change in the law has occurred, (2) new evidence not
previously available has emerged, or (3) the need to correct
a clear error of law or prevent a manifest injustice arises.
See, North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co.,52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Because reconsideration of a judgment
after its entry is an extraordinary remedy, requests pursuant
to these rules are to be granted "sparingly, "
Maldonado v. Lucca,636 F.Supp. 621, 630 ...