United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Lamar
Walker, Plaintiff Pro Se.
OPINION
JEROME
B. SIMANDLE Chief U.S. District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Lamar Walker seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant
to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Jail
(“CCJ”). Complaint, Docket Entry 1. Based on
Plaintiff's affidavit of indigency, the Court will grant
his application to proceed in forma pauperis.
At this
time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
alleges that between June 2005 and May 2006 as well as
between June 2008 and May 2009, he was detained in the CCJ in
an overcrowded cell and had to sleep on the floor. Complaint
§ III.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section
1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to
service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. This action is subject to sua sponte
screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim,
the complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages from CCJ for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Primarily, the
complaint must be dismissed as the CCJ is not a “state
actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See,
e.g., Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726
F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is
not a “person” under § 1983). Accordingly,
the claims against CCJ must be dismissed with prejudice.
Generally,
“plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal
under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002). This Court denies leave to amend at this time as
Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's two-year
limitations period for personal injury.[1] See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J.
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The
accrual date of a § 1983 action is determined by federal
law, however. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388
(2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of
Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
“Under
federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action
is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff states he was detained at
CCJ between June 2005 and May 2006 as well as between June
2008 and May 2009. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at CCJ would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the
statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims expired May
2011 at the latest. As there are no grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations, [2]the complaint will
be dismissed ...