Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Riccio v. Alliance One Receivables Management, Inc.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

October 9, 2014

MAUREEN RICCIO on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,


PETER G. SHERIDAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for to dismiss by Alliance One Receivables Management, Inc. ("Alliance One") pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). [ECF No. 12.]

The Complaint seeks to certify a class of all New Jersey residents who have been subject to violations of the Fair Debt Collection Act by Defendant Alliance One.[1] The named Plaintiff, Maureen Riccio, bases her complaint on receiving one communication from Alliance One and one response received from Alliance One by her lawyer in response to a "cease and desist all collection efforts" letter sent by him to Alliance One. The communication to Ms. Riccio is half a page (the second half is a payment coupon which is not depicted here). Under Alliance One's letter head, Plaintiffs name and account number, the following language appears:

In response to Plaintiffs attorney's letter to Alliance One, Alliance One forwarded a statement of account, and several other paragraphs which are not depicted below. The statement of account reads:

Principal $3, 611.16 Interest $.00 Attorney's Fees $.00 Costs $.00 Credits $.00 Balance Due $3, 611.16

Plaintiff argues that the communication from Alliance One to Ms. Riccio is misleading because it "requires the least sophisticated debtor to question whether, or not, interest will accrue on the debt, thereby "threatening to add interest or other charges when there was no legal basis.... to do so." The Plaintiff reaches this conclusion by comparing the language in the communications "[y]our account balance may be periodically increased due to the addition of accrued interest or other changes if so provided in your agreement with your original creditor" - with the later statement received by her attorney which states no interest is due. Additionally, plaintiff claims that the least sophisticated debtor would be confused by the payment figures listed in the communication from Alliance One-the "balance due" of $3611.16. and the "settlement amount" of $2527.81. Plaintiff also claims that the procedures for payment of the settlement amount are unclear on the face of the letter, and that the least sophisticated debtor would question whether, when, and how to make a payment that would be considered satisfactory to eliminate the debt owed.

Alliance One has moved for dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the letter speaks for itself and has but one interpretation. Therefore, Alliance One argues, because there can be only one interpretation of the letter, there can be no possible deception or confusion, with the result that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.


I. Standard of Review

A party may make a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) "[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The standard for a decision pursuant to Rule 12(c) is nearly identical to that for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Turbe v. Gov't of V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). The Court is required to accept as true all allegations in the Complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79: see also Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A complaint should be dismissed only if the well-pleaded alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim. See In re Warfarin Sodium, 214 F.3d 395. 397-98 (3d Cir. 2000).

The question is whether the claimant can prove any set of facts consistent with his or her allegations that will entitle him or her to relief, not whether that person will ultimately prevail. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Forbes v. Semerenko, 531 U.S. 1149, 121 S.Ct. 1091 (2001). The pleader is required to set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist." Kost v. Kozakewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting 5A Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 1357 at 340). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.... Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twomnbly, 550 U.S. at 555. 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

II. The Collection Letter As An Offer Of Settlement

The collection letter which forms the basis for this purported class action suit contains settlement language. The Third Circuit has found that such settlement letters in collection matters are not, of themselves, inherently improper. Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 550 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2008). "Forbidding them would force honest debt collectors seeking peaceful resolution of the debt to file suit in order to advance efforts to resolve the debt-something that is clearly at odds with the language and purpose of the [FDCPA]." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, such letters are nevertheless "within the ambit of § 1692e, which prohibits the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." Campuzano, 550 F3.d at 300 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e). In analyzing the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.