United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Maryann Cottrell Pro Se Plaintiff.
JACKSON LEWIS, P.C. By: Joseph C. DeBlasio, Esq. Benjamin L.
Rouder, Esq. Counsel for Defendants.
OPINION
NOEL
L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Pro
se Plaintiff Maryann Cottrell is self-proclaimed
advocate for the disabled. Plaintiff alleges that on a single
day in 2014, she attempted to park in a handicapped parking
spot at the Vineland SPCA but was prevented from doing so
because a delivery truck operated by Defendant United Parcel
Service (“UPS”) was blocking her access. Both the
Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint assert two claims;
one under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and one under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et
seq. (“NJLAD).[1]
Presently
before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to
state an ADA claim and amendment of the claim would be
futile. The Court will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining NJLAD claim. Accordingly,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to the
ADA claim, and denied as moot as to the NJLAD claim.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend will be denied as
to the ADA claim, and denied as moot as to the NJLAD claim.
I.
Both
the Complaint and the Proposed Amended Complaint allege the
following. On March 25, 2014 Plaintiff “encountered a
denial of access to Cumberland County SPCA.” (Compl.
¶ 23; Prop. Amend. Compl. ¶ 23) A “UPS truck
. . . was parked blocking access to the two remaining
designated handicap parking spaces in [the] parking
lot.” (Compl. ¶ 24; Prop. Amend. Compl. ¶ 24)
Plaintiff allegedly is disabled (Compl. ¶ 13-14; Prop.
Amend. Compl. ¶ 13-18), and “was at the Vineland
SPCA to get a cat spayed.” (Compl. ¶ 27; Prop.
Amend. Compl. ¶ 27)
II.
When
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and
view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it
contains “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Under
the liberal federal pleading rules, it is not necessary to
plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead all the
facts that serve as a basis for the claim. Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 562 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).
However, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do
require that the pleadings give defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (quotation and citation
omitted).
A
district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claim.'” Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974));
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684
(2009)(“Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' . . .
.”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009)(“Iqbal . . . provides the
final nail in the coffin for the ‘no set of facts'
standard that applied to federal complaints before
Twombly.”).
In the
context of a Motion to Amend, the Court applies the same
analysis in determining whether amendment would be futile.
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2000)(“In assessing ‘futility, ' the District
Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as
applies under Rule 12(b)(6).”).
III.
Both
motions raise the same issue: whether Defendant UPS can be
liable under the ADA based on the ...