United States District Court, D. New Jersey
SHERMAN, SILVERSTEIN, KOHL, ROSE & PODOLSKY, P.A. By:
Alan C. Milstein, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiffs
LORD LLP By: Aileen E. McTiernan, Esq. Counsel for Defendant
L. Hillman, U.S.D.J.
dispute arises out of a soured business relationship between
Plaintiffs George Worrell and Linda Souza, and Defendant
Prajakta Harshe. Presently before the Court is
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. For
the reasons stated herein, the motion will be
following allegations are relevant to the issues raised by
the instant motion. “Both plaintiffs have Yahoo! email
accounts which they use for both business and personal use
including communications with [legal] counsel.” (Amend.
Compl. ¶ 9) Allegedly, “[o]n April 27, 2015,
defendant accessed the Yahoo email accounts without
plaintiffs' authority or consent.” (Id.
¶ 10) Specifically, plaintiffs allege that, on that
date, “defendant contacted Yahoo and, posing as one or
both plaintiffs, represented that she had forgotten the
password to the [email] account[s]. She then entered the cell
number of one or both plaintiffs which was the security
recovery method utilized by Yahoo to restore a password and
log into an account.” (Id. ¶ 18)
then allegedly logged into the accounts “without the
authorization of plaintiffs [and] intercepted the account
information in real time which gave [defendant] access to
plaintiffs' email history as well as the ability to
generate emails from those accounts.” (Id.
¶ 19) Further, Plaintiff Worrell attaches to the Amended
Complaint an email between himself and his attorney which he
alleges Defendant forwarded from Worrell's email account
to Defendant's own email account. (Amend. Compl. ¶
20 and Ex. 1)
Amended Complaint asserts four claims: (1) violation of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511
et seq.; (2) violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.; (3) libel and slander; and (4)
violation of the New Jersey Identity Theft Statute, N.J.S.A.
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and
view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it
contains “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
the liberal federal pleading rules, it is not necessary to
plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead all the
facts that serve as a basis for the claim. Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 562 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).
However, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do
require that the pleadings give defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (quotation and citation
district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claim.'” Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974));
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684
(2009)(“Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' . . .
.”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009)(“Iqbal . . . provides the
final nail in the coffin for the ‘no set of facts'
standard that applied to federal complaints before
moves to dismiss arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to state
claims under the federal statutes, and that the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the