United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE JUDGE
In this
action, Plaintiff Jean Emmanuel Rodriguez alleges, inter
alia, a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
racial discrimination after he was not hired for a job with
an IHOP restaurant located in Mays Landing, New Jersey.
[Docket Item 1-1 at 6-7.] Defendant AT Corp. d/b/a IHOP
(“IHOP”) removed the case from the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Atlantic County, where Plaintiff filed it
pro se, to this Court [Docket Item 1] and
subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss or for a
more definite statement. [Docket Item 5.] IHOP claims that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). Plaintiff has not filed opposition.[1] For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion
to dismiss.2 The Court finds as follows:
1. The
facts of this case are imprecisely alleged in Plaintiff's
original complaint. Plaintiff applied for employment as a
server/bus-person/dishwasher at an IHOP restaurant in Mays
Landing, New Jersey, on April 27, 2016. [Docket Item 1-1 at
4.] Plaintiff claims that he was denied “employment
based on race and not plaintiff's ability to perform the
task required.” Plaintiff states that Defendant's
“only concern was the plaintiff's ability to
communicate to employees that did not speak English”
and not his ability to perform the duties of the position.
[Id. at 9.] Plaintiff alleged that “ethnicity
was the primary factor to acquiring the job.”
[Id. at 10.] Plaintiff did not specify his race or
ethnicity, or detail further his ability (or not) to speak
English or any other language. He did not offer any further
details about the hiring process or why he believed the
hiring process had been discriminatory and biased. Plaintiff
sought damages for discrimination, his lost time, and
distress. [Id.]
2. When
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per
curiam). A pro se complaint in particular should be
construed liberally. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229,
234 (3d Cir. 2004); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d
365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003).
3. A
motion to dismiss may be granted only if the court concludes
that the plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient facts
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Fleisher
v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To determine if a complaint meets this
pleading standard, the Court must strip away conclusory
statements and “look for well-pled factual allegations,
assume their veracity, and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.”
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the
court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations, it may disregard any legal conclusions in the
complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
4.
After reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court agrees
with Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has failed to
state a cognizable cause of action for discrimination.
5. A
plaintiff alleging racial or ethnic discrimination may prove
his case through direct evidence of such discrimination
(e.g., oral or written statements by the defendant evincing a
discriminatory motivation). See Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1985). In the
absence of direct evidence, to establish a prima facie claim
for racial or ethnic discrimination in employment or hiring
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., a
plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected
class, (2) he was qualified for an employment position, (3)
the employer rejected him despite his qualifications, and (4)
he was afforded less favorable treatment than similarly
situated individuals outside his class. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If he makes
such a prima facie case, the defendant then has the burden of
identifying a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
failing to hire the plaintiff. Id. If the defendant
meets that burden, the plaintiff then has the burden of
proving that the defendant's stated reason was pretextual
and the actual reason was unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 804.
6.
Viewed in light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the
allegations are insufficient to establish a prima facie case
for racial or ethnic discrimination. Plaintiff does not
identify himself as a member of a protected class, nor does
he show that he was qualified for the position for which he
applied. Although his application for employment does list
previous positions, the most recent position appears not to
have been at a restaurant. [Docket Item 1-1 at 4.] While he
does list having been a bus-person for approximately four
months in 2014 and a cashier at a deli, id., those
experiences do not allow the Court to find a sufficient
factual basis for the second prong of the prima facie case
Plaintiff is required to plead under McDonnell
Douglas. While he does state that he was denied
employment by IHOP, he does not allege any facts regarding
whether he was treated differently than a person similarly
situated to himself but outside of his protected class.
Plaintiff makes only a conclusory allegation that he was
denied employment with IHOP because of his race, and suggests
that the employer was concerned not with his ability to do
the job but with his ability to communicate with other
employees. Because Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient
facts supporting a prima facie case of racial discrimination
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and because
he has not identified any direct evidence of racial or ethnic
discrimination in the hiring process, the Court must dismiss
his claim.
7.
Having found that the Complaint fails to state a claim under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law
claims.
8.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the unopposed motion to
dismiss by Defendant. The accompanying Order will be entered.
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Notes:
[1] Plaintiff's deadline to file
opposition expired on August 1, 2016. The Court sent a letter
to Plaintiff on February 15, 2017 advising him of the
opportunity to oppose Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
granting him an additional fourteen days within which to file
his opposition, if he chose to do so. [Docket Item 9.] The
Court also stated in this letter that, should the Court not
receive an opposition in writing from Plaintiff, it would
treat Defendant's motion as unopposed. [Id.] To
date, the Court has not received any opposition from
Plaintiff, nor any filings by Plaintiff after this case was
removed on July 11, 2016.2 ...