United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Junior
Moore, Plaintiff Pro Se
OPINION
JEROME
B. SIMANDLE JUDGE
1.
Plaintiff Junior Moore seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Camden County Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. This action is subject to sua sponte
screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice as to
claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983.
See Crawford v. McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL
6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (“[T]he prison
is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d
991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr.
Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).
5.
Second, the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). Even
accepting the statements in Plaintiff's Complaint as true
for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual
support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has
occurred.
6. To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
7. With
respect to alleged facts giving rise to Plaintiff's
claims, the Complaint states in its entirety: “During
my time at Camden County Jail I was in a cell on the floor
with three other inmates which I was forced to sleep on the
cement floor for 5 days.” Complaint § III(C).
8.
Plaintiff states that the purported events giving rise to
these claims occurred “2002-2004[, ] 2003[, ]
2005[.]” Id. § III(B).
9.
Plaintiff claims “injury to my lower back due to having
to sleep on the concrete floor.” Id. §
IV.
10.
Plaintiff is “seeking 15, 000 in compensation for
injuries to my lower back while at Camden County Jail.”
Id. § V.
11.
These claims do not set forth factual support for the Court
to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred. The
mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell
with more persons than its intended design does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding
double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment);
Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F.App'x 554, 560 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute
punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that
such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the
conscience and thus violates due process rights. See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)
(noting due process analysis requires courts to consider
whether the totality of the conditions “cause[s]
inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over
an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions
become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to
them.”).
12.
Finally, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. “[P]laintiffs who file complaints subject
to dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment
would be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.”
Grayson v. MayviewState Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies leave to amend at
this time as Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the
statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal
injury.[1]See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603
F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a §
1983 action is determined by federal law, however.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007);
Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773
F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. ...