United States District Court, D. New Jersey
CHESTER L. ROSE, JR., Plaintiff,
ATLANTIC CTY. JUSTICE FACILITY, et al. Defendants.
Chester L. Rose, Jr. Plaintiff Pro se
L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Chester L. Rose, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) seeks to bring
a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(ECF No. 1.) Based on his affidavit of indigence (ECF No.
1-1), the Court previously granted him leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and ordered the Clerk of the Court
to file the Complaint. (ECF No. 4.)
time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed
brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against Defendants Atlantic County Justice Facility and
CFG Medical Center. The following factual allegations are
taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of
this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the
veracity of Plaintiff's allegations.
April 11, 2016, Plaintiff alleges that he fell from the top
bunk in his cell and injured his ankle. (Compl. ¶ 4, ECF
No. 1.) A correctional officer took him to the medical
center, where Nurse Marie Affreni examined his leg and,
because there was no swelling or bruising, determined that it
was only a sprain. (Id.). The nurse provided
Plaintiff with Motrin and he returned to his cell.
(Id.) Plaintiff's foot swelled the next day, but
he assumed it was still just sprained and waited until the
following Monday to submit a “sick call slip.”
(Id.) He was seen by another nurse, who sent him for
x-rays, where it was determined that his ankle was broken.
(Id.) Plaintiff was sent to the medical unit of the
is seeking $160, 000 in damages for his pain and suffering.
(Compl. ¶ 5.)
Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26,
1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review
complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is
proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b),
or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs
district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because Plaintiff is
a prisoner who is proceeding as indigent.
to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'” 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua
sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the
claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv.
Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while
pro se pleadings are liberally construed,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient
facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted).