United States District Court, D. New Jersey
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, District Judge.
On March 4, 2014, the court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed this case. Notably, the court found that the Morristown Defendants had qualified immunity from the constitutionally-based claims. On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(i) challenging the finding of qualified immunity and dismissal of the constitutionally-based claims. On April 9, 2014, the Morristown Defendants filed a motion for sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Local Civil Rule 11.3, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59, and N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f). On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies all motions.
I. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Motions for reconsideration filed in the District of New Jersey are governed by Local Rule 7.1(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Byrne v. Calastro, No. 05-68, 2006 WL 250672, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006). "The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Under Local Rule 7.1(i), a motion for reconsideration may be granted if: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See North River Insurance Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). Local Rule 7.1(i) does not permit a court to rethink its previous decision; instead, the rule permits reconsideration only when "dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law" were presented to the court but were overlooked. See Resorts Int'l v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F.Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992).
Plaintiff makes three arguments on this motion for reconsideration: (1) "The Court Overlooked the Evidence that Defendants' Unlawful Seizure of the Plaintiff was in Bad Faith and therefore the Defendants are not Entitled to Qualified Immunity;" (2) "The Court Overlooked the Fact that Plaintiff was Seized by the Defendants in Violation of the Fourth Amendment;" (3) "Further Evidence of Bad Faith is the Fact that there was no Good Faith Probable Cause to Seize the Plaintiff for a Psychological Evaluation."
Plaintiff cites no fact or law that the court erroneously overlooked when it determined that qualified immunity barred the constitutionally-based claims. Plaintiff's arguments all hinge upon the faulty argument that evidence of bad faith warrants survival of the constitutional claims. Bad faith is not the relevant inquiry when making a determination about qualified immunity. The relevant inquiry is whether the "officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009). The court listed 10 reasons for finding that the Defendants reasonably believed that it was proper to conduct a mental health evaluation and to take Cole into custody for a mental health screening at a mental health facility.
Many of the 10 reasons for determining that Cole was in need of a mental health screening were reports from family members about Cole's recent behaviors and mental health history. Cole denied that any of her family's reports were true. Plaintiff argues that this court made improper credibility determinations about the truth or falsity of those reports. Making a credibility determination at the summary judgment phase would be a clear error of law; however, the court did not make any credibility determinations. Rather, the court found that the Police behaved reasonably when they erred on the side of caution by crediting at least some of Cole's relatives' reports and seeking the assistance of mental health professionals.
For these reasons, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
II. MOTION TO VACATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order of summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justified relief.
The remedy provided under Rule 60(b) is "extraordinary, and [only] special circumstances may justify granting relief under it." Moolenaar v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir. 1987). In fact, relief under Rule 60(b) is available only under such circumstances that the "overriding interest in the finality and repose of judgments may properly be overcome." Harris v. Martin, 834 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1987). Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal, and legal error, without more, does not warrant relief under this rule. Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any of the six reasons for vacating a judgment are present. Instead, Plaintiff argues that a recent Third Circuit decision, Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014) warrants vacating the order of summary judgment.
While an intervening change in case law is not an appropriate basis for vacating a judgment pursuant to Rule 60, it is a proper basis for reconsideration of a decision pursuant to Local Rule 7.1. North River Insurance Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, the court will ...