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Mauriello v. Sears Roebuck and Co.

United States District Court, Third Circuit

January 8, 2014



WILLIAM J. MARTINI, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Albert J. Mauriello brings this action against his former employer, Sears Holding Co. (improperly plead as Sears Roebuck and Co.) ("Sears" or "Defendant"), alleging age discrimination and hostile work environment. This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). There was no oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.


Mauriello worked as a mechanic in Sears's auto centers for 34 years. (Compl. p. 1, ECF No. 1.) Mauriello alleges that, during the last few years of employment, he was continually harassed for being old, given fewer and less lucrative jobs, and singled out for disciplinary action, until he was eventually discharged in July 2011.

Plaintiff began his employment with Sears at its Livingston auto center, where he worked from May 20, 1977, until sometime in 1988. (Compl. p. 2.) He then transferred to Sears's Watchung auto center, which was closer to his home. (Compl. p. 2.) At this point, the alleged pattern of discrimination began. Mauriello moved to the Watchung auto center to do suspension work, but found that not much of that work was available. (Compl. p. 2.) Additionally, when suspension work did come in it was often given to other employees. (Compl. p. 2.) Furthermore, even though the Watchung center had a lot of brake and alignment work, the other employees would not share those jobs with Mauriello. (Compl. p. 2.) Mauriello alleges although another employee also did not have enough work, he was the only one that the district manager disciplined for it. (Compl. p. 2.) The district manager also began threatening to transfer Mauriello to the South Plainfield auto center. (Compl. p. 2.) Eventually, Mauriello and another older man were transferred to South Plainfield. (Compl. p. 2-3.)

The alleged discrimination continued in South Plainfield. (Compl. p. 3.) Mauriello continued to receive few lucrative jobs to perform. (Compl. p. 2.) Mauriello also alleges that he was frequently harassed by his managers and co-workers. (Compl. p. 3.) His co-workers called him "old man, " and, while he was out of work to have surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, someone broke into his toolbox and stole his tools. (Compl. p. 3.) At least once, he was forced to do extra work without pay. (Compl. p. 3.) Eventually the lease expired on the South Plainfield auto center, and Plaintiff found out that the shop would be closed. (Compl. p. 3.) Mauriello asked the district manager if he could transfer to the New Brunswick auto center, because he had heard from the manager of that center that there was an opening. In response, the district manager told Mauriello that "he didn't want him there" and that "he was like a cancer." (Compl. p.3.) Mauriello was then transferred to the Union auto center.

Mauriello's problems continued in Union. (Compl. p. 3.) Mauriello alleges that he was repeatedly threatened and harassed by an assistant manager. (Compl. p. 5-9.) He was also singled out to do "comebacks, " for which he did not get paid. (Compl. p. 6.) He eventually contacted Defendant's ethics hotline to request a transfer. (Compl. p. 8.) However, even though there were openings at both his old center in Livingston and in Woodbridge, his request was ignored. (Compl. p. 8.) When he went to Livingston to discuss a transfer with the new manager, he was told that they had hired someone else. (Compl. p. 8.) When he went to Woodbridge to talk to the manager about transferring there, the manager yelled at him. (Compl. p. 8-9.) The district manager eventually told Mauriello that he could not transfer to Woodbridge because business was slow. (Compl. p. 8-9.)

All of this culminated in a final incident, which is discussed in a New Jersey Appeal Tribunal decision that Mauriello attached to his Complaint:[1]

The day of the final incident, one of the other employees was working on three different automobiles simultaneously. When another automobile came in for repair, [Mauriello] hoped to work on it. The employee who had all of the other jobs claimed this one for himself as well. [Mauriello], in frustration, tossed a can of spray paint into a corner, and it hit the hood of the closest automobile in the shop. The hood was damaged. The claimant did not intend to hit the automobile hood. [Mauriello] was not discharged on that day. Several weeks later, on [July 14, 2011], the district manager terminated the employee because of violating rules and policy.

(Compl. Ex. A, at p. 1.)[2]

After Mauriello was fired, he called the Sears ethics hotline again and was told that nothing could be done. (Compl. p. 9.) Mauriello then filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleging employment discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"). (Anders Cert. Ex. B, ECF No. 11-2.) The EEOC denied his claim and provided him with a Right to Sue notice on December 18, 2012. (Anders Cert. Ex. C.) Mauriello filed the instant action on March 18, 2012.


Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). Moreover, where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint is "to be liberally construed, " and, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).

Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds' of his entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, such that it is "plausible on its face." See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. ...

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