United States District Court, D. New Jersey
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PETER G. SHERIDAN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant New York Terminal 1, Inc.'s (hereinafter, "Defendant" or "New York Terminal") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 8) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In this maritime action, Plaintiffs Gilberthe and Marie Jean-Baptiste (hereinafter "Jean-Baptiste" or "Plaintiffs") seek compensation for damages to a shipment of personal effects and an automobile carried by sea to St. Marc, Haiti on board an ocean vessel chartered by the Defendant. Defendant seeks a determination that its liability, if any, is limited to $500 per customary freight unit pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 521, § 4(5), 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), reprinted in note following 46 U.S.C. § 30701 ("COGSA"). The Court decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Plaintiff Gilberthe Jean-Baptiste and Marie Jean-Baptiste are a daughter and mother residing in Neptune, New Jersey. (Compl. at Count I, ¶ 1). New York Terminal 1, Inc. is a corporation located in Bayonne, New Jersey, which is engaged in the business of shipping or arranging for property to be shipped to Haiti. ( Id. at Count I, ¶ 2). In 2012, Plaintiffs engaged the Defendant to ship to Haiti (1) a 1988 Toyota Land Cruiser they had previously purchased for $9, 450.00 and (2) personal effects stored within the vehicle valued at approximately $30, 000.00. ( Id. at Count I, ¶¶ 5, 7, 11). According to the Plaintiffs, "Defendant represented that [it] shipped automobiles to Haiti in the regular course of [its] business and would be able to do this work successfully." ( Id. at Count I, ¶ 6). The Defendant further represented that "Plaintiffs' items would arrive safely in Haiti." ( Id. ). New York Terminal charged the Plaintiffs $1, 480.00 to ship the automobile with the personal effects inside and represented that the automobile would be shipped "on or about August 2012." ( Id. at Count I, ¶¶ 8-9). Based on this representation, Plaintiffs made accommodations for the vehicle to be picked up from the port in St. Marc, Haiti. ( Id. at Count IV, ¶ 3).
Despite its representation as to the shipping date, the Defendant failed to ship the automobile in August 2012. After initially evading questions from the Plaintiffs regarding the next shipment date, Defendant represented that the items would be shipped in September 2012. ( Id. at Count I, ¶ 13). At this point, the Plaintiffs allegedly "requested their money back [but] were met with assurances by the Defendant that the items would be shipped in a timely fashion." ( Id. at Count IV, ¶ 5). The items were finally shipped from Bayonne between October 22 and 26, 2012 on board the ocean vessel M/V ANNE and arrived in St. Marc, Haiti on October 31, 2012, approximately three months after the initial date promised by the Defendant. The automobile was "totally unpackaged" during transport and, according to the Defendant, the "ocean freight agreed upon by Plaintiffs and [New York Terminal] was based upon a lump sum rate for the one automobile and contents." (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s Br.") at 1). Defendant claims to have been the carrier and Charterer of the M/V ANNE. ( Id. ).
According to the Plaintiffs, when the items arrived in Haiti, "the automobile was completely totaled and all of the consumer goods [stored within the vehicle] had been destroyed." (Compl. at Count I, ¶ 14). Plaintiffs attempted to contact the Defendant for an explanation as to what happened to the shipment, however, Defendant failed to respond. ( Id. at Count I, ¶ 15). Furthermore, Plaintiffs incurred an additional $2, 700.00 in costs to remove the automobile and personal effects from Haitian customs. ( Id. at Count I, ¶ 16).
On January 14, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a civil action for damages against Defendant in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County alleging breach of contract, breach of bailment, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. According to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, "[a]s a direct and proximate result of the Defendant['s] actions, Plaintiffs... suffered damages, including but not limited to financial loss, loss of economic gain, loss of business opportunity and such other damages as will be determined at the time of trial." ( Id. at Count I, ¶ 20). Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek damages, attorney's fees and costs from the Defendant. The Complaint was formally served upon the Defendant by mail on February 25, 2013. (Def.'s Notice of Removal at ¶ 4).
On March 18, 2013, Defendant filed a timely Notice of Removal to remove this action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On June 18, 2013, Defendant filed the instant motion for a partial summary judgment limiting its potential liability to $500 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 30701 (note). In its motion, Defendant argues that its liability as a carrier is limited to "$500 per customary freight unit" because "the automobile was not shipped in packages and the unit of freight charged was one lump sum amount for the one automobile." (Def.'s Br. at 1). Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Defendant's motion should be denied because "there are substantial genuine disputes as to material fact with regard to the applicability of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act." (Pls.' Br. in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Pls.' Opp. Br.") at 2-3). Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that that are genuine issues as to (1) whether Defendant is a carrier within the meaning of the COGSA and (2) whether the damages to the Plaintiffs' property occurred during ocean transport. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the entry of partial summary judgment would be premature because no discovery has occurred.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the evidence establishes the moving party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1995). To do so, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ' designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. In other words, the non-moving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[U]nsupported allegations... and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment." Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorp., 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (requiring nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."). Moreover, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If a court determines, "after drawing all inferences in favor of [the non-moving party], and making all credibility determinations in his favor - that no reasonable jury could find for him, summary judgment is appropriate." Alveras v. Tacopina, 226 Fed.Appx. 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2007).
B. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 521, § 13, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), reprinted in note following 46 U.S.C. § 30701 ("COGSA"), applies to "all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade." Specifically, COGSA "governs bills of lading for the carriage of goods from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship." Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 29, 125 S.Ct. 385, 160 L.Ed.2d 283 (2004) (internal quotation omitted). Under § 4(5) of the Act, a carrier's liability for damages in connection with the transportation of goods is limited to $500 per package, "or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit... unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading." 46 U.S.C. § 30701(4)(5). "[I]n order to apply to a given shipment, the $500-per-package or [customary freight unit] liability limitation provisions of COGSA must be incorporated into the language of the bill of lading[.]" Granite State Ins. Co. v. M/V Caraibe, 825 F.Supp. 1113, 1119 (D.P.R. 1993). "Courts have developed two preconditions to invoking COGSA section 4(5)'s limitation on liability. First, the carrier must give the shipper adequate notice of the ...