United States District Court, D. New Jersey
OPINION
ROBERT
B. KUGLER United States District Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Brendan O'Carroll is a state prisoner who is proceeding
pro se with a civil rights complaint. Currently
pending before this Court is defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the
following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted in
part.
II.
BACKGROUND
The
Court recites the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. Mr. O'Carroll is a convicted and sentenced
state prisoner presently confined in Southern State
Correctional Facility (“SSCF”), New Jersey. He
practices Odinism, also known as Asatru, a religion
worshipping the Norse pantheon. Prior to November 2016,
Odinist inmates in SSCF were permitted to wear metal
Thor's Hammer medallions as the symbol of their faith.
Mr.
O'Carroll sought to order a medallion from an approved
vendor following the New Jersey Department of
Corrections' (“NJDOC”) specifications:
“must be from source of sale, Maximum value of $25.00,
no larger than 2” x 2”, gold or silver in color,
and a maximum chain length of 24 inches and the chains value
can not exceed $5.00.” A fellow practitioner informed
plaintiff that there was a notice from SSCF's mailroom
stating metal Thor's Hammer medallions were no longer
allowed in the facility. Any medallion had to be constructed
out of wood. Plaintiff and two other practitioners approached
a sergeant and asked why metal hammer medallions were no
longer permitted. After making a phone call, the sergeant
informed the inmates that the policy had changed on March 18,
2016. A memo from SSCF Administrator C. Ray Hughes dated
December 12, 2016 confirming this policy was posted in the
inmates' living areas on December 16, 2016.
Plaintiff
alleges Christian and Muslim prisoners are permitted to wear
metal medallions with their religious symbols and are
provided other benefits within SSCF that Odinist inmates are
not, i.e., regular religious services and religious
texts. He filed suit alleging violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, Article 1 of the
New Jersey Constitution, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
(“RLUIPA”), and New Jersey's
“Fundamental Fairness Act”. This Court granted
Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application and
permitted the complaint to proceed after screening pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Defendants
have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Mr. O'Carroll did not file a response in
opposition to the motion.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
When
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and
view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. A motion to dismiss may be granted only if the
plaintiff has failed to set forth fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests that make such a
claim plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not
require “detailed factual allegations, ” it
requires “more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must
“tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead
to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
IV.
DISCUSSION
i.
First Amendment Claims
Mr.
O'Carroll alleges defendants violated his First Amendment
rights to practice his religion and to free speech.
“[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974). “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987). To make out a claim for denial of an individual's
free exercise rights ...