United States District Court, D. New Jersey
NICHOLAS E. PURPURA, Plaintiffs,
JP MORGAN CHASE, JAMES DIMON, DEAN COOPER, ERICK CLARK, CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, GLENN J. MOURIDY, CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, JANE DOE, AND JOHN DOE, ET AL. Defendants.
Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
present matter comes before the Court on
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and Federal
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Pro Se
Plaintiff Nicholas E. Purpura ("Plaintiff) opposes the
motion.This case concerns allegations that
Defendants do not own Plaintiffs mortgage since the mortgage
was executed with Washington Mutual Bank ("WaMu"),
which was subsequently acquired by Defendants. This motion
was decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. The Court has
considered the parties' submissions and grants
following facts are derived from Plaintiffs Complaint
("Compl."), as well as the exhibits attached to the
complaint and to Defendants' motion to
dismiss. On June 8, 2005, Plaintiff executed a Note
and Mortgage in conjunction with a loan from WaMu. Compl. at
5. According to Defendants, the Note and Mortgage was in the
amount of $633, 750.00 (the "Loan"). Def. Br., Ex.
D. On September 25, 2008, Chase acquired certain assets and
liability of WaMu, including Plaintiffs Loan. Compl. at 1.
Plaintiff claims that his "mortgage was a nullity"
when he obtained it from WaMu in June 2005. Id. at
23. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that "WAMU/Chase had
ceased to exist in April 2005" and that "[WaMu]
named as 'the Lender' on that mortgage was a
fictitious entity engaged in fraud with [Plaintiff]."
Id. at 5.
2009, Plaintiff alleges that he "was no longer able to
continue making payments on the [allegedly] fraudulent
loan." Id. at 21. As a result, Plaintiff claims
that he was "forced to agree to a 'modification'
of the former mortgage agreement." Id.
Defendants state that as a result of Plaintiffs default on or
about September 1, 2008, Chase brought a foreclosure action
in state court. Def. Br. at 3. As a resolution to that case,
Plaintiff and Chase executed a Loan Modification Agreement.
Compl. at 22; Def. Br. at 4 (stating that the Loan
Modification Agreement was executed on July 15, 2010).
Plaintiff also alleges that, when he was in default,
Chase/WAMU used "acts of harassment, oppression, and
abusive conduct... to extort and coerce [him]" and to
threaten "to illegally confiscate [his] home."
Compl. at 11.
the Loan Modification, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has
paid Chase monthly. Def. Br. at 7. Plaintiff also indicates
that "[he] has not defaulted." Compl. at 24.
However, Plaintiff alleges that his mortgage was "fraud
from its inception." Compl. at 7. Additionally,
according to Plaintiff, his mortgage was fraudulently
obtained by Chase when it bought WaMu. Id. at 5-6,
21. As a result, Plaintiff claims that there is no entity who
has a right to Plaintiffs mortgage payments. Id. at
concludes that "[he] has suffered grievous damage by
being forced to sign fraudulent documents under false
pretense[s] with WAMU Chase in 2005, and then again, with
Chase/WAMU in 2009." Id. at 3. Plaintiff
indicates that "Defendant's actions have resulted in
severe emotional and physical distress" which "have
caused Plaintiff to suffer a heart attack, shingles and other
severe consequences to health." Id. at 26.
Additionally, Plaintiff maintains that Chase/WAMU "must
grant clear ownership of the subject property to the
Plaintiff, and refund every payment, with interest, Plaintiff
has made since the fraudulent mortgages' inceptions,
beginning in June 2005, and continuing to the present."
Id. at 10.
filed his complaint on June 27, 2016. D.E. 1. Plaintiffs
complaint sets forth numerous laws that Defendants have
allegedly violated, including (1) "18 USC § 241:
Conspiracy Against Rights;" (2) "18 USC § 242:
Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law;" (3) "18
USC §§ 1961-1965 Civil [Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act]" ("RICO"); (4)
"28 USC § 1331 Federal question;" (5) "31
USC § 3729 False Claims Act" ("FCA"); (6)
"15 USC § 1629 et seq. [Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act]" ("FDCPA"); (7) the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA") and the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA"); and (8)
"white-collar crime." Compl. at 4-14. In lieu of
answering, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on August
23, 2016. D.E. 23. Plaintiff opposed this motion. D.E. 25.
first argue that Plaintiff does not have standing because he
has not suffered an "injury in fact." Def. Br. at
5-8. Next, Defendants contend that all claims related to the
origination of the Loan are jurisdictionally precluded since
Chase expressly did not assume liability from wrongdoing that
occurred prior to its purchase of WaMu. Id. at 8-10.
Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allegations do
not state a claim sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 10-13. Furthermore, Defendants
maintain that "Plaintiffs claims are untimely, are
inapplicable to the case-at-bar, or simply do not exist as
independent causes of action." Def. R.Br. At 1.
opposition continues to allege the central allegation of his
complaint - that Chase does not own his mortgage and that the
assignment from WaMu to Chase was fraudulent. PI. Opp'n.
Plaintiff states that he has standing based on the
"injury in fact" that "[he] has been making
payments to entities not entitled to those proceeds."
Pl. Opp'n at 6. Plaintiff maintains that his complaint is
"extensively supported by numerous facts, as discovered
and proven by Federal and State authorities and previous
Courts." Id. at 13.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
defendant to move to dismiss a count for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" To
withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint
is plausible on its face when there is enough factual content
"that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Although the plausibility standard "does not
impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading
to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." Connelly v. Lane Const.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a
plaintiff must "allege sufficient facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of
[his] claims." Id. at 789.
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court
must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny,515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d
Cir. 2008). A court, however, is "not compelled to
accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or
legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations."
Baraka v. McGreevey,481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir.
2007). If, after viewing the allegations in the complaint
most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the
allegations, a ...