United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Ferdinand Vega, Plaintiff Pro Se
OPINION
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE JUDGE
1.
Plaintiff Ferdinand Vega seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Camden County Correctional Facility/ State. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis. The Court must sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4. To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
5.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983[1]
for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case
under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a person
deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who
deprived him of that right acted under color of state or
territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons' includes local and
state officers acting under color of state law.”
Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21
(1991)).[2] To say that a person was “acting
under color of state law” means that the defendant in a
§ 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49
(1988) (citation omitted). Generally, then, “a public
employee acts under color of state law while acting in his
official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities
pursuant to state law.” Id. at 50.
7.
Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that a person
deprived him of a federal right, the complaint does not meet
the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie
case under § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that he was
confined in the CCCF on September 30, 2007 as well as in
August 2016. Complaint § III. Plaintiff states he was
detained in an overcrowded cell and forced to sleep on the
floor. Id. He further states that he sustained boils
from the “bad mold” in the bathrooms in the
facility. Id. Even accepting these statements as
true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual
support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has
occurred.
8.
Plaintiff lists alleged injuries and states cursory and
conclusory allegations of “unsanitary conditions”
and “bad mold” that are insufficient, without
more, to state a claim for relief. In order to make out a
plausible claim for relief and survive this Court's
review under § 1915, Plaintiff must plead something more
than “labels and conclusions” and allege enough
facts to support a reasonable inference that defendants
deprived him of a constitutional right. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. For a pretrial detainee, this means Plaintiff
must plead facts showing that the conditions he encountered
shock the conscience and thus violated his due process
rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to
consider whether the totality of the conditions
“cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and
hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes
assigned to them.”). Some relevant factors are the
dates and length of the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was
a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, etc.
9. In
addition, though the Warden may be a proper defendant in a
§ 1983 action, the CCCF may not be sued under §
1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The
CCCF, however, is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must
be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v.
McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)). Because the
claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice, the
claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as
a defendant.
10.
Moreover, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for
conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of
confinement for September 30, 2007, those claims are barred
by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed with
prejudice, meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those
claims because they have been brought too late. Civil rights
claims under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's
limitations period for personal injury and must be brought
within two years of the claim's accrual. See
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d
Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v.
Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d
Cir. 2014).
11.
Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims
occurred during September 30, 2007 and August 2016. Complaint
§ III. The 2007 incarceration occurred more than two
years prior to the filing of Plaintiff's complaint, which
plaintiff filed on February 6, 2017. The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF, namely
the overcrowding, would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the
statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims arising
from his September 2007 incarceration expired well before
this complaint was filed in 2017. Plaintiff therefore cannot
recover for these claims.[3]
12. As
Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to address the
deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall grant
Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the
date of this order. However, in the event Plaintiff does
elect to file an amended complaint, he should focus only on
the facts of his confinement from August 2016. Because
Plaintiff's earlier claim is barred by the statute ...