United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MICHAEL A. SHIPP, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by motion filed by Plaintiff, Akintoye Laoye, seeking to re-open this case (ECF No. 18), which was dismissed without prejudice in a Memorandum Order issued by this Court on March 12, 2013, (ECF No. 11.), and again by Memorandum Order dated January 30, 2014, after this Court's consideration and dismissal of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 17.) This motion is being considered on the papers pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it appearing that:
1. On February 17, 2012 and April 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Amended Complaint asserting only conclusory allegations that false statements and fraud by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers have caused Plaintiff pain and suffering, and damages are warranted. (ECF No. 1, Complaint; ECF No.2, Amended Complaint.)
2. On March 12, 2013, this Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiffs action without prejudice. (ECF No. 11.) In that Order, this Court had observed that Plaintiff asserted these same claims in an earlier action, Laoye v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., Civil No. 09-1990 (MLC). In a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on March 16, 2010, the Honorable Mary L. Cooper, U.S.D.J., granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss the action on the grounds that Plaintiffs claims asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") were time-barred, and no basis for equitable tolling existed. See Laoye v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., Civil No. 09-1990 (MLC), 2010 WL 1009891 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2010). Judge Cooper also ruled that Plaintiffs request for a "cease and desist" against the ICE was moot due to the fact that Plaintiffs petition for review of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals' final order of removal was denied by the Court of Appeals. See Laoye, Civil No. 09-1990 (MLC) (Mem. Op., ECFNo. 21).
3. Accordingly, on March 12, 2013, this Court dismissed the Complaint and Amended Complaint filed in this action because Plaintiff failed to assert enough facts to determine whether or not his claims were duplicative of his earlier action, or to show that his claims are facially plausible. The dismissal was without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Second Amended Complaint within 45 days from the date of entry of the Court's Order. (ECF No. 11.)
4. On June 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to re-open his case, together with a proposed Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 14.) The Second Amended Complaint generally alleged continuing torts by ICE officers, namely perjury, false statements, malicious prosecution and personal injury, since March 2011 through 2013, that allegedly "have no bearings [sic] on his case from 2010." (ECF No. 14-1, Second Amended Complaint at 1.) Plaintiff asserted his action under the FCTA.
5. In a Memorandum Order issued on January 30, 2014, this Court found that the Second Amended Complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to show that Plaintiffs general tort claims are facially plausible. The Court determined that the Second Amended Complaint was wholly conclusory and subject to dismissal under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Moreover, the Court noted that Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint also was subject to dismissal because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that he had satisfied the jurisdictional notice requirements of the FTCA before bringing this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint was dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint alleging facts to show that he had satisfied the jurisdictional notice requirements under the FTCA. ( See ECF No. 17.)
6. On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed this motion to re-open his case. (ECF No. 18.) He requested additional time to file a Third Amended Complaint, which he then filed on May 13, 2014. (ECF No. 21.) Accordingly, this Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to re-open this case for consideration of Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint.
7. Because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent in this matter, the Court must review the Third Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether the amended pleading should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
8. The Court finds that Plaintiffs latest amendment again fails to allege any facts to show that Plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional notice requirements under the FTCA before filing his lawsuit. The third amendment also makes broad and conclusory allegations as to his general tort claims of fraud, negligence, etc., without providing any specific facts in support of his general claims. Plaintiff has been afforded three opportunities to cure the deficiencies of his pleading as directed, and he has been unable to do so. Therefore, the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
9. The Court further notes that Plaintiff is attempting to add a new claim that alleges denial of medical care in February 2014. He attaches to his Third Amended Complaint, a January 20, 2014 letter from Michael A. Steinle, DMD advising that Plaintiff was scheduled for corrective jaw surgery on February 11, 2014 and that Plaintiff needed to have his electronic monitoring device removed before surgery. (ECF No. 21 at page 11.) Plaintiff also attaches his February 13, 2014 letter addressed to the Office of Inspector General complaining that the ICE agents never responded to Dr. Steinle's letter (ECF No. 21 at pages 12-15.) Plaintiffs letter then reiterates his general allegations previously made in his Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs new denial of medical care claim clearly is unrelated to Plaintiffs FTCA claims of continuing torts by ICE officers, namely perjury, false statements, malicious prosecution and personal injury, allegedly occurring from March 2011 through 2013.
10. Because Plaintiffs new claim is wholly unrelated to the present action, and the present action is dismissed with prejudice, the new claim shall be severed from this action and Plaintiff must file a new and separate complaint should he wish to pursue the severed claim. The Court does not address the merits of Plaintiffs new claim here.
THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING,
IT IS ON THIS 30 day of ...