United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Paul R. Melletz, Esq., Ross Begelman, Esq., Begelman Orlow & Melletz, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff Perman Pitman.
Matthew J. Behr, Esq., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant Matthew Woshnak.
Elyse Glazer Crawford, Esquire, Parker McCay, PA, Mt. Laurel, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant Harry Collins.
NOEL L. HILLMAN, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is the motion [Doc. No. 54] of Defendant Matthew Woshnak seeking dismissal of the claims in the amended complaint that are asserted against him. The Court previously granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Camden County Prosecutor's Office, Woshnak and Joshua Ottenberg and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint, and Defendant Woshnak now seeks dismissal of the claims set forth therein.
The Court has considered the parties' submissions and decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons that follow, Defendant Woshnak's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
In his amended complaint [Doc. No. 49], Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights as well as state law claims for malicious prosecution and alleged violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
As the Court has previously explained, "[i]n this case, Plaintiff, Perman Pitman, contends that he was wrongfully arrested and imprisoned for a murder he did not commit. After spending two years in jail because he was unable to make bail, Plaintiff pled guilty to a downgraded charge of manslaughter. [Approximately] [t]wo years later, the Camden County Prosecutor's Office ("CCPO") disclosed exculpatory evidence, at which time Plaintiff's Judgment of Conviction and guilty plea were vacated and Plaintiff was released from jail. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed the present civil action... based on his wrongful arrest and subsequent prosecution." (Op. [Doc. No. 40] 2, Dec. 30, 2011.) As noted above, by Opinion and Order dated December 30, 2011, several defendants were dismissed from this suit, and Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint.
The essence of Plaintiff's civil rights claims arises from his arrest, conviction, and imprisonment for the September 2005 shooting death of Robert A. Mays ("Mays"). Late in the evening of September 26, 2005, Mays was shot and killed in Camden, New Jersey. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) As set forth in the amended complaint, Mays was shot three times with a.45 caliber weapon in the back and the arm. (Id.) The City of Camden Police Department and the CCPO assigned detectives to investigate the shooting death of Mays. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12-13, 21-22, 29.) According to Plaintiff, the CCPO and the individual Defendants "had no physical or testimonial evidence against [Plaintiff] other than a witness" by the name of Efrain Ayala Acevedo ("Acevedo"), and they relied solely on Acevedo's statement to "arrest, imprison and prosecute Mr. Pitman." (Id. ¶¶ 2, 43.)
On or about February 8, 2006, approximately four months after Mays was killed, Defendant Palmira White, the Court Administrator for the City of Camden Municipal Court, issued a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest for the alleged felony murder of Mays. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 15, 32.) The arrest warrant was issued by Defendant White based upon a sworn statement of probable cause submitted to her by Defendant Woshnak, an investigator with the CCPO, and Defendant Isidoro Reyes, a detective with the City of Camden Police Department. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 12, 13.) Pursuant to the arrest warrant, Plaintiff was arrested on February 9, 2006 and charged with murder in the shooting death of Mays. (Id. ¶ 32.) On February 9, 2006, after he was arrested, Plaintiff provided a statement to Defendants Woshnak and Reyes in which he admitted that "he was present at the scene of the shootings" but denied that he was the shooter. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff told the investigators he observed a lone gunman of Puerto Rican origin - who Plaintiff believed killed Mays - and who shot at Plaintiff as Plaintiff ran away from the scene. (Id.)
At the time he was arraigned, Plaintiff's bail was allegedly set so high that he was unable to post bail and remained in prison "during the entire pre-trial process" for nearly two years. (Am. Compl. ¶ 44.) During this time, Plaintiff continued to profess his innocence, demanded discovery, requested investigation of the crime scene, and filed motions to dismiss the indictment against him and reduce his bail, but was unsuccessful in his attempts. (Id. ¶¶ 45-47.) In October of 2007, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Collins presented Plaintiff with a plea offer whereby Plaintiff would plead guilty to a significantly downgraded charge of manslaughter with a four year prison term, approximately half of which Plaintiff had already served. (Id. ¶ 50.)
Facing an indictment that charged him with murder, felony murder, armed robbery, conspiracy, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a handgun, Plaintiff represents that he "reluctantly agreed to the plea agreement" which dismissed all of those charges in lieu of the amended single charge for manslaughter because he was feeling "[d]epressed, broken, ... cornered and abused by the system" and he had "no trial date and [there was] no end in sight[.]" (Id. ¶¶ 50-51.)
As the Court previously noted, "[i]t now appears, by its own admission, that the State should never have allowed Plaintiff to plead guilty." (Op. [Doc. No. 40] 5, Dec. 30, 2011.) Plaintiff asserts in the amended complaint that on February 23, 2010, the CCPO sought Plaintiff's immediate release from prison and an Order vacating his conviction. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) This apparently occurred because, on February 18, 2010, during the course of responding to Plaintiff's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Teresa M. Garvey, an Assistant Prosecutor in the CCPO, "searched the trial file" and discovered a March 7, 2007 memorandum and an attached "sticky note", both written by Defendant Collins and addressed to Defendant Woshnak. (Id. ¶ 41.) The handwritten sticky note, attached as Exhibit G to Plaintiff's amended complaint, indicated that another investigator with the CCPO had been advised by a jailhouse informant that Acevedo was paid to implicate Plaintiff in the crime. Garvey brought the sticky note to the attention of her superiors and "it was determined that the note and the information contained therein represented exculpatory evidence that should have been provided to" Plaintiff pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (Id.) The state court entered "an Order of Nolle Pros, dated February 23, 2010, confirming that the [CCPO] [would] no longer prosecute [Plaintiff] on behalf of the State of New Jersey for the indictment... and that all proceeding[s] upon the indictment aforesaid be altogether and forever stayed in court against [Plaintiff].'" (Id. ¶ 52.)
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts a number of claims against various Defendants. At this time, the Court focuses only on the claims against the moving Defendant, Matthew Woshnak. Defendant Woshnak is named as a defendant in Count I for purported Fourteenth Amendment Due Process deprivations; Count II alleging a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count IV asserting a state law claim for malicious prosecution; and Count V asserting a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1 to -2. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 65, 69, 78, 81.) With respect to Count I, Plaintiff asserts violations of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment through a series of sub-claims. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-67.) Plaintiff's sub-claims against Defendant Woshnak are purportedly based on the fabrication of false inculpatory evidence, and (2) acts of coercion which resulted in Plaintiff making a false plea. (Id. ¶¶ 59-61, 65-67.)
In the present motion, Defendant Woshnak seeks the dismissal of the claims against him pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
A. Standard for Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
Defendant Woshnak argues that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are barred by the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Eleventh Amendment immunity is a challenge to this Court's subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is determined pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). The ...