United States District Court, D. New Jersey
GINNIE FRIED, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al., Defendants
Madeline Cox Arleo United States District Judge
MATTER comes before the Court by way of Defendants
JPMorgan Chase & Co. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s
(collectively, “Defendants” or
“Chase”) motion for partial summary judgment. ECF
No. 49. Plaintiff Ginnie Fried (“Plaintiff”), on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, opposes
the motion. ECF No. 53. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants' motion is DENIED in part and
GRANTED in part.
allegations that form the background of this case were
discussed in depth in both this Court's prior decision
and in the Third Circuit's opinion affirming that
decision. See Fried v. Jpmorgan Chase & Co.,
2016 WL 347314 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2016), leave to appeal
granted (May 26, 2016), aff'd and remanded sub
nom. Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590
(3d Cir. 2017). For purposes of this motion, it is undisputed
that Chase is engaged in U.S. consumer and commercial
business including home lending, that Chase is an
“active bank” holding Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) certificate number 628, and
that Chase is included on a list of “depository
institutions and affiliates . . . currently under [the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's
(“CFPB”)] jurisdiction and subject to CFPB
supervision and examination.” Def's. Statement of
Material Facts at ¶¶ 1-3; Pl's. Resp. at
April 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
violations of the Homeowner's Protection Act
(“HPA”) as well as supplemental state law claims.
ECF No. 1. Plaintiff brought her case as a putative class
action. Id. On June 17, 2015, Defendants moved to
dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to
state a claim under the HPA, that Plaintiff's HPA claim
was barred by the statute's two-year limitations period,
12 U.S.C. § 4907(b), that Plaintiff failed to state a
claim against JP Morgan Chase & Co. (“JPMC”),
and that Plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by
the HPA. ECF No. 10.
January 28, 2016, by order of this Court, ECF No. 23,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted in part and
denied in part. This Court denied Defendants' request to
dismiss Plaintiff's HPA claim but granted Defendants'
request to dismiss the state law claims. Id. This
Court did not expressly rule on Defendants' request to
dismiss Plaintiff's claim against JPMC. On February 25,
2016, Defendants moved to certify this Court's order for
interlocutory review. ECF No. 31. Plaintiff consented to
Defendants' motion. ECF No. 40, 43.
April 7, 2016, this Court granted Defendants' motion to
certify its Order for interlocutory review. ECF No. 42. By
Order of May 26, 2016, the Third Circuit granted
Defendants' Petition for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 44, and
the Third Circuit held argument on January 18, 2017.
March 9, 2017, the Third Circuit affirmed this Court's
Order with respect to the HPA claim and remanded for further
proceedings. Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850
F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2017).
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a motion for summary judgment will be
granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). All facts and
inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Peters v. Del. River Port
Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994). The party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of
production. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. This means
that the moving party must establish either that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party must
prevail as a matter of law, or demonstrate that the
non-moving party has not shown the requisite facts relating
to an essential element of an issue for which it bears the
burden. Id. at 322-23.
seek partial summary judgment on two issues: first,
Defendants argue JMPC should be dismissed from the case
because the Complaint does not allege any wrongdoing by JPMC
and, second, Defendants claim the HPA caps potential total
recovery in this action at $500, 000. The Court will
GRANT summary judgment on the first issue
and DENY summary judgment on the second
Dismissal of JPMC
argue, without opposition, that JPMC should be dismissed from
the case because the Complaint does not allege any wrongdoing
by JPMC. The Court agrees.
Third Circuit's decision establishes that JPMC should be
dismissed from this case. In its March 9, 2017 opinion in
this case, the Third Circuit explained:
The complaint names both Chase and its parent company,
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPMC”), as defendants.
While the District Court did not address the issue in its
opinion, parent companies are not merely by dint of
ownership, liable for the acts of their subsidiaries.
Pearson. v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484
(3d Cir. 2001). At oral argument, Fried's counsel
acknowledged that the complaint did not allege any wrongdoing
by JMPC itself and that ...