United States District Court, D. New Jersey
RALPH STRUMOLO and DONNA STRUMOLO, Plaintiffs, STEELCASE, INC., et al., Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER (Reconsideration)
a products liability action based on injuries received in an
accident involving an office chair. Now before the Court is a
motion (ECF no. 140) by defendant SUSPA, Inc., for
reconsideration of the portion of my Opinion and Order, filed
on August 26, 2016, that was adverse to SUSPA. (ECF nos. 137,
138). Plaintiffs have opposed SUSPA's motion and
cross-moved for reconsideration of a portion of my Opinion
and Order that was adverse to the plaintiffs. (ECF no. 142)
Steelcase has filed an opposition to the plaintiffs'
motion. (ECF no. 144) SUSPA has joined in Steelcase's
opposition, and filed its own opposition and reply brief.
(ECF no. 145) The matter is thus fully briefed and ripe for
decision. For the reasons stated herein, both motions for
reconsideration are DENIED.
These Motions and the Applicable Standard
with my prior rulings, reflected in the Opinion and Order
(ECF nos. 137, 138), is assumed. That prior Opinion had three
(a) It denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
of liability on their design defect and failure-to-warn
(b) It granted the motions of defendants SUSPA and Steelcase,
Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs'
design defect claim; and
(c) It denied the motions of SUSPA and Steelcase for summary
judgment on the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim.
upshot is that there are genuine, material issues of fact to
be tried as to the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim.
SUSPA, the wisdom of rulings (a) and (b) was immediately
apparent. It moves, however, for reconsideration of ruling
(c) and entry of judgment in SUSPA's favor on the
failure-to-warn claim. The plaintiffs, although thoroughly
persuaded by ruling (c), move for partial reconsideration of
ruling (a) and entry of judgment in plaintiffs' favor on
the failure-to-warn claim.
not review the standards governing summary judgment, which
are stated in my prior opinion. The standards governing a
motion for reconsideration are well settled. See
generally D.N.J. Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Reconsideration is
an "extraordinary remedy, " to be granted
"sparingly." NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Generally,
reconsideration is granted in three scenarios: (1) when there
has been an intervening change in the law; (2) when new
evidence has become available; or (3) when necessary to
correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest
injustice. See North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance
Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995); Carmichael
v. Everson, 2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21,
2004). Local Rule 7. l(i) requires such a motion to
specifically identify "the matter or controlling
decisions which the party believes the Judge or Magistrate
Judge has overlooked." Id.; see also Egloff v. New
Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F.Supp. 1275, 1279
(D.N.J. 1988). Evidence or arguments that were available at
the time of the original decision will not support a motion
for reconsideration. Damiano v. Sony Music Entm't,
Inc., 975 F.Supp. 623, 636 (D.N.J. 1997); see also
North River Ins. Co., 52 F.3d at 1218; Bapu Corp. v.
Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 2010 WL 5418972, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010) (citing P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt.
LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F.Supp.2d 349, 352 (D.N.J.
SUSPA's Reconsideration Motion
reconsideration motion is admirably focused. The Court, says
SUSPA, overlooked two things:
(a) a concession by plaintiffs' liability expert, Gary
Jackson, that he had no opinion as to a failure-to-warn ...