United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Daniel
Crespo Plaintiff Pro Se
OPINION
JEROME
B. SIMANDLE Chief U.S. District Judge
1.
Plaintiff Daniel Crespo seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This
action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice as to
claims made against the CCCF because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983.
See Crawford v. McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL
6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (“[T]he prison
is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d
991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr.
Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).
4.
Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state
a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
5. The
present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support
a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court's review under
§ 1915. Even accepting the statements in §§
III - V of Plaintiff's Complaint as true for screening
purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the
Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
6. To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim[1], the Complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the
claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing,
Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014).
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are
liberally construed, “pro se litigants still
must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
7.
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint states in its entirety:
“Due to over crowding [sic] was forced to
sleep on floor. Sleep on the floor, sometimes next to toilet
where others [sic] men urinated and defacated
[sic], since then I suffer from severe back pain. I
had to continue to sleep on the floor even after I complained
about the situation.” Complaint § III. Plaintiff
alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred
“01/27/13[;] 6/5/13[;] 08/10/13[;] 7/22/15[;]
01/15/11[;] 04/11/13.” Id. The Complaint seeks
“twenty-five thousand dollars ($25, 000) in monetary
compensation” because Plaintiff allegedly has to
“deal with chronic back pain untill [sic] this
day.” Id. § V. Plaintiff claims that he
“now suffer[s] from back problems. My legs fall asleep
a lot [sic], next to smelly to[i]let.”
Id. § IV.
8.
Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because the
Complaint does not set forth enough factual support for the
Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred.
9. The
mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell
with more persons than its intended design does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding
double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment);
Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F.App'x 554, 560 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute
punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that
such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the
conscience and thus violates due process rights. See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)
(noting due process analysis requires courts to consider
whether the totality of the conditions “cause[s]
inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over
an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions
become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to
them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were
involved in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of
confinement, any other relevant facts regarding the
conditions of confinement, etc.
10.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to particularly
identify adverse conditions that were caused by specific
state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this
order.[2]
11.
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended complaint must
plead specific facts regarding the conditions of confinement.
In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff
must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference
that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to
survive this Court's review under §
1915.[3]
12.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is
filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is
specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright,
Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d
ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt
some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but
the identification of the particular allegations to be
adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid
confusion, the safer course is to file ...