United States District Court, D. New Jersey
DENEEN M. SCULLY, Plaintiff,
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL, Defendant.
APPEARANCES Deneen M. Scully, Plaintiff Pro Se.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff Deneen M. Scully seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Camden County Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. This action is subject to sua sponte
screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice in part and dismiss it without
prejudice in part. The Complaint: (a) is dismissed with
prejudice as to claims made against defendant CCJ; (b) is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim as
to conditions of confinement regarding overcrowding
allegations, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); and(c) is
dismissed without prejudice as to Plaintiff's conditions
of confinement claim regarding jail conditions for provision
of basic hygiene products and clean clothes (“Jail
Hygiene Conditions Claim”). Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint within 60 days after the date of this
Opinion that identifies by name the party(ies) who are
allegedly liable under the Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim. Any
such amended complaint shall be subject to screening under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Upon Plaintiff's failure to file an
amended complaint naming the party(ies) whom she alleges are
liable under the Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim, such claim
shall be subject to dismissal without further notice for
failure to state a claim.
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Against CCJ: Dismissed With Prejudice
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case
under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a person
deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who
deprived him of that right acted under color of state or
territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons' includes local and
state officers acting under color of state law.”
Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21
(1991)). To say that a person was “acting
under color of state law” means that the defendant in a
§ 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49
(1988) (citation omitted). Generally, then, “a public
employee acts under color of state law while acting in his
official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities
pursuant to state law.” Id. at 50.
the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCJ for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The
CCJ, however, is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must
be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v.
McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v.
Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537,
538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983). Given that the
claims against the CCJ must be dismissed with prejudice, the
claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCJ as
Of Confinement Claims: Dismissed Without
Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state
a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support
a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court's review under
§ 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff's
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not