SUSAN D. WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Titolola Hughes's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This Court, having considered the parties' submissions, decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Previous opinions and orders in this case have included extensive recitations of the factual history of this case. (See Dkt. Nos. 4, 45, 80.) Accordingly, this Court will provide a short background including only the facts relevant to the instant motion.
Shirley Rosenberg ("Plaintiff") is an involuntarily committed psychiatric patient at the Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital ("Greystone") in Morris Plains, New Jersey. (Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ("SOF") at ¶ 1.) On August 24, 2010, Plaintiff was attacked by another patient, P.K., who struck her face and neck with his fists. (Id. ¶ 2.) A physician who examined Plaintiff after the incident found that she sustained a "3 x 3 cm frontal hematoma and superficial abrasion to her nose" for which an ice pack was prescribed. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff did not sustain any fractures. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that she had headaches that day. (Pl.'s Response to Def's SOF at ¶ 6.)
On the day of the incident, Defendant was the staff member responsible for one-to-one supervision of P.K. (SOF ¶ 7.) According to Defendant, a doctor's note required her "to be in eye contact [of P.K.] at all times." (Id.; Def. Br. Ex. E. at 109:7-19.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant was required to be within five feet of P.K. at all times per Greystone's policy. (Pl.'s Response to Def's SOF at ¶ 7; Pl. Br. Ex. D. at 1.) Defendant testified that at the time P.K. entered into Plaintiff's room, P.K. was fifty feet away from her and outside of her eyesight. (Def. Br. Ex. D. at 102:12-103:13.) Defendant testified that she ran into the room after P.K. and screamed for help. (SOF ¶ 7.)
The Department of Human Services Risk Management investigated the incident and prepared a report which was reviewed by the Incident Review Committee. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9; Def. Br. Ex. A. at 9-10.) Additionally, Officer Michael Scangarella of the Human Services Police Department charged P.K. with simple assault of Plaintiff based on the incident. (SOF ¶¶ 10-11.)
On April 27, 2012, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Eric Whitehead, the charge nurse on duty, and against Defendant in her official capacity. (Dkt. No. 80.) The only remaining claim is Plaintiff's claim against Defendant in her personal capacity.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A fact is only "material" for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id . The dispute is not genuine if it merely involves "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations, speculations, unsupported assertions or denials of its pleadings. Shields v. Zuccarini , 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001). "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co. , 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255).
The nonmoving party "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions' to show the existence of a genuine issue." Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 325). Further, the nonmoving party is required to "point to concrete evidence in the record which supports each essential element of its case." Black Car Assistance Corp. v. New Jersey , 351 F.Supp.2d 284, 286 (D.N.J. 2004). If the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which... [it has] the burden of proof, " then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim